On September 24, 2025, the Karnataka High Court (High Court) dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the microblogging and social networking company ‘X’ (formerly Twitter). X had challenged the Union of India’s practice of issuing information blocking and takedown orders under Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act), and Rule 3(1)(d) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 (‘IT Rules’).

X had also contested the constitutionality of the “Sahyog Portal,” a centralized digital platform developed by the Union of India to issue online content takedown and blocking notices under the IT Act. X argued that the portal enables millions of police officers and government officials to issue takedown orders based solely on allegations of illegality without judicial review or due process.

The writ petition arose from a series of takedown requests, including the blocking of thousands of X’s handles, directed at X after the IT Rules came into force. While refusing to take any action on the takedown requests, X argued that Section 79 merely provides “safe harbour” immunity for intermediaries hosting third-party content. It does not authorise the government to order the blocking or removal of content. Only Section 69A of the IT Act, with its procedural safeguards under the 2009 Blocking Rules, permits the government to issue such orders. Rule 3(1)(d) of the IT Rules, X argued, unconstitutionally enlarges government powers by allowing a vast array of ministries, departments, and police officers to issue takedown orders under threat of loss of “safe harbour.” In addition, X described the government’s Sahyog Portal as a “censorship portal” through which thousands of officials could funnel arbitrary takedown demands.

The High Court held that Section 79(3)(b) and Rule 3(1)(d) together establish a valid due diligence framework for intermediaries, and that the Sahyog Portal, as a central government platform, is a legitimate administrative tool. The Court also held that a foreign corporation like X cannot invoke the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 of the Indian Constitution.

In this contribution, I argue that by declining X’s challenge to the practice of content takedown and the operation of the Sahyog Portal, the High Court has effectively sanctioned a system of indirect state censorship that chills online expression by coercing intermediaries into over-removal of content under threat of losing statutory immunity.

The court collapses immunity into censorship

The High Court, in its reasoning, referred to Shreya Singhal v. Union of India and distinguished that Shreya Singhal’s reasoning on the ground that the 2011 Intermediary Rules considered in Shreya Singhal had been replaced by the IT Rules, which, in its view, were “materially different”. However, the Court’s approach unsettles the carefully calibrated balance between State power and the constitutionally permissible restrictions on free expression under Article 19 of the Constitution, restrictions that extend only to specific grounds such as the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, public order, decency or morality, contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to an offence.

The rationale of the High Court’s decision will enable takedown orders through its expansive interpretation of Section 79(3)(b) and Rule 3(1)(d), effectively authorizing a “due diligence” regime backed by the threat of losing statutory immunity. By tethering an intermediary’s continued legal protection to instantaneous compliance with executive takedown requests, the High Court blurs the distinction between due diligence and compelled censorship, effectively transforming intermediaries from neutral facilitators of online expression into instruments of state control. This turns conditional immunity from liability into an engine for prior restraint, a leap the Supreme Court explicitly rejected in Shreya Singhal ten years ago, to prevent this very outcome.

This High Court’s reading amounts to “self-censorship by proxy” where vague executive directions, tied to loss of ‘safe harbour,’ strip intermediaries of choice and compel private suppression of speech beyond the narrow grounds of Article 19(2) of the Constitution, which requires that restrictions on speech must be both substantively and procedurally reasonable. The State’s threat of safe-harbour forfeiture operates as an informal but potent lever of control, circumventing the checks that direct censorship would face, and leading to “jawboning.”

The Court’s narrow, citizen-centric reading of Article 19 further undermines the protection of free expression. Although it is correct that the fundamental freedoms in Article 19 are conferred on citizens, the High Court ratio gives that principle an unduly restrictive application. The Court’s narrow, citizen-centric reading of Article 19 further undermines the protection of free expression. Although it is doctrinally correct that the fundamental freedoms in Article 19 are conferred on citizens, the High Court’s reasoning applies this principle too rigidly and misses the core constitutional harm.

The real impact of government-directed takedowns is not on X’s right to speech, but on the rights of Indian users whose expression is curtailed when their posts, accounts, or content are removed. These users are citizens entitled to protection under Article 19(1)(a), and any state action, whether direct or mediated through private platforms, that restricts their speech must satisfy the strict requirements of Article 19(2).

By focusing solely on the nationality of the intermediary, the Court overlooks that intermediaries function as the primary channels through which citizens exercise and disseminate their speech. When the State compels these intermediaries to suppress content through administrative directives or regulatory pressure, it effectively achieves indirect censorship without the constitutional scrutiny that would attach to direct state action. The question, therefore, is not whether a foreign corporation can claim free speech, but whether the State can bypass constitutional limits by outsourcing censorship to private actors.

The chilling effect and the erosion of proportionality

The High Court’s approach to the “chilling effect” is equally problematic. Freedom of speech is abridged not merely by overt penalties, but by official actions (whether administrative or indirect) that predictably induce intermediaries to suppress lawful content. Judicial review must account for the “anticipation of harm”, the risk that vague or broad laws cause speakers and platforms to remain silent or overcomply for fear of punitive consequences. By tethering the continued enjoyment of safe-harbour protection to instantaneous compliance with indeterminate “lawful” takedown orders issued by a diffuse array of police and departmental officers, the High Court's rationale creates a coercive environment in which intermediaries will inevitably err on the side of removal.

The operative standard for removal, i.e., “any material prohibited under any law for the time being in force”, is excessively vague and overbroad. This collapses the specific grounds provided in Article 19(2) into an open-ended license, allowing for the introduction of grounds such as “public interest” or “national interest” through subordinate legislation. In a catena of decisions, the Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed that the permissible restrictions under Article 19(2) are exhaustive and cannot be expanded by regulatory or executive fiat. Yet the High Court, relying on a sweeping historical narrative of state regulation of communications, treats the mere prevalence of regulation as proof of its constitutional legitimacy.

The proportionality requirement, central to Indian constitutional jurisprudence, is largely ignored. The freedom of expression can only be limited by restrictions that are “necessary, suitable, and proportionate” to a legitimate State interest. The Court’s acceptance of regulatory convenience, demographic scale, or historical precedent cannot substitute for a rigorous proportionality analysis.

The High Court’s consideration of the Sahyog Portal, as a neutral facilitation mechanism, is deeply contestable. Aggregating the takedown process within a centralized, opaque system compounds the risk of arbitrary suppression, especially in the absence of oversight, notice to affected users, or public reporting of takedown actions. When the executive is both complainant and adjudicator, self-censorship is not merely speculative but all but inevitable. This arrangement blurs the line between intermediary due diligence and direct state censorship, facilitating mass prior restraint under administrative cover.

Rethinking intermediary liability in a post-decision landscape

The expansion of intermediary liability in India demands more than the technical adjustment of safe-harbour rules. It calls for a constitutional re-orientation toward listener-centred protection. Ambiguous “due diligence” duties, tied to the threat of losing immunity, create an information asymmetry, yet the Sahyog framework weaponizes that asymmetry to suppress speech rather than inform the public.

Any post-High Court framework must therefore begin with the audience’s right to receive information, require precise statutory limits and transparent notice-and-counter-notice procedures, and incorporate independent oversight and public reporting of takedowns to neutralise covert pressure. Content-based regulation is permissible only insofar as it enhances the listener’s capacity for autonomous judgment. Intermediaries like ‘X’ should be treated not as deputized censors but as conduits of democratic discourse.