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Muddling Through Uncertain Waters: Why the UN’s Troubles Could Spell Trouble for the Internet

Konstantinos Komaitis / Jun 10, 2025

United Nations General Assembly hall. Patrick Gruban/Flickr. CC by 2.0

On May 13, 2025, the UN Secretary-General’s Envoy on Technology, Amandeep Singh, stated that the United States should not regard the United Nations as an act of charity, but rather as an institution from which it can derive meaningful benefits. His remarks come amid growing concern about the future of the 79-year-old organization and the broader prospects for multilateral cooperation.

The past decade has posed significant challenges for the United Nations and its 193 member states, prompting renewed questions about the organization's relevance and whether it remains fit for purpose. A series of setbacks—including difficulties in peacekeeping operations, deepening geopolitical divisions, eroding political trust, and persistent financial constraints—have contributed to a decline in effective multilateral coordination. This erosion comes at a time when the international community faces unprecedented challenges, including the climate crisis, a growing number of armed conflicts, and a rapidly evolving digital landscape in urgent need of oversight and accountability. In the realm of digital governance in particular, the absence of robust international coordination is already undermining collaborative efforts—efforts that are essential to maintaining an open, global, and interoperable Internet.

In an attempt to address this lack of coordination, last year and after a two-year consultative process, UN member states adopted the Pact for the Future —an initiative spearheaded by UN Secretary-General António Guterres. The Pact aims, among other objectives, to accelerate progress toward achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and to establish a Global Digital Compact (GDC) that ensures inclusive participation of developing countries in digital decision-making processes. More broadly, the Pact seeks to revitalize the UN and the multilateral system, enhancing their effectiveness, responsiveness, and preparedness for future global crises. It also underscores the critical role of science, technology, innovation, and digital cooperation in addressing today’s most pressing global challenges.

Whether the Pact for the Future and the Global Digital Compact (GDC) can effectively reform the UN remains an open and significant question. What is certain, however, is that the GDC has established an inflection point—one in which the future of digital governance is now inextricably linked to the complexities and uncertainties of the UN system.

Echoes of the past

In 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal, a move that prompted strong opposition from France and the United Kingdom, who had previously controlled the waterway. In response, the two powers entered into a secret military agreement with Israel—known as the Sèvres Protocol—with the objective of reasserting Western influence over the canal and potentially removing Nasser from power. On October 29, 1956, Israel launched an invasion of the Sinai Peninsula, followed shortly thereafter by British and French air strikes on Egyptian targets, carried out under the pretense of separating the conflicting parties.

At the time, both the United States and the Soviet Union opposed the invasion, albeit for different reasons. When the UN Security Council sought to adopt a resolution condemning the military action, the United Kingdom and France exercised their veto power to block it, resulting in a diplomatic deadlock. In response, the United States invoked General Assembly Resolution 377A(V), known as "Uniting for Peace," which permits the General Assembly to convene in a special session and take action when the Security Council is unable to fulfill its responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Although the crisis was eventually resolved, the incident laid bare the structural weaknesses of the UN and underscored the limitations of its decision-making framework.

Throughout its history, the UN has faced comparable challenges that have highlighted certain limitations within the organization. On previous occasions, however, the UN has demonstrated resilience and an ability to navigate through such difficulties. Today, the situation presents a particularly complex set of circumstances, as the current gridlock appears to be more pronounced and deeply rooted.

Geopolitical tensions and rivalries—particularly among the United States, China, and Russia—have significantly weakened aspects of the United Nations system, revealing its limitations in effectively addressing global crises such as those in Myanmar, Yemen, Ukraine, and Gaza. This dysfunction is partly attributable to the existing institutional framework, especially within the Security Council, which reflects a post-World War II distribution of power that no longer corresponds to the realities of the twenty-first century. Despite ongoing calls for reform, including proposals to expand permanent membership, progress has been limited. Concurrently, the rise of nationalism, unilateralism, and populism in many states has fostered a rejection of international cooperation, thereby undermining support for multilateral institutions such as the UN. As a result, the organization has faced delays and reductions in funding—often driven by political considerations—which have jeopardized the efficacy of its operations and missions.

