The Web Can Thrive Without Google’s Search Monopoly

Alissa Cooper is the Executive Director of the Knight-Georgetown Institute (KGI). The below analysis is based on her independent research and does not necessarily reflect the views of KGI. This post is part of a pair on this subject published in tandem—read the other one here.

Overcoming the Web’s Stockholm Syndrome

In August 2024, a United States district court judge found that Google had illegally monopolized the market for online search. The case has since moved to the remedies phase. Late last year, the Department of Justice proposed a comprehensive remedy plan that included a potential divestiture of Chrome. This proposal has sparked debate about the future of web browsers and the open internet. While some view the divestiture as a necessary step to restore competition, others worry it could imperil the web's continued evolution by removing Google's substantial investments in web technologies. This essay summarizes a recent analysis showing how such a divestiture could be structured to protect the public interest while fostering a more competitive digital ecosystem.

The concerns about Chrome's divestiture reflect a form of Stockholm syndrome in the tech industry – a fear of life without the monopolist's resources. This anxiety is understandable given Google's outsized role in web development, but a close look suggests these fears are overstated. Examining the economics of browser development and considering specific conditions for the divestiture reveals a path forward that could preserve the benefits of shared web infrastructure while reducing Google's dominance.

Maintaining a competitive browser doesn't require monopoly-level resources. Mozilla's Firefox serves as a compelling proof point. Despite operating on a fraction of Chrome's budget – less than $400 million annually compared to Chrome's estimated $1-2 billion – Mozilla has maintained a performant browser that often implements new web features ahead of its larger competitors. While Firefox has experienced declining market share, its technical capabilities demonstrate that viable browser and web platform development are possible without Google-scale investment.

Compared to these costs, the revenue picture is particularly illuminating. Google currently generates an estimated $17-35 billion in annual US search advertising revenue through Chrome, not counting international markets or indirect benefits to other Google properties. In contrast, Mozilla operates Firefox on roughly $500 million in annual revenue, with about 80% coming from its search revenue sharing agreement with Google.

These estimates are relevant when considering how a divested Chrome might sustain itself. Even with some decrease in market share and without monopoly search revenue, a standalone Chrome business could likely generate sufficient revenue from search deals with non-Google search providers and from other sources to maintain substantial investment in web technologies, albeit at lower levels than Google's current spending. Importantly, Google would also retain incentives to invest in web standards and technologies regardless of Chrome ownership, as its core businesses – search, display advertising, and YouTube – depend heavily on a robust web platform. This could change over time as a result of other remedies imposed in search and ad tech antitrust litigation or due to advances in AI that diminish the web’s importance, but both of those factors may present independent threats to the web regardless of who owns Chrome.

Public Interest Conditions on the Divestiture of Chrome

The remedies discussion has illuminated a critical reality: while the web may not need Google's search monopoly to thrive, it currently depends heavily on Chromium, the open-source project underlying Chrome and many other browsers. If the divestiture of Chrome is included in a final remedy package, it is important to consider what public interest conditions should be applied to the divested entity such that the web community can continue to benefit from and contribute to this important component of digital infrastructure. These conditions should include:

1. Open source Chromium. The acquirer should be required to maintain Chromium as an open source software project in perpetuity. This means that:
   • All code, software, applications, APIs, and other products and services required for an independent third party to build a Chromium-based browser would remain freely available at no cost under a permissive open source license with their source code and documentation available to the public.
   • Any developer would be allowed to download all Chromium code and build, develop, fork, deploy, or sell a browser based on or incorporating Chromium code, consistent with the permissive open source license.
   • The service-level terms of software updates (e.g., timeliness of updates and bug fixes) would be governed by the governance structure specified below.
2. Chromium governance. The acquirer should be required to steward the Chromium open source project according to an open, non-discriminatory governance structure (see Mozilla’s for an example) that must be reviewed and approved by the Technical Committee established by the court.
   • The acquirer should be allowed to contribute and occupy any role in the governance structure, and should have a decisional role in the event of disputes, but the governance structure should allow or require independent third parties to take on roles with responsibility for code or architecture review and approval.
   • The court should serve as the ultimate backstop in the event of governance disputes.
   • Google should be allowed to contribute and occupy any role in the governance structure as long as no decision about code or architecture review or approval rests solely with a Google contributor.
3. Independence of Chromium from Chrome. The acquirer should be required to maintain Chromium separately from Chrome (or the acquirer’s own successor browser product). The acquirer’s branded user interface, browser settings, and proprietary functionality and APIs adopted in its own browser should not be incorporated into the Chromium open source project.
4. Web standards support and contributions. The acquirer should be required to maintain support in Chromium for approved core industry standards promulgated by the W3C, WHATWG, IETF, and other related or successor organizations as identified by the Technical Committee. The Technical Committee should be resourced to articulate guidance and field complaints about which standards are considered “core.”
5. Commitment to royalty-free patent licensing. The acquirer must commit to offer a worldwide royalty-free non-exclusive license to all patents it may acquire through the development of Chromium, Chrome, and their successors (again, see Mozilla’s for an example).

In addition to the safeguards that this suite of conditions would provide for the open web, they would also serve as constraints on the types of buyers interested in acquiring Chrome. Many different concerns have been expressed about the motivations and business models of potential Chrome buyers. Ad tech companies using the browser to extract user data and invade privacy (as Google does), private equity firms stripping the acquired entity down to its essentials and disregarding the web platform entirely, and content companies turning the browser into the ultimate walled garden or echo chamber machine are all scenarios of concern.

Requiring the buyer to support open source Chromium with independent governance, standards investment, patent licensing, and separation from the branded Chrome browser would insulate the web ecosystem from many of the dangers these scenarios represent. First, the universe of buyers willing to take on these commitments is likely much smaller than it would be if the divestiture came with no conditions. Second, even if the buyer chooses to evolve Chrome in a direction that is more privacy-invasive or provides a more curated walled garden experience than users have come to expect from browsers, Chromium would still provide a robust open source base for competitors to develop their own browser offerings. With the markets for both search and browsers (hopefully) becoming more contestable, these competitors would have a greater chance at gaining traction than they do today competing against Google’s vertically integrated Chrome.

The proposed conditions offer a pragmatic framework for preserving the benefits of shared infrastructure while creating space for increased competition and innovation. Another way to achieve these goals would be to divest Chrome or Chromium into a nonprofit organization or foundation – ideas that have merit, but may face a tougher path to adoption by the court. As the court considers remedies in the Google case, all of these suggestions deserve serious consideration as paths toward a more vibrant and sustainable web ecosystem.

Conclusion

Whether or not the Chrome divestiture is included in the final remedy package, this should be a moment of public recognition that the web can thrive without Google controlling it. While Google has made substantial investments in web technologies through Chrome and Chromium, these investments have been inflated by monopoly profits and are not the minimum required to sustain browser development and web platform innovation. Mozilla's success in maintaining Firefox on a fraction of Google's budget demonstrates that viable browsers and meaningful contributions to web standards can be sustained with more modest revenue streams.

To the extent that Google will retain strong incentives to invest in web technologies based on the needs of its core businesses, those incentives will remain whether Google controls Chrome or not. The combination of these ongoing investments, contributions from a divested Chrome/Chromium entity operating under appropriate conditions, and increased competition in both search and browsers can create a more vibrant and sustainable web ecosystem – one that better serves users and developers without depending on monopoly control.