Transcript: TikTok CEO Testifies to Congress

On March 23rd, the House Energy and Commerce Committee conducted a hearing with the CEO of TikTok, Shou Chew, focused on TikTok's consumer privacy and data security practices, its impact on children, and its relationship with the Chinese Communist Party. This hearing marked Chew's first time appearing before a congressional committee. The hearing was titled "TikTok: How Congress Can Safeguard American Data Privacy and Protect Children from Online Harms."

What follows is a flash transcript. Compare to the video before quoting.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Here we go. The committee will come to order. Before I begin, I'd like to take a moment to address the guest in the audience. First of all, thank you for coming. We think engaged citizens are welcome and a valuable part of the political process. I do want to remind the guest in the audience that the chair is obliged under the house rules and the rules of the committee to maintain order and preserve decorum in the committee room. I know that we have deep feelings on these issues and that we all may not agree on everything, but I ask that we abide by these rules and be respectful of our audience members, our viewers, and our witnesses. The chair appreciates the audience's cooperation and maintaining order as we have a full discussion on these important issues. The chair recognizes herself for five minutes for an opening statement.

Mr. Chew, you are here because the American people need the truth about the threat Tiktok poses to our national and personal security. Tiktok collects nearly every data point imaginable from people's location to what they type and copy who they talk to, biometric data and more, even if they've never been on TikTok. Your trackers are embedded in sites across the web. Tiktok surveils us all, and the Chinese Communist Party is able to use this as a tool to manipulate America as a whole. We do not trust TikTok will ever embrace American values, values for freedom, human rights, and innovation. Tiktok has repeatedly chosen the path for more control, more surveillance, and more manipulation. Your platform should be banned. I expect today you'll say anything to avoid this outcome. Like you are 100% responsible for what TikTok does, that you suddenly endorse a national data privacy standard.

That Project Texas is more than a marketing scheme, that TikTok doesn't harm our innocent children, or that your ties to the Chinese Communist Party through ByteDance is just a myth. We aren't buying it. In fact, when you celebrate the 150 million American users on TikTok, it emphasizes the urgency for Congress to act. That is 150 million Americans that CCP can collect sensitive information on and control what we ultimately see, hear, and believe. Tiktok has repeatedly been caught in the lie that it does not answer to the CCP through ByteDance. Today, the CCPs laws require Chinese companies like ByteDance to spy on their behalf. That means any Chinese company must grant the CCP access and manipulation capabilities as a design feature. Right now, ByteDance is under investigation by the DOJ for surveilling American journalists, both digital activity and physical movements through TikTok. We also know that many of your employees still report directly to Beijing.

Internal recordings reveal there is a backdoor for China to access user data across the platform. Your employees said, quote, everything is seen in China. A gateway Desp is not the only way TikTok and ByteDance can do the bidding of the CCP. Tiktok has helped you race events and people China wants the world to forget it's even censored. An American teenager who exposed CCP’s genocide in torture of uighur Muslims. The facts show that ByteDance is beholden to the CCP and ByteDance and TikTok are one in the same. Tiktok also targets our children. The four U algorithm is a tool for TikTok to own their attention and prey on their innocence. Within minutes of creating an account, your algorithm can promote suicide self-harm, and eating disorders to children. It encourages challenges for them to put their lives in danger and allows adults to prey on our beautiful beloved daughters.

It's also a portal for drug dealers to sell illicit fentanyl that China has banned yet is helping Mexican cartels produce, send across our border and poison our children in China. The CCP proactively prohibits this type of TikTok content that promotes death and despair to kids from the data it collects to the content it controls. Tiktok is a grave threat of foreign influence in American life. It's been said, it's like allowing the Soviet Union the power to produce Saturday morning cartoons during the Cold War, but much more powerful and much more dangerous. Banning your platform will address the immediate threats. Make no mistake, this committee is also looking to the future. America needs to be prepared to stop the next technological tool or weapon China will use for its own strategic gain. We must prevent any app, website, and platform like TikTok from ever Spy on Americans again, and we must provide the strongest protections possible for our children. That is why this committee is leading on a national privacy and data security standard. It restricts sensitive American data from reaching our adversaries to begin with, and what big tech and data brokers collect, process, store and sell. It makes it illegal for any platform to track and target children under 17.

Mr. Chew, the committee has requested that TikTok appeared before us for a long time. For those we serve, we're glad the day has finally come. Today, the world is watching. ByteDance is watching. The Chinese Communist Party is watching, but the answers you owe are to the American people of free people who cherish their God-given unalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness for all they deserve the truth. Complete honesty is the standard and the law you are being held to before this committee as we seek to get answers in a full understanding of what happens at TikTok under your watch. Thank you Chair. Now recognizes the ranking member, Mr. Pallone for five minutes.

Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ):

Thank you Madam Chair. And let me say that I agree with much of what you just said, and I certainly appreciate your enthusiasm and your commenting on being a mother and being concerned about children. And I'm glad that we are having this hearing today. Big Tech has transformed the information superhighway into a super spreader of harmful content, invasive surveillance practices, and addictive and damaging design features. Data is big tech's most valuable commodity, and by collecting far more user data than they need, big tech platforms can use, share, and sell information to generate billions of dollars in revenue. Today, the American people are powerless to stop this invasion of their privacy, and we can't wait any longer to pass comprehensive national privacy legislation that puts people back in control of their data. We must hold big tech accountable for its actions, and transparency is critical to that accountability.

In the past several congresses, this committee has heard from senior executives of other social media platforms about troubling and repeated instances where they put profits over people. Now, today, we intend to bring more transparency to TikTok, which is controlled by its Beijing communists based parent company, ByteDance. And while TikTok videos provide a new fun way for people to express their creativity and enjoy the videos of others, the platform also threatens the health, privacy and security of the American people. And I'm not convinced that the benefits outweigh the risks that poses to Americans in its present form. More than 130 million people in the United States use TikTok every month, including two thirds of American teenagers. Tiktok collects and compiles vast troves of valuable personal information to create an addictive algorithm that is able to predict with uncanny accuracy, which videos will keep users scrolling even if the content is harmful, inaccurate or fees, destructive behavior or extreme misbeliefs.

Now, the combination of talk's Beijing, communist based China ownership and its popularity exacerbates its danger to our country and to our privacy. The Chinese Communist government can compel companies based in Beijing like TikTok to share data with the communist government through existing Beijing law or coercion. National security experts are sounding the alarm warning that the Chinese communist government could require TikTok to compromise device security, maliciously access American user data, promote pro-communist propaganda and undermine American interests. Disinformation campaigns could be launched by the co, by the Chinese Communist government through TikTok, which has already become rife with misinformation and disinformation illegal activities and hate speech. A recent report found that 20% of TikTok search results on prominent news topics contain misinformation. Social media's profitability depends on growth and engagement. More eyes on their content for longer time leads to more advertising dollars and revenue generation.

Addictive algorithms are fine tuned to optimize growth and engagement without necessarily taking into account potential harms to users, children and teens are particularly vulnerable. Frequent online use of interactive media on digital devices is associated with increased levels of depression among middle and high school students. Research has found that talk's addictive algorithms recommend videos to teens that create and exacerbate feelings of emotional distress, including videos promoting suicide, self-harm, and eating disorders. Public outrage and hollow apologies alone are not going to reign in big tech. Congress has to enact laws protecting the American public from such online harms, and we simply cannot wait any longer to pass the comprehensive privacy legislation that I authored with the then Ranking Member. Now, Chair Rodgers last Congress that overwhelmingly advanced out of the committee. It ensures that companies, wherever they live, it ensures, I should say, that consumers, wherever they live in this country, will have meaningful control over their personal information.

Our legislation establishes baseline data minimization requirements, ensuring that companies only collect process and transfer data necessary to provide a service, and it provides heightened privacy protections for children and teenagers. So I think it's time to make this legislation the law of the land, and we also have to examine the reforms needed to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. The liability shield for social media platforms has for too long been abused and led to a lack of accountability for social media platforms. So I hope we can find a bipartisan path forward on that issue too. And I think you're having a hearing next week on it so we can stop the very real harms to our country and democracy under the current law. I'd. I'd look forward to the discussion today as we continue to bring accountability to Big Tech. And let me say to Mr. Chew, I know this is about TikTok, but I am focusing all my attention not only on TikTok, but on these concerns, wide concerns about social media and the protection of privacy. And with that, I yield back. Thank you again Madame Chair for having this very important hearing.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Our witness today is Mr. Shou Chew, Chief Executive Officer of TikTok. You're recognized for five minutes.