In the meantime, the policies of the current US administration have contributed notably to this situation. Although the US government has not completely withdrawn its support for the UN, it has substantially reduced both its engagement and funding. Specifically, in January 2025, President Trump signed Executive Order 14155, directing the US to withdraw from the World Health Organization (WHO), citing concerns over the organization's handling of global health crises and alleged political bias. Additionally, the US has also withdrawn from the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and UNESCO. The administration has also proposed significant budget cuts to the State Department and various international organizations, resulting in marked reductions in funding for UN operations, such as peacekeeping missions, the 2030 sustainable development agenda, and humanitarian aid programs. These measures have diminished the US’s presence in multiple UN activities, prompting other countries, most notably China, to increase their contributions and expand influence within the UN system.

Double dipping

The United States’ withdrawal has presented a strategic opportunity for China, which has adeptly capitalized on the challenges facing the UN. While the UN is often criticized for its inefficacy, it remains a crucial platform for alliance-building, and China has leveraged this space and its associated processes to expand its soft power in areas where the US has scaled back its involvement. For instance, China has pledged $500 million to the WHO to offset the shortfall caused by US funding reductions. Moreover, China recognizes that the UN continues to serve as a vital forum where countries from the Global South advocate for their interests, collaborate on shared challenges, and advance their perspectives. Reflecting this understanding, China committed $12 billion in 2015 to support the UN’s 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.

It is important to recognize that China’s investment is not merely an act of generosity. For many years, the world’s second-largest economy has strategically occupied dual roles within the UN development framework: simultaneously presenting itself as a developing country while also acting as a major donor and global power. Specifically, within the Group of 77, China asserts its status as a developing nation, thereby gaining access to preferential treatment and development funding, while circumventing binding commitments on critical issues such as climate change and trade liberalization. This positioning also enables China to secure loans, aid, and technical assistance from international development institutions—including the UN Development Programme, the World Bank, and the Global Environment Facility—under terms typically reserved for less-advanced economies.

While China continues to present itself as a developing country, it simultaneously exercises the role of a global power. Over the past several years, China has financed development projects across Africa, Latin America, and Asia through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), fostering significant dependencies that often translate into political support within the UN system. One example includes Greece, which, in 2017, blocked a European Union statement at the UN Human Rights Council that criticized China’s human rights record. This move was widely perceived as a setback for the EU’s efforts to address human rights concerns in China and raised questions about Greece’s commitment to EU values amid substantial Chinese investment. Additionally, China has strategically sought to influence UN institutions by securing key leadership positions for Chinese nationals, including within the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). Moreover, Chinese aid is often conditioned on recipients’ alignment with its political priorities, such as adherence to the One China Policy.

This form of ‘double dipping’ complicates efforts to assess aid effectiveness and has raised concerns regarding equity, particularly in terms of how other developing countries may be disadvantaged when China accesses funds or concessions intended for less powerful or poorer states. Ultimately, however, this strategy enables China to consolidate its soft power and establish itself as the preeminent voice within the United Nations system.

Slip through the cracks

If there is one area in which China demonstrates particular acumen, it is foresight. Over the past decade, China has closely observed how the development agenda addresses the needs of the countries in the global majority and has strategically positioned itself to emerge as a global leader in technology and governance. To this end, China has leveraged the UN system as an instrument to advance its objectives in shaping the global digital governance framework in ways that align with its domestic priorities and political model. This multifaceted strategy encompasses a range of mechanisms, from diplomatic engagement to the setting of international standards. Central to this approach is China’s promotion of the concept of “cyber sovereignty”—the principle that states possess the sovereign right to manage, regulate, and control the Internet within their own borders.

With this objective in mind, China was the first country to introduce the term “cyber sovereignty” within the UN, particularly in forums such as the UN General Assembly and the UN Group of Governmental Experts. China has argued that this approach is essential to safeguarding national security and preserving cultural integrity. Through these efforts, China has influenced the language and norms embedded in UN resolutions, shifting the discourse away from terms like “human rights” and “freedom of expression” toward more state-centric concepts such as “responsible state behavior” and “national security.” By pursuing leadership positions within key UN specialized agencies responsible for establishing technical and normative standards, China has positioned itself as a significant disruptor and a compelling representative of the Global South.

Ultimately, however, it is the way China utilizes the UN to form alliances with other countries in support of its proposals that stands out. China views the UN as a platform for South-South cooperation to build relationships and foster a sense of shared interests. Notably, the relationships China cultivates with African countries, many of which often vote in line with its views on sovereignty—have helped elevate Chinese interests within the UN. China also encourages African countries to reach regional consensus within the UN’s intergovernmental setting, further consolidating its influence.

In this regard, China has been strategic in integrating its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with the UN by aligning it with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In September 2016, China and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), marking the first such agreement to promote the BRI through international cooperation. This was followed by a more detailed Action Plan in May 2017 during the first Belt and Road Forum in Beijing. The plan focused on aligning BRI projects with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) through policy coordination, information sharing, project collaboration, and capacity building—especially in areas like digital development and infrastructure.

Furthering this partnership, in March 2022, UNDP, China’s government, and the China Development Bank (CDB) signed a Statement of Intent to cooperate on the Belt and Road Innovation and Development Platform. The point of this initiative is to promote the synergy between the BRI and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, contributing to global sustainable development and the high-quality advancement of the BRI.

Put simply, China’s dominant role in shaping the development agenda within the UN is indisputable.

The urgent need for engagement

For most of the Internet’s history, there have been calls for the UN to stay away from Internet governance, and—for the longest time—such efforts were successful. Previous attempts to give the UN a more direct role in Internet governance failed, allowing the multistakeholder model to become the default framework. This is no longer the case, as the UN has now become a de facto space for meaningful discussions about the Internet’s future.

Specifically, in addition to serving as the steward of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF)—the only global multistakeholder forum that has endured for the past twenty years—the United Nations has also launched the implementation of the Global Digital Compact (GDC), a process led by the Office of the Tech Envoy, which some view as ambitious and overly assertive in its approach. Furthermore, the UN continues to advance the sustainable development agenda, which many countries—particularly those in the Global South—consider deeply interconnected with Internet and digital governance. And, most recently, the UN successfully concluded negotiations on the UN Convention on Cybercrime, though the process faced significant criticism.

To this end, disengaging from the UN is shortsighted and problematic, as it enables authoritarian regimes to influence and shape the global digital governance agenda. In a world where democratic nations fail to participate, the future of the Internet risks being defined by values that undermine openness, freedom, and human rights. This could mean a world where China and Russia continue to promote the concept of cyber sovereignty, advancing a state-centric model of Internet governance that threatens to fragment the global Internet; where Chinese companies such as Huawei and Hikvision export AI-powered surveillance technologies, spreading authoritarian practices and eroding global norms around privacy and digital freedom; and where China’s “New IP” proposal gains traction, embedding authoritarian values into the foundational architecture of emerging global technologies.

There is no question that, through the Belt and Road Initiative, China is expanding its investments in global digital infrastructure—including undersea cables and cloud data centers—and promoting alternative platforms such as WeChat and TikTok, thereby increasing its influence over the operation and regulation of digital services. Meanwhile, Russia’s efforts to advance a UN Convention on Cybercrime could establish a precedent for more restrictive models of Internet governance, shifting international consensus toward a more authoritarian framework.

Engagement is, therefore, not optional—democratic governments must recognize this reality. As authoritarian regimes increasingly leverage the UN system to challenge the open and interoperable nature of the Internet, it is essential for democracies to reinforce multistakeholder governance models and protect digital rights on a global scale. Swift and coordinated action is needed to uphold the principles of openness, freedom, and innovation that are fundamental to global connectivity.

Authors

Konstantinos Komaitis
Konstantinos Komaitis is a veteran of developing and analyzing Internet policy to ensure an open and global Internet. Konstantinos spent almost ten years in active policy development and strategy as a Senior Director at the Internet society. Before that, he spent 7 years as a senior lecturer at the ...

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