Shou Chew:

Thank you. Chair Rodgers, Ranking Member Pallone, Members of the Committee. Thank you for your time. I am Shou Chew and I'm from Singapore. That's where I was born as for my parents, and after serving in Singapore's military, I moved to the UK to attend college and then here to the US to attend business school. I actually met my wife here, by the way. She was just born a few miles away from here in Virginia. Two years ago, I became the CEO of TikTok. Today we have more than a billion monthly active users around the world, including over 150 million in the United States. Our app is a place where people can be creative and curious, and we're close to 5 million American businesses. Mostly small businesses go to find new customers and to fuel their growth. Now, as TikTok has grown, we've tried to learn the lessons of companies that have come before us, especially when it comes to the safety of teenagers.

While the vast majority of people on TikTok are over 18, one of and one of our fastest growing demographics are people over 35. We spent a lot of time adopting measures to protect teenagers. Many of those measures are firsts for the social media industry. We, for, we forbid, direct messaging for people under 16, and we have a 16 minute watch time by default for those under 18. We have a suite of family pairing tools so that parents can participate in their teens' experience and make the choices they think are right for their family. We want TikTok to be a place where teenagers can come to learn, which is why we recently launched a feed that exclusively features educational videos about stem. STEM videos already have over 116 billion views on TikTok, and I think TikTok is inspiring a new generation to discover a passion for math and science.

Now I would also like to talk about national security concerns that you have raised that we take very, very seriously. Let me start by addressing a few misconceptions about ByteDance, of which we are a subsidiary. ByteDance is not owned or controlled by the Chinese government. It's a private company. 60% of the company is owned by global institutional investors. 20% is owned by the founder and 20% owned by employees around the world. ByteDance’s five board members, three of them are American. Now TikTok itself is not available in mainland China. We're headquartered in Los Angeles and in Singapore, and we have 7,000 employees in the US today. Still, we have heard important concerns about the potential for unwanted foreign access to US data and potential manipulation of the TikTok US ecosystem. Our approach has never been to dismiss or trivialize any of these concerns. We have addressed them with real action now.

That's what we've been doing for the last two years, building what amounts to a firewall. The seals of protected US user data from unauthorized foreign access. The bottom line is this American data stored on American soil by an American company overseen by American personnel. We call this initiative Project Texas. That's why Oracle is headquartered today. US TikTok data is stored by default in Oracle service only vetted personnel operating in a new company called TikTok. US data security can control access to this data. Now, additionally, we have plans for this company to report to an independent American board with strong security credentials. Now, there's still some work to do. We have legacy US data sitting in our service in Virginia and in Singapore. We're deleting those and we expect that to be complete this year. When that is done, all protected US data will be under the protection of US law and under the control of the US led security team.

This eliminates the concern that some of you have shared with me that TikTok user data can be subject to Chinese law. This goes further, by the way, than what any other company in our industry have done. We will also provide unprecedented transparency and security for the source code for the TikTok app and recommendation engine. Third party validators like Oracle and others will review and validate our source code and algorithms. This will help ensure the integrity of the code that powers what Americans see on our app. We will further provide access to researchers, which helps them study and monitor our content ecosystem. Now, we believe we are the only company that offers this level of transparency.

Now, trust is about actions we take. We have to earn their trust with decisions we make for our company and our products. The potential security, privacy manipulation concerns raised about TikTok are really not unique to us. The same issues applied to other companies. We believe what's needed are clear, transparent rules that apply broadly to all tech companies. Ownership is not at the core of addressing these concerns. Now, as I conclude, there are more than 150 million Americans who love our platform and we know we have a responsibility to protect them, which is why I'm making the following commitments to you and to all our users. Number one, we will keep safety particularly for teenagers as a top priority for us. Number two, we will firewall protected US data from unwanted foreign access. Number three, TikTok will remain a place for free expression and will not be manipulated by any government. And fourth, we will be transparent and give access to third party independent monitors to remain accountable for our commitments. I'll be grateful for any feedback that you have, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

As you know, the testimony that you're about to give is subject to Title 18, Section Two, 1001 of the United States Code. As you stated in your testimony, ByteDance is TikTok's parent company, is it accurate to say that you are in regular communication with the CEO of ByteDance, Liang Rubo?

Shou Chew:

Chair Rodgers, yes. I am in communication with him.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Kelly Zhang is the CEO of ByteDance China overseeing Douyin, the Chinese version of TikTok. Are you in regular communication with Kelly?

Shou Chew:

I'm not in regular communication with her.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

The ByteDance editor-in-chief is Zhang Fuping, correct?

Shou Chew:

I believe so.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

And Wu Shugang is Beijing ByteDance Technology Board member and also an official of the Cyberspace administration in China. Is this correct?

Shou Chew:

I believe so. They are not in direct…

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Thank you. All of these individuals work or affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party are at the highest levels of leadership at ByteDance, a company where you previously served as the Chief financial Officer and where you regularly communicate with their CEO, TikTok has told us that you weren't sharing data with the CCP, but leaked audio from within TikTok has proven otherwise. Tiktok told us that you weren't tracking the geolocation of American citizens. TikTok told us you weren't spying on journalists. You were in your testimony. You state that ByteDance is not beholden to the CCP. Again, each of the individuals I listed are affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party, including Zong Fu Ping, who is reported to be the, the Communist Party's Secretary of ByteDance and who is called for the party committee to quote, take the lead across all party lines to ensure the algorithm is enforced by quote, correct political direction.

Just this morning, the Wall Street Journal reported that the CCP is opposed to a forced sale of TikTok by ByteDance. Quoting a CCP spokesman saying the Chinese government would make a decision regarding any sale of TikTok. So the CCP believes they have the final say over your company. I have zero confidence in your assertion that ByteDance and TikTok are not beholden to the CCP. Next question. Heating content is a way of promoting and moderating content. In your current or previous positions within Chinese companies, have employees engaged in heating content for users outside of China? Very quickly, yes or no.

Shou Chew:

Our heating process is approved by our local teams in the various countries.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

The answer is yes. Thank you. Have any moderation tools been used to remove content on TikTok associated with the Uyghur genocide? Yes or no?

Shou Chew:

We do not remove that kind of content. Tiktok is a place for freedom of expression and cherish. Just like I said, if you use our app, you can go on it. Then you will see a lot of users around the world thank expressing content. Thank you in on that topic and many others. Thank you.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

What about the massacre in Tiananmen Square? Yes or no?

Shou Chew:

I'm sorry. I didn't hear the question.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

The massacre in Tiananmen Square,

Shou Chew:

That kind of content is available on our platform. You can go and search it.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

I will remind you that making false or misleading statements to Congress is a federal crime.

Shou Chew:

I understand. Again, you can go on our platform. You will find that content.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Okay. Thank you. Reclaiming my time. Can you say with 100% certainty, that ByteDance, the CCP cannot use your company or its divisions making content to promote pro CCP messages for an act of aggression against Taiwan?

Shou Chew:

We do not promote or remove content at the request of the Chinese government.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

The question is, are you 100% certain that they cannot use your company to promote such messages?

Shou Chew:

It is our commitment to this committee and all our users that we will keep this free from any manipulation by any government.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

If you can't say 100% certain, I take that as a no. As I previously referenced TikTok Spy on American Journalists. Can you say with 100% certainty that neither ByteDance nor TikTok employees can target other Americans with similar surveillance techniques?

Shou Chew:

Chair Rodgers, I first of all disagree with the characterization that is spying. It was an internal investigation on yes or

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

No. Can you do surveillance of other Americans?

Shou Chew:

We will protect the US user data and fire it all from all awan foreign access. It's a commitment that we've given to the committee.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

So I guess my question is, and I want you to, I wanted to hear you say with 100% certainty that neither ness nor TikTok employees can target other Americans with s similar surveillance techniques as you did with the journalist.

Shou Chew:

Again, I don't disagree with the character characterization is surveillance, and we have given our commitments, chair Rodgers, the four commitments. I think it's a commitment that we will not be influenced by any government on these issues.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

DOJ is investigating this surveillance right now. To the American people watching today: hear this, TikTok is a weapon by the Chinese Communist Party to spy on you, manipulate what you see and exploit for future generations. A ban is only a short term way to address TikTok and a data privacy bill is the only way to stop TikTok from ever happening again in the United States. I yield back, I now yield to the ranking member for five minutes.

Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ):

Thank you, Madam Chair. Let me just start out by saying, Mr. Chew, that I don't find what you suggested with Project Texas and this firewall that's being suggested to whoever will be, will be acceptable to me. In other words you know, the co I still believe that the Beijing Communist government will still control and have the ability to influence what you do. And so this idea, this Project Texas, is simply not acceptable. According to a recent report, TikTok is on target to make between 15 and 18 billion in revenue this year. Is that an accurate forecast?

Shou Chew:

Congressman? as a private company, we are not sharing our, I thought publicly,

Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ):

How much money will TikTok make by delivering personalized advertisements just to your users in the United States? Will you give me that information

Shou Chew:

Again? Congressman, respectfully, as a private company, not disclosing that.

Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ):

Look Mr. Chew, the impression you're giving, and I know, you know, I can understand why you're trying to give that impression, is that you know that you're just performing some kind of public service here, right? I mean, this is a benign company that's just performing a public service. I maybe you're not, maybe that's not what you're saying, but it, I don't buy it, right? My concern here is primarily about the privacy issue. The fact that TikTok is making all kinds of money by collecting private information about Americans that they don't need for their business purposes, and then they sell it. And I mentioned this legislation that the ranking that the chair and I have that would minimize data collection and make it much more difficult for TikTok and other companies to do that. So what, what if you wanna make some commitments today, why don't, I'll ask you to make some commitments with regard to this legislation and you know, you're gonna tell me, well, the bill isn't passed, and so therefore I don't have to do it. But, you know, you say you're benign. You want to do good things for the public. So let me ask you why not? What about a commitment that says that you won't sell the data that you collect? Would you commit to that? Not selling the data you collect?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, I believe we sell data at all to any data brokers.

Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ):

Don't sell to anyone.

Shou Chew:

We don't sell data to data brokers.

Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ):

I didn't ask you about data brokerage. You sell it to anyone. In other words, under our bill, you could only use the data for your own purposes, not to sell it to anyone. Would you commit to not selling your data to anyone?

Shou Chew:

Congressman? I actually am in support of some rules.

Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ):

I didn't ask you whether rules, I asked you whether the company TikTok would commit to not selling its data to anyone and just using it for its own purposes internally.

Shou Chew:

I can get back to you on the details of that. Okay.

Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ):

Get back to me. All right. Another thing that's in our bill says that we would prohibit targeting marketing to people under the age of 17. Would you be willing to agree to prohibit targeted marketing to people, Americans under the age of 17?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, we have actually stricter rules for advertisers in terms of what they can show to our users.

Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ):

So do you prohibit targeting? Would you be willing to prohibit targeted marketing to those under 17? That's what's in our bill.

Shou Chew:

I understand that there's some talk and some legislation around this, around the country. Well,

Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ):

Again, I'm not interested. I wanted you to make that commitment without the legislation. Since you say you're a good company, you wanna do good things, why not?

Shou Chew:

It's something we can, we can look into and get back to you.

Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ):

I appreciate that. Okay. We also have in our bill a requirement of heightened protection for sensitive data particularly location and health data. Would you commit to not gathering or dealing with location or health data unless you get affirmative consent from the consumer? In other words, under our bill, those are categorized as sensitive. And unless the person specifically says, I want you to collect that data, you wouldn't be able to find location and health data. Would you commit to that?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, in principle, I support that. Which by the way, we do not collect precise GPS data at this point, and I do not believe we collect any health data. All right.

Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ):

So would you be willing to make that commitment that from now on you won't collect location health data without, you're saying at all

Shou Chew:

That commitment? This is data that's frequently collected by many other companies in our industry.

Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ):

I know other companies do it. I don't think they should without affirmative consent. You said you wanna be a good actor, so why not make that commitment to me today?

Shou Chew:

We're committed to be very transparent with our users about what we collect. I don't think what we collect, I don't believe what we collect is more than most.

Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ):

My problem here is you're trying to give the impression that you're going to move away from Beijing and the Communist Party. You're trying to give the impression that you're a good actor, but the commitments that we would seek to achieve those goals are not being made today. They're just not being made. You're gonna continue to gather data, you're gonna continue to sell data, you're gonna continue to do all these things and continue to be under the ages of, of the Communist Party through the, through your you know organization that owns you. So in any case, thank you. Thank you Madam Chair

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentleman, yields back chair now recognizes gentleman from Texas. Mr. Burgess for five minutes.

Rep. Michael Burgess (R-TX):

Can I thank the chair? Thank you, Mr. Chew, for joining us today. I think we've heard you say multiple times that TikTok is not a Chinese company, that ByteDance is not a Chinese company. But according to an article in today's Wall Street Journal, quoting here, China's Commerce Ministry said Thursday that a sale or divestiture of TikTok will involve exporting technology that has to be approved by the Chinese government. Continuing to quote the reported efforts by the Biden administration with severely undermine global confidence in the US, said Sujuk, a ministry spokeswoman, continuing to quote, if that is true, China will firmly oppose it, she said, referring to the forced sale. So despite your assertions to the contrary, China certainly thinks it is in control of TikTok and its software. Is that not correct?

Shou Chew:

Congressman? TikTok is not available in mainland China, and today we are headquartered in Los Angeles and Singapore. But I'm not saying that, you know, the founders of Biden are not Chinese. Nor am I saying that we don't make use of Chinese employees just like many other companies around the world. We, we do, you know, use their expertise on some engineering projects, but

Rep. Michael Burgess (R-TX):

According to their ministry spokeswoman, it would be a divestiture of exporting technology from China. So they, again, China thinks they own it, even though you do not. Madam Chair, I'd just like to ask unanimous consent to put today's Wall Street Journal….

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Without objections. So oredered into the record.

Rep. Michael Burgess (R-TX):

Mr. Chew, I wouldn't ask you to discuss any privileged attorney client materials, but did anyone aside from your lawyers assist you in preparation for today's hearing?

Shou Chew:

I prepared for this hearing of my team here in dc.

Rep. Michael Burgess (R-TX):

Did anyone at ByteDance directly provide input, help, or instruction for your testimony today?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, this is a very high profile hearing. My phone is full of well wishes that, you know, but I prepared for this hearing with my team here in D.C.

Rep. Michael Burgess (R-TX):

Are you, are, are you willing to share who, who helped prepare you for this hearing with the committee? And you can do that.

Shou Chew:

I can follow up with you, if you like.

Rep. Michael Burgess (R-TX):

Can you guarantee that no one at ByteDance had a role in preparing you for today's hearing?

Shou Chew:

Like I said, Congressman, this is a high profile hearing. A lot of people around the world were selling me wishes and unsolicited advice, but I prepared for this hearing with my team here in DC.

Rep. Michael Burgess (R-TX):

Are the attorneys representing TikTok also representing ByteDance?

Shou Chew:

Yes, I believe so.

Rep. Michael Burgess (R-TX):

What percentage of TikTok revenue does ByteDance retain? Just give me a ballpark estimate if you don't know.

Shou Chew:

Congressman, like, like I said as a private company, we are not prepared to disclose our financials in public today.

Rep. Michael Burgess (R-TX):

But can we ask you to get back to us with a ballpark, we're not asking for the precise figures, but to get, so the committee can have some understanding of the percentage of TikTok revenue, the ByteDance retains.

Shou Chew:

I understand the question respectfully. As a private company, we're not disclosing our financials today.

Rep. Michael Burgess (R-TX):

Prior to today's hearing, did anyone affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party discuss this hearing with you or anyone else on TikTok? Senior management?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, since I've been c o of this company, I've not had any discussions with Chinese government officials.

Rep. Michael Burgess (R-TX):

So what, but, but what about the Chinese Communist Party itself? Have any of those officials discussed this with you?

Shou Chew:

Like I said, I have not had any discussion with Chinese government officials. I don't know the political affiliation of everybody I speak to, so I can't verify the statement.

Rep. Michael Burgess (R-TX):

Let me ask you a question in a different direction. A few weeks ago, this committee had a field hearing down in Macallan, Texas, and it was on the issue of fentanyl and, and illegal immigration. And one of our witnesses Brandon Judd, a 25 year veteran border patrol agent, said that all social media platforms play a role in illegal immigration. That's one of the ways cartels advertise their services throughout the world and convince people to put themselves in their hands and come to the United States. The cartels all use social media platforms. Are you aware of this phenomenon?

Shou Chew:

Any content that promotes human abuse is violative of our community guidelines, which dictates what is allowed and not allowed on our platform. We proactively identify and remove them from our platform.

Rep. Michael Burgess (R-TX):

Well, it would be very helpful if you would share with the committee examples of how you have removed people, because what we heard at the hearing was that TikTok was one of the platforms that recruits adolescents in the United States to help with transporting people who are in the country, who've, who've tra been trafficked into the country, as well as contraband substances. Would you help us with understanding who you have removed from your platform?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, I'll be delighted to check on my team and get back to yours and be collaborative.

Rep. Michael Burgess (R-TX):

Thank you all. You go back,

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentlemen's time is expired. Chairs recognizes the lady from California, Ms. Eshoo for five minutes.

Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA):

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Mr. Chew, thank you for being here today. As members of Congress, our very first and top responsibility is to protect and defend, protect and defend our Constitution and the national security of our country. So I view this entire issue. Now there are many parts of it that are not part of our national security, in my view but first and foremost, for our national security. So in examining TikTok, breaking away from ByteDance I'd like to ask you some questions about that. And how a severance in terms of the relationship with ByteDance, how user data, American user data would be protected now under Beijing's security laws. Article seven compels companies to provide data. Article 10 makes the reach of the law extra extra territorial. Now, this is very clear. I don't need to read all of it into the record but that those are the laws of the PRC. How does ByteDance? How does TikTok rather, how do you convince the Congress of the United States that there can be a clean break? Why would the Chinese government sidestep their national law, including Article 7, Article 10 in terms of user data?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, thank you for the question. I'm glad you asked this. As I said in the opening statement, our plan is to move American data to be stored on American soil. I understand by American understand that,

Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA):

Understand, I understand that. But you're sidestepping or I haven't read anything in terms of TikTok, how you can actually say, and you spoke in your opening statement about a firewall relative to the data, but the Chinese government has that data. What, how, how can you promise that that will move into the United States of America, be protected here?

Shou Chew:

I have seen no evidence that the Chinese government has access to that data. They have never asked us. We have not provided…

Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA):

Well, you know what I've asked, I find that actually preposterous.

Shou Chew:

I have looked in, I have seen no evidence of this happening. And in order to assure everybody here and all our users, our commitment is to move their data into the United States to be stored on American soil by an American company, overseen by American personnel. So the risk will be similar to any government going to an American company asking for data, if that,

Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA):

Well, I'm one that doesn't believe that there is really a private sector in China. And when you look at their national law, and what specifically these two articles, article seven and Article 10 are very clear. So I, I, I think that there is a real problem, a real problem relative to our national security about the protection of the user data. I don't believe that TikTok has sent or done anything to convince us that information, the personal information of 150 million Americans that the Chinese government is not going to give that up. So, can you tell me, can you tell me who writes the algorithms for TikTok?

Shou Chew:

Today? The algorithm that powers the US user experience is running in the Oracle cloud infrastructure. You know, initially there were parts of the source code, especially in the infrastructure layer that doesn't touch the user experience. Now, that's a collaborative global effort, including built by engineers in China, just like many other companies. By the way, the phone you use, the car you drive is a global collaborative effort now, but today, the business sites and the main parts of the code for TikTok is written by TikTok employees. And congresswoman, what we are offering is third party monitoring of our source code. I am not aware of any company, American companies or otherwise that has actually done that. We, because we are saying we wanna give you transparency and rely on third parties to make sure that we get all the comfort that we need about the experience.

Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA):

Well, my time is up and I yield back. Thank you.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Lady yields back pleased to yield to the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Latta for five minutes.

Rep. Bob Latta (R-OH):

Well, thank you Madam Chair. Unlike the Chinese Communist Party, the United States' believes in individual freedom, innovation and entrepreneurship. That is in part why Congress enacted Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. Our goal is to promote growth of the e an online ecosystem in the United States, and to protect companies from being held liable for good faith efforts to moderate their platforms. Last year, a federal judge in Pennsylvania found that Section 230 protected TikTok from being held responsible for the death of a 10 year old girl who participated in a blackout challenge, also known as the choking Challenge. Tiktok actively pushes video on her feed. Unfortunately, this is one of the many devastating examples of children losing their lives because of content promoted by TikTok. Section 230 was never intended to shield companies like yours from amplifying dangerous and life-threatening content to children. Do you consider this to be a good faith moderation?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, as a father myself, when I hear about the tragic deaths of my question people, it's heartbreaking.

Rep. Bob Latta (R-OH):

We find that good faith moderation.

Shou Chew:

Well, Congressman Section 230 is a very complex, okay,

Rep. Bob Latta (R-OH):

I'm, I'm, you know, yes or no.

Shou Chew:

We are very focused on safety and all these dangerou , trying, we find them.

Rep. Bob Latta (R-OH):

Do you believe TikTok deserves this liability protection?

Shou Chew:

I'm sorry, Congressman.

Rep. Bob Latta (R-OH):

You believe that TikTok deserves this liability protection under Section 230.

Shou Chew:

Congressman, as you pointed out 230 has been very important for freedom of expression on the internet. It's one of the commitments we have given to this committee and our users. And I do, I do think it's important to preserve that, but companies should be raising the bar on safety.

Rep. Bob Latta (R-OH):

Lemme follow up. I really agree with that. Lemme follow up real quickly from your own testimony. When you told us and you repeated it, we'll keep safety, particularly for teenagers, a top priority for us. When you're saying you're making that following commitment, why did you have to wait till now to make that following commitment now and not having done it before when this 10 year old lost their life?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, I'm reiterating the commitment, okay. Internally, in all my, in all my priorities, which is public to my employees, okay? This has been a priority.

Rep. Bob Latta (R-OH):

This company is a picture perfect example of why this committee in Congress needs to take action immediately to ammend Section 230. When we recently met, I asked you if the Chinese Communist Party can currently access user data, and you did not have a clear answer. So today, I wanna follow up. You heard it a little bit, but I wanna be absolutely sure of this answer. Are employees of ByteDance subject to Chinese law, including the 2017 National Intelligence Law, which requires any organization or citizen to support, assist, and cooperate with state intelligence work in accordance with the law.

Shou Chew:

Like many companies, including many American companies, we rely on the global workforce, including engineers in China, okay?

Rep. Bob Latta (R-OH):

But no, yes and no.

Shou Chew:

No. So, in the past, yes, I'm sorry, in the past, yes, yes, but we are building Project Texas and we're committing the firewall off all protected data's taking that mine want foreign

Rep. Bob Latta (R-OH):

Taking that as a yes because again, on your Article seven, the article seven of the 2017 National Intelligence Law, which I just said cuz it says in addition, as we was asked a little bit earlier, the 2014 Counter Espino espionage law states that when the state's security organ investigates and understands the situation of espionage and collect relevant evidence, the relevant organizations and individuals, it does not say may, it says, shall provided truthfully and may not refuse. Yes or no, do any ByteDance employees in China, including engineers currently have access to US user data.

Shou Chew:

Today, all US user data is stored by default in the Oracle cloud infrastructure. And access to that is question controlled any by

Rep. Bob Latta (R-OH):

American personnel employees in China, including engineers currently have access to US data.

Shou Chew:

Congressman I would appreciate this. This is a complex topic today. All data.

Rep. Bob Latta (R-OH):

It's not that complex. Yes or no? Do they have access to user data?

Shou Chew:

We have after Project Texas is done, done? The answer is no. Today, there is still some data that we need to,

Rep. Bob Latta (R-OH):

We've heard already the ranking member he hasn't, and that he doesn't really see that Project Texas is gonna be useful. So I think I'm taking that as a note, because again, the question is what came up earlier on that, on December the 22nd of last year when Bance confirmed some of its Chinese employees had access TikTok data to monitor and track, monitor and track the physical location of journals. So I took that as a yes from an earlier answer. You know, earlier this week you posted a TikTok videos asking American users to mobilize in support of your app and oppose the potential US government action to ban TikTok in the United States based on the established relationship between your company and the Chinese Communist Party. It's impossible for me to conclude that the video is anything different than the type of propaganda the CCP requires Chinese companies to push on its citizens now, yield back.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentlemen, yields back chair recognizes the lady from Colorado, Ms. Degette for five

Rep. Diana DeGette (D-CO):

Minutes. Thank you, Matt. Thank you very much. Madam Chair, Mr. Chew Mike, my colleagues, I'm concerned about the influence of China on TikTok and what that does for US users, but I'm also concerned about how the content in TikTok is being distributed, particularly to young people. This is not a problem unique to TikTok, but TikTok has 150 million users in the United States, and so I think you'll agree that TikTok has a particular responsibility to monitor content to make sure that it's safe and accurate. Would that be fair to say?

Shou Chew:

Yes, I agree with that.

Rep. Diana DeGette (D-CO):

So you know, I know you said in your opening statement, there's a ban an for are limited for kids under 13 and under 18 and so on, but I'm, I'm, I, I'm, I know it won't be news for you that, that computer savvy kids actually can bypass some of those restrictions quite frequently, and they can do it even if they have parental oversight. And so what I wanna ask you is, rather than putting the burden on young people and parents to accurately put in the birthdate and so on, when registering for TikTok, I wanna ask what TikTok can do to make sure to monitor this, this content. And I wanna give you some examples of some of the extreme content. Mr. Lata talked about the blackout challenge and the danger, some of the dangers to young people's safety, but there's also extreme content around healthcare information in one study, 13 out of 20 results.

For the question, does mugwort induce abortion? It's, it, it talked about herbal, so-called aborts, like papaya seeds, which don't work. And so if people searching for information on safe abortions went on TikTok, they could get devastatingly incorrect information. Another study showed that TikTok had a hydroxychloroquine tutorial on how to fabricate this from grapefruit. Now, there's two problems with that. Number one, hydroxychloroquine is not effective in treating covid. So that's one issue. The second issue is you can't even make hydroxychloroquine from grapefruit. So again, this is a really serious miscommunication about healthcare information that people looking at TikTok are able to get. And in fact, it's being pushed out to them. So I want to know from you, and I will give you time to answer this. You have current controls, but the current controls are not working to keep this information mainly from young people, but from Americans in general. What more is, is TikTok doing to try to strengthen its review to keep this information from coming across to people?

Shou Chew:

Thank you for the question. Congresswoman, the dangerous misinformation that you mentioned is not allowed on our platform. It violates them.

Rep. Diana DeGette (D-CO):

I'm sorry to report. It is on your platform though.

Shou Chew:

Congresswoman, I, I don't think I can sit here and say that we are perfect in doing this. We do work very hard.

Rep. Diana DeGette (D-CO):

So how can you make yourself more perfect? I don't want you to say it's not there, or you apologize. What can you do to limit it as much as possible, more than what you're doing now?

Shou Chew:

We invest a significant amount in our content moderation work. I shared that number in our, in my written…

Rep. Diana DeGette (D-CO):

I know you're investing, yes, but, but what steps are you taking to improve the AI or whatever else you're doing to limit this content?

Shou Chew:

For example, if you search for certain search terms, we do direct you on TikTok to resource safety resources. That's one of the things we have done. We will continue to invest in this. I recognize and, and fully align with you that this is a problem that faces our industry, that we need to really invest and address this. I'm very in alignment. The vast majority of our users come to our platform for entertaining safe content. But there are people who do have some, who do spout some dangerous misinformation. And we need to take that very seriously, invest in it, proactively identify it, and, and remove it from our platform. Okay,

Rep. Diana DeGette (D-CO):

I'm gonna stop you right now. I asked you specifically how you were increasing, how you're trying to increase your review of this, and you gave me only generalized statements that you're investing, that you're concerned that you're doing more. That's not enough for me. That's not enough for the parents of America. I'm gonna ask you to supplement your testimony and have your experts tell me what you're doing to make this a higher level of scrutiny, not just PLO at a hearing. Thank you. I yield back. Thank

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

You, lady Yields back chair recognizes gentlemen from North Carolina, Mr. Hudson for five minutes.

Rep. Richard Hudson (R-NC):

Thank you Chairwoman Morris Rodgers for holding this important hearing. I appreciate the witness, Mr. ShoChew, for making yourself available here today. While many consider TikTok to be just another video sharing app, in reality, TikTok has been functioning as a massive surveillance program collecting vast swaths of personal data for more than a billion people worldwide. This includes data from the personal devices of federal employees, contractors, and most concerning US military service members and their families at places like Fort Bragg in North Carolina. As Fort Bragg's Congressman, I have serious concerns about the opportunities TikTok gives the Chinese Communist Party to access the non-public sensitive data of our men and women in uniform. This personal data and location information can be harvested and could be used for blackmail to conduct espionage and to possibly even reveal troop movements. While the Department of Defense and most agencies have banned TikTok on government issued devices, I believe more needs to be done at the command level to urge troops in their dependence, to erase the app from the personal devices and keep them off home wifi, having an app banned on a device in one pocket, but it on your device and the other doesn't make a whole lot of sense to me.

I believe Congress and DOD should address the continued use of TikTok on military installations as well as any use that depicts US military operations. Mr. Chew, does TikTok access the home wifi network?

Shou Chew:

Only if the user turns on the wifi. I, I'm sorry. I may not understand the, so if I have

Rep. Richard Hudson (R-NC):

Tiktok Apple, my phone and my phone is on my home wifi network, does TikTok access that network?

Shou Chew:

It will have to access that network to get connections to the internet. If, if that's the question…

Rep. Richard Hudson (R-NC):

Is it possible then that it could access other devices on that home wifi network

Shou Chew:

Co congressman, that we do not do anything that is beyond any industry norms? I believe the answer to your question is no. It could be technical. Let me get back to

Rep. Richard Hudson (R-NC):

You. Okay. I'd appreciate it if you can answer that. I'd like to change directions real quick. Do you receive personal employment, salary, compensation, or benefits from ByteDance?

Shou Chew:

Yes, I do.

Rep. Richard Hudson (R-NC):

What is your salary from ByteDance?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, if you don't mind. I would prefer to keep my compensation private.

Rep. Richard Hudson (R-NC):

Okay. Do you personally have any company shares or stock in ByteDance or Douyin?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, if you don't mind. I would like to keep my personal access private.

Rep. Richard Hudson (R-NC):

Is TikTok the company your only source of employment compensation? Where's your other source of income outside of TikTok?

Shou Chew:

It's my only source of compensation.

Rep. Richard Hudson (R-NC):

Do you have any financial debts or obligations to ByteDance, Douyin or any other ByteDance affiliated entity?

Shou Chew:

Personally, no, I do not.

Rep. Richard Hudson (R-NC):

Does your management team receive separate salary compensation or benefits from ByteDance?

Shou Chew:

We receive salaries from the employee, the entities that we are employed in. But we do share in the employee stock option plan that is available from, from the ByteDance top company.

Rep. Richard Hudson (R-NC):

So your primary salary comes from TikTok, but you have other compensation that comes directly from ByteDance.

Shou Chew:

You can characterize it as that? Yes.

Rep. Richard Hudson (R-NC):

Does your management team have company shares or stock in ByteDance or doyen?

Shou Chew:

Yes. we, some of our employees are compensated in shares in ByteDance.

Rep. Richard Hudson (R-NC):

Does TikTok share technological resources with doyen? Are the two technology systems or IT systems interconnected in any way?

Shou Chew:

They are, as with many companies. Some shared resources on some services, but it doesn't include anything that involves us user data. Congressman is in Project Texas, as we talked about, stored by default in American Soil by America Company,

Rep. Richard Hudson (R-NC):

Be, but currently there is shared technology or interconnected IT systems.

Shou Chew:

Congressman with respect, I have to get back to you. This could be a very broad question. Like, for example, we could all be using Microsoft Windows.

Rep. Richard Hudson (R-NC):

Yeah. If you could get back with details on that, I'd appreciate it. Yes. can Doyen personnel or employees access TikTok user data?

Shou Chew:

Not after Project Texas? This is not allowed.

Rep. Richard Hudson (R-NC):

Are there employees who are employed by both Doyen and TikTok?

Shou Chew:

I do not believe so.

Rep. Richard Hudson (R-NC):

Okay. And so I don't believe so. Is that a, I mean, if again, I'll, I'll allow you to come back in the written response. If you could give me a definitive answer,

Shou Chew:

I will go back and check to be very sure.

Rep. Richard Hudson (R-NC):

Okay, thank you. I've also concerned about an issue that our chairwoman brought up about an apparent pattern of misinformation or misrepresentation from your company in regards to the amount and extent of data that you're collecting, as well as how much has been accessed from inside China. There are dozens of public reports that conclude individuals in the People's Republic of China have been accessing data on US users directly contradicting several public statements by TikTok employees. And I'm, I'm referencing Project Raven, which was first reported on by Forbes last October. Did investigation revealed, I'm sorry, I'm about out of time. Do you want to respond to that?

Shou Chew:

Yes, Congressman. We do not condone the effort by certain former employees to access us TikTok user data in an attempt to identify the source of leak confidential information, we condemn these actions after learning about them. We found a highly reputable law firm that thoroughly investigated the, the incident. We took Swift disciplinary action against employees were found to be involved and are implementing measures to make sure this doesn't happen again. We have made this team available to you. They, I think they have briefed many of you in this committee very extensively, and I will continue to make them very available to you as part of our transparent commitment.

Rep. Richard Hudson (R-NC):

Thank you. My time's expired. I yield back.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentleman, yields back chair recognizes the lady from Illinois. Ms. Schakowsky for five minutes.

Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-IL):

Thank you. So today in the Wall Street Journal they said today China China's commerce Minister said that China opposes the sale of TikTok because it would involve export exporting China's technology. And would and, and this is the important part, and would need to be approved by the Chinese government, would need to be approved by the Chinese government. So all of what you've been saying about the distance between TikTok and China has been said to be not true in the in, in the paper today. And I, I would like to see what you have to say in response.

Shou Chew:

Congresswoman, I do disagree with that characterization. I think we have designed Project Texas to protect US user interests and to move forward here in the us. Again, it's the protections of storing American data on American soil by an American company looked after by American personnel. And I do not think that you know our commitments to this committee and all our users is impacted by, by any event that you mentioned now the, the whole, you know, discussion on this the resolution of this is, is an ongoing and developing event. So we'll continue to pay attention to this and we'll get back to you and we have more specifics. So if it's my commit, Stan, yeah.

Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-IL):

Okay. So if it's an ongoing debate apparently with, with, with China, so it's hard to say with any certainty that China would not have any influence. But let me ask another question. So last fall along with Guas, who were chair and co-chair of of the co subcommittee together were, were were told that TikTok had surveilled w was involved in, in surveillance of users, very personal information. And you might say, well, not more than other companies. And I agree with ranking member Pallone that I, I, I really don't wanna go buy that standard particularly, but that talk's in-app browser surveilled everything from Americans including passwords and credit card numbers, et cetera. So I just want to ask you if if, if TikTok did track and collect this sensitive data that Americans don't want to have disclosed.

Shou Chew:

Congressman tha thank you. I'm glad you asked this question because like you pointed out, we actually do not believe we collect more data than any other social media company out there. A lot of these reports, and I we can talk about which specific one, specific one you're talking about. A lot of them are not that accurate. Some of them we have contacted the, we have actually gotten in touch with the authors to help them understand the data that we are collecting. A lot of it is speculation. You know, this is something they could do, they could do. But if you look at the subtext, this is something that company could do.

Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-IL):

So, I'm running out of time. Let, let me just say that if TikTok toes not to take this sensitive, this sensitive information that you don't need for a transaction and support our comprehensive privacy bill, that would be, that would be very helpful. The other thing I wanted to ask, so really this is a yes or no, that TikTok does TikTok share user information from companies from parent companies from affiliated or or send user information to overseas in the past?

Shou Chew:

Yes, for interoperability, interoperability purposes now after project taxes, all protected US data will be stored here with the access controlled by a special team of us, US personnel. Again, congresswoman, this is something that as far as I understand, no other company, including American companies are willing to go. So maybe this is something that we can ask the industry to provide, not just us, to protect us. In

Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-IL):

Case of sharing information, I do wanna quote from employee ease that you had that, and here's the quote. Everything is seen in China is really what they said. People who were in touch with the sensitive data were saying that, how do you respond to that?

Shou Chew:

I disagree with that statement.

Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-IL):

Well, I know you disagree with that statement, but my point is, how does that happen that employees of the of the company are saying that in fact, that's not true.

Shou Chew:

I cannot speak to, I don't know who this person is, so I cannot speak to what the person ca have has or has not said. What I can say is, you know, based on my position in this company and the responsibility that I have, that statement is just not true.

Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-IL):

Okay. Unfortunately. And I, I'll, I'll close. Oh, I guess I'm over my time. We need to look into the facts of this, and so do you And I yelled back,

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentle lady, yields back chair recognizes the lady from Florida, Ms. Cammack for five minutes.

Rep. Kat Cammack (R-FL):

Thank you. Madame Chairwoman. Mr. Chew. Are you aware of Chinese Communist Party leader Chairman Xi Jinping's comments in May, 2021 during a Communist Poll Bureau study session where he instructed colleagues to target different countries, different audiences with short form video. Are you aware of these comments? Yes or no,

Shou Chew:

Congressman? I'm not aware of these comments.

Rep. Kat Cammack (R-FL):

Okay. Well, and as was pointed out by Chairwoman Rodgers, you have regular contact with Chinese Communist Party Secretary, Mr. Zang Fing, who is your boss at ByteDance, correct? .

Shou Chew:

No, no, no, he's neither my boss. Nor do we have frequent contact.

Rep. Kat Cammack (R-FL):

But you have regular contact with ByteDance.

Shou Chew:

With the CEO of ByteDance, who...

Rep. Kat Cammack (R-FL):

My colleague, representative Burgess a few minutes ago exposed that TikTok and ByteDance share legal teams. You confirmed this, correct?

Shou Chew:

Our general counsel is yes. An American lawyer Yes. Veteran of Microsoft.

Rep. Kat Cammack (R-FL):

Also, my colleague, Representative Latta confirmed that your parent company ByteDance currently can access user data. Yes.

Shou Chew:

Let's, we have to be more specific. Yes. After Project Texas, no,

Rep. Kat Cammack (R-FL):

I'm not asking after Project Texas. I'm asking now.

Shou Chew:

Yes. Some user data is public data, Congresswoman, which means everybody can switch.

Rep. Kat Cammack (R-FL):

What's interesting to me is that you have used the word transparency over a half a dozen times in your opening testimony and subsequently, again in your answers to my colleagues. Yet, the interesting thing to me is that ByteDance, your parent company has gone out of their way to hide an airbrush. Corporate structure ties to the CCP, the company's founder and their activities. You can look no further than the fact that by Dan's website has been scrubbed. In fact, we found webpages from the Beijing Internet Association, the Industry Association charged with communist party building work of internet companies in Beijing. They have been archived, but since deleted. Makes you kind of wonder why yes or no ByteDance is required to have a member of the Chinese government on its board with veto power. Is that correct?

Shou Chew:

No, that is not correct. ByteDance owns some Chinese businesses, and you're talking about this very special subsidiary that is Chinese Business Licensing Company.

Rep. Kat Cammack (R-FL):

Mr. Chew, I'm gonna have to move on. You've said repeatedly that there is no threat, that this is an inter a platform for entertainment and for fun. I have to ask you then, if there is no threat to Americans, if there is no threat to our data privacy security, why did an internal memo from TikTok corporate headquarters explicitly coach senior management to quote, downplay the parent company ByteDance? Why would they say downplay the China Association and downplay ai? This is from an internal memo from your company. Why, if you had nothing to hide, would you need to downplay the association with ByteDance in China?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, I have not seen this demo.

Rep. Kat Cammack (R-FL):

You can't, you can't answer that question, Mr. Chew. I'd like to direct your attention to the screen for a short video, if you don't mind, Mr. Chew. That video was posted 41 days ago. As you can see, it is caption me as f at the House Energy and Commerce Committee on March 23rd of this year. This video was posted before this hearing was publicly noticed. I think that's a very interesting point to raise, but more concerning is the fact that it names this chairwoman by name. Your own community guidelines state that you have a firm stance against enabling violence on or off TikTok. We do not allow people to use our platform to threaten or incite violence or to promote violent extremist organizations, individuals, or acts. When there is a threat to public safety or an account is used to promote or glorify off-platform violence, we ban the account. This video has been up for 41 days. It is a direct threat to the chairwoman of this committee, the people in this room, and yet it still remains on the platform.

And you expect us to believe that you are capable of maintaining the data, security, privacy, and security of 150 million Americans where you can't even protect the people in this room. I think that is a blatant display of how vulnerable people who use TikTok are. You couldn't take action after 41 days when a clear threat of very violent threat to the chairwoman of this committee and the members of this committee was posted on your platform. You damn well know that you cannot protect the data and security of this committee or the 150 million users of your app because it is an extension of the CCP. And with that, I yield back.

Shou Chew:

Can I have a respond chair?

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

No, we're gonna move on. General lady yields back chairman recognizes the lady from California, Ms. Matsui for five minutes.

Rep. Doris Matsui (D-CA):

Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and I'm really glad that we're having this very important hearing here today. And let me just say, make no mistake, the Chinese government represents a real and immediate threat. Look no further than even the vulnerable gear still in our telecom networks that needs to be rep and replaced, but we can't lose sight of the important internet governance issues TikTok and other social media companies represent. I'm especially committed to demanding transparency from large platforms about the algorithms that shape our online interactions, especially for teenagers and young users. And that's why I introduce the Algorithmic Justice and Online Platform Transparency Act. To bring greater visibility into this ecosystem, my bill would require re would prohibit algorithms that discriminate on the basis of race, age, gender ability, and other protected character characteristics. It also would establish a safety and effectiveness standard for algorithms while requiring new forms of intersite oversight. Now, this bill would require online platforms to publish annual public re reports detailing their content moderation practices, which I believe should be a baseline requirement to enable meaningful oversight and consumer choice. Mr. Chew, just yes or no. Do you believe a requirement for annual contact moderation practices for social media platforms would be beneficial? Yes or no?

Shou Chew:

Yes.

Rep. Doris Matsui (D-CA):

This transparency Bill would also require online platforms to maintain detailed records describing their algorithmic process for review by the Federal Trade Commission in compliance with key privacy and data de identification standards. Mr. Chew, does TikTok currently maintain records describing their algorithmic processes? Yes or no?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, I will need to check and get back to you on what kind of specific records you are talking about.

Rep. Doris Matsui (D-CA):

I'll wait for that. Over the past few years, alarming information brought to light by whistleblowers have shown that social media companies are intimately aware of the effect their products have on young women political extremism and more. Despite this, they withheld those studies or declined to investigate further. In either case, it shows that pattern evasive or negligent behavior that I find concerning in extreme. Mr. Chew, does TikTok conduct its own studies on the effect of his algorithms and content distribution models on mental health or safety? And if so, how and when are those findings made public? And if not, do you believe they're necessary?

Shou Chew:

Congresswoman, we rely on external third parties and fund their research to help us understand some of these issues. For example, we worked with the Digital Wellness Lab at the Boston Children's Hospital to understand the 60 minute time limit that we put for all our under 18 users. And we are supportive of legislation that provides more funding for research, like, for example, for the NIH.

Rep. Doris Matsui (D-CA):

Okay. Yeah. Tiktok tailor is, is recommended content based on user activity to encourage people to spend more time on the app. While this practice is by no means unique to TikTok, given the prevalence of young users and the digestible nature of short form video, I'm concerned about the app's tendency to exacerbate existing mental health challenges. Mr. Chew, does TikTok have different policies for amplifying contact that would be related to depression or dieting versus content like gardening and sports? If yes, describe these policy differences. If no, why not?

Shou Chew:

Congresswoman? thank you for that. This is a great question. The the answer is yes, we are trying out some policies together with experts to understand certain contents that are not inherently harmful, like extreme fitness, for example, but shouldn't be seen too much. And this is, these are models that we're building and we are trying to understand, you know, together with experts how to best implement them across our platform, particularly for younger users.

Rep. Doris Matsui (D-CA):

Okay. Under 18. Yeah. So in cases where users have been engaging with potentially harmful content, I believe is imperative that the app takes steps to moderate that behavior rather than continuing to promote it. That means, in a sense,

Shou Chew:

I apologize, I'll let you know about that. wasn't clear. First anything that is violative and harmful will remove what I meant to say were things, content, content that is not inherently, inherently harmful. Like some of the extreme fitness videos are about people running a hundred miles. It is not inherently harmful, but if we show them too much, the experts are telling us that we should disperse them more and make sure that they're not seen too regularly, especially by younger users.

Rep. Doris Matsui (D-CA):

So you're intentional about that then? It's something that you

Shou Chew:

We are working on it.

Rep. Doris Matsui (D-CA):

Yeah. You're working on it? Yes. Okay. I yield back.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentle lady yields back. Chair recognizes gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis for five minutes.

Gus Bilirakis (R-FL):

Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it very much. Thanks for holding this hearing. Mr. Chew, your algorithms have prioritized providing harmful contact directly to children like self-harm challenges, and even suicide. Just three days ago, Italy opened an investigation into TikTok over user safety concerns after the so-called French scar challenge went viral on your platform. I know you know about the blackout challenge, which others may know as the choking challenge that encourages children to bring them to the point of unconsciousness, or in some cases tragically death, if that if that isn't enough, I want to share the story of Chase Naska, a 16 year old boy from New York, who tragically ended his life a year ago by stepping in front of a train. I want to thank his parents again. They're, they are here. I want to thank his parents for being here today and allowing us to show this, Mr.

Choose Your company destroyed their lives. Your company destroyed their lives. I admire their courage to be here and share Chase's story in the hopes that it will prevent this from happening to other families. The content in Chase's for You page was not a window to discovery as you boldly claimed in your testimony. It wasn't content from a creator that you invited to roam the hill today, or stem education content that children in China see instead, his for you page was sadly a window to discover suicide. It is unacceptable, sir, that even after knowing all these dangers, you still claim TikTok is something grand to behold. I want you to see what Chase would see. And I think if you want again, would you share this content with your children, with your two children? Would you want them to see this? And again, I I wanna warn everyone watching that you may find this content disturbing, but we need to watch this. Please.

TikTok Video:

Claire tip, you gotta kill yourself. Oh,



Word. Like right now.



And I'm gonna put a shotgun in my mouth and blow the brains outta the back of my head.



Cool.



This is a cute story. My brother, who is addicted to painkillers blew his head off on the State Street Bridge. Bam. Now hold on. It gets better. No letter, no goodbye. Nothing.



Better question if I died, would you miss me?

Gus Bilirakis (R-FL):

Mr. Chew? Mr. Chew, please. Your technology is literally leading to death. Mr. Chew, yes or no? Do you have full responsibility for your algorithms used by TikTok to prioritize content to its users? Yes or no? Please.

Shou Chew:

Congressman, I'll, I'll just like to, if respectfully, if you don't mind, I would just like to start by saying it's devastating to hear about the news of Yes, yes. As a father myself. This is

Gus Bilirakis (R-FL):

Project yes or no. I'll repeat the question. Do you have full responsibility over the algorithms used by TikTok to prioritize content to its users? Yes or no? Please,

Shou Chew:

Congressman, we, we do take these issues very seriously.

Gus Bilirakis (R-FL):

Yes or no.

Shou Chew:

And we do provide resources for anyone who types in anything that suicide.

Gus Bilirakis (R-FL):

Sir, yes or no? I see you're not willing to answer the question or take any responsibility for your parents', companies, the technology and the harms it creates. It's just very, very sad. Very sad. He's very sad. This is why Congress needs to enact a comprehensive privacy and data security law to give Americans more control over their information. And to protect our children, we must save our children from big tech companies like yours, who continue to abuse and manipulate them for your own gain. And I'll, I'll yield back. Madame Chair,

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentlemen, yields back chair recognizes the, the lady from Florida, Ms. Castor for five minutes.

Rep. Kathy Castor (D-FL):

Well, thank you, Madame Chair. Colleagues, it is urgent that the Congress passed and, and online data privacy law that protects the personal privacy of Americans online, and particularly our kids. While this hearing shines a light on TikTok this hearing also should serve as a call to action for the Congress to act now to protect Americans from surveillance, tracking, personal data gathering, and addictive algorithmic operations that that serve up harmful content and has a corrosive effect on our kids' mental and physical wellbeing. For many years, I've sounded the alarm in this committee of how big tech platforms like TikTok and Facebook and Instagram, incessantly surveil, track gather personal private information and use it along with data brokers to target and influence our behavior. This is a much broader issue than TikTok in China. There are other malign actors across the world who gather data to use it as an element of social control and influence and worse.

And as I detailed in this committee last year, when we passed the on our online privacy law, the harms to children are very serious and demand swift action. Big tech platforms profit immensely from keeping children addicted. They do not care about the privacy, safety, and health of our kids. They are the modern day tobacco and cigarette companies that for so long resisted and misled Congress. And it took the Congress, it took action by the Congress to, to actually protect our kids and to outlaw smoking by, by young people. In early 2020, based upon the growing body of evidence, evidence to harm to kids online, I introduced the Kids' Privacy Act and the Kids' Act. And I wanna thank all of the researchers, the young people, the parents, the Surgeon General of the United States, who have explained the correlation between social media usage and body dissatisfaction, disordered eating habits, anxiety, depression, self-injury, suicide ideation, and cyberbullying.

Heck, Francis Haugen. The Facebook whistleblower was right here and testified to us that Facebook and Instagram conducted research on this topic. They knew and understood the harms, but they continued to elevate profits over the wellbeing of children. And TikTok does the same. Last Congress when we passed the ADPPA, the committee incorporated many of these important child online privacy and safety provisions from my bills. But we can make the 118th Congress's version of this bill of this new law, even more protective of children. And I look forward to working with the chair and the ranking member to make that happen. Mr. Chew, TikTok has incredible sway over children in the us but you don't have a very good track record. In, in 2019, TikTok was hit with the largest civil penalty by the Federal Trade Commission in a children's privacy case. Four years later, TikTok still has not taken sufficient action to fix the problems. I assume because child users are incredibly profitable to your bottom line. So answer me this, TikTok allows advertisers to specifically target advertising to children age six 13 to 17, correct,

Shou Chew:

Congresswoman? I do want to disagree. Yes, the statement that child abuses are not allowed, our platform, yes or no, is deplorable target and is not allowed on our platform.

Rep. Kathy Castor (D-FL):

Target advertising to young people. Age 13 to 17.

Shou Chew:

We do serve personalized advertising at this point, but the policies are very safe for money.

Rep. Kathy Castor (D-FL):

How much money does TikTok make? Selling ads targeted to minors?

Shou Chew:

Congresswoman, can I clarify? Minors in what age?

Rep. Kathy Castor (D-FL):

From just say age 13 to 17.

Shou Chew:

For the teenage population, I wanna clarify that we do have a 13 under 13 experience and zero advertising on that, on that platform. For those,

Rep. Kathy Castor (D-FL):

Well, that's a whole other top.

Shou Chew:

Okay. Between 13 and 17, if you don't mind, I'll check into my team and get back to you on those answers.

Rep. Kathy Castor (D-FL):

You know, TikTok could be designed to minimize the harm to kids, but a decision was made to aggressively addict kids in the name of prophets. And it's our responsibility members to act swiftly to address this. This has gone on for too long. We've dilly downed too much. This committee. Thankfully, we've taken responsibility and enacted, but we have an enormous responsibility tax swiftly, and get this bill to the floor of the house and passed into law as soon as possible. Thank you. I yield back my time.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentle lady yields back. Chair recognizes gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Johnson for five minutes.

Rep. Bill Johnson (R-OH):

Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Chew, I'm, I'm an information technology professional. Been doing it for the most of my life. You've been evasive in many of your answers. I'm going to talk to you in some language that maybe you'll better understand one's in zeros. Okay? Let's talk about the Citizen Lab report. This is something your team frequently mentions in hearings as a way to exonerate yourself. For example, in the limitation section it reads, we could not examine every source code component and test in the apps in every circumstance, which means our methods could not find every security issue, privacy violation, and censorship event. So it's an incomplete assessment. The report notes, that's data collection using third party trackers was an apparent conflict with the GDPR, and that multiple themes were censored by TikTok. What is shocking to me is the shared source code between TikTok in the United States and the CCP centered Douyin.

The Citizen Labs report says that many of the functions and classes were identical, and that the differences in behavior between TikTok and the United States and Douyin and China are slight changes in hard coded values. Incredibly specific censorship parameters from Douyin are present in TikTok, but just turned off. The authors say that for unknown reasons, the parameter vari variable, the itself is preserved. So, while Citizen Lab may have been afraid to say the obvious conclusion, Mr. Chew, I am not TikTok, source code is riddled with back doors and CCP censorship devices. Here's the truth. In a million lines of code, the smallest shift from a zero to a one on just one of thousands of versions of TikTok on the market, we'll unlock explicit CCP censorship and access to American data. Mr. Chew as c e o of TikTok, why have you not directed your engineers to change this source code?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, thank, thank you for the question. I have

Rep. Bill Johnson (R-OH):

You directed them to change the source code,

Shou Chew:

Like what we are offering am my source commitment...

Rep. Bill Johnson (R-OH):

Have you directed them to change that source code?

Shou Chew:

Congressman if you give me a bit of time to just explain.

Rep. Bill Johnson (R-OH):

Explain No, I don't, it's a yes or no question. Have you directed your engineers to change that source code?

Shou Chew:

I'm not sure I understand that.

Rep. Bill Johnson (R-OH):

Why are you allowing TikTok to continue to have the capacity for censorship? And yet you claim here that you don't. Let me remind you of something. Do you realize that making faults and misleading statements to Congress is a federal crime? Yes,

Shou Chew:

I do.

Rep. Bill Johnson (R-OH):

Okay. So have you directed your engineers to change that source code?

Shou Chew:

I am giving third party access monitoring by experts. And, and Congress, your expert on this could agree with percentage and no other company

Rep. Bill Johnson (R-OH):

Source code is the same as Douyin. What percentage?

Shou Chew:

I can get back to you on the specifics.

Rep. Bill Johnson (R-OH):

Okay. I'd appreciate that. Where was the source code for TikTok developed? Was it developed in China or in the United States?

Shou Chew:

It's a global collaborative effort. Like a lot of, was it developed...

Rep. Bill Johnson (R-OH):

A lot of companies? Was it developed in China?

Shou Chew:

Some of it, some of it is.

Rep. Bill Johnson (R-OH):

At ByteDance, Can, can the, when it's compiled in the compilation process, can byte code be manipulated? We've talked a lot about source code. What about the byte code? The ones and zeros that actually execute on the device?

Shou Chew:

Congressman to give you comfort, that's why we're giving third party monitors. Yes. As an expert, I think you can agree that very few companies offer to do this.

Rep. Bill Johnson (R-OH):

Report here by Citizen Lab. I wanna read you something from Ron Deibert. Specifically in your written testimony to Congress. You stated on page nine, Citizen Lab found that there was no overt data transmission by TikTok to the Chinese government, and that TikTok did not contact any servers within China. You implied that Citizen Lab exonerated TikTok from any information sharing with China. Well, the director of Citizen Lab saw this and issued a statement correcting the record yesterday. And I'm quoting Ron Deibert, the director of the lab. I am disappointed that TikTok executives continue citing the Citizen lab's research in their statements to government as somehow expo exculpatory. I've called them out on this in the past and it's unfortunate that I have to do it again. He goes on to say, and I quote, we even speculated about possible mechanisms through which the Chinese government might use unconventional techniques to obtain TikTok user data via pressure on ByteDance. End of quote, Mr. Chew, you sent Congress written testimony citing this lab as a support of your claim that China cannot access user data, us user data. And now this lab has come out to say, we never said that. That's misleading. Mr. Chew, hope you understand what that is. That's misleading Mr. Chew. This is yet another instance of TikTok attempting to mislead Americans about what their technology is capable of and who has access to their information. Madame Chair, I'd like to enter the report by...

Shou Chew:

Madam Chair, I'd like to respond to that directly please.

Rep. Bill Johnson (R-OH):

Ron Diebert and the Citizens Lab into the record.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Without objection.

Rep. Bill Johnson (R-OH):

Without I yield back.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentleman yields back chair, chair yields to the gentleman from Maryland. Mr. Sarbanes, five minutes.

Rep. John Sarbanes (D-MD)

Thanks very much, Madam Chair. Mr. Chew, I'm gonna pick up on a theme we've already covered here, which is the effect that your platform, along with many other social media platforms, by the way, has in terms of mental and behavioral health in this country. I won't speak to what's happening elsewhere in the world, but we've talked about the impact that it's having on children on teens. We took some action last year in this committee to try to improve accesses to resources. We authorize critical programs to address mental health needs, but we need to do even more than that. And we gotta address with the big tech companies like TikTok are doing, because those are platforms that expose children teens to additional risks. The more time that middle and high schoolers spend on social media, the evidence is the more likely they are to experience depression and anxiety.

And this is particularly troubling since apparently 16% of American teenagers report that they use TikTok quote almost constantly. That's, I think, about 5 million teenagers in this country that are on TikTok all the time. And we know that big tech, including TikTok users design features that can manipulate users, including children's and teens, to keep them engaged, designed to feed them a never ending stream of content, keep their attention for hours on end, which includes capitalizing on the desire for others' approval through, like features preying on the fear of missing out through push notifications and so forth. Again, you're part of an industry that's set up to do this. You in some sense don't appear to be able to help yourselves in reaching out and finding that new user and then holding onto them. TikTok itself has acknowledged that these features and others, like the endless scroll feature, can have an outsized effect on teams.

And we've been discussing today how your app only intensifies that harm by amplifying dangerous content and misinformation. I don't wanna be too paternalistic here because we have young people in the audience. We've got TikTok users that are watching this hearing, and I'm sure they have their own ideas about how this technology is being managed by TikTok and other social media platforms. They like to access the platforms and they should be able to do that safely. So it's certainly in their interest and they can drive this conversation, I think perfectly well. But it's not a fair fight, is it? I mean, the algorithms are on one side of the screen. The human brain is on the other side of the screen drowning in these algorithms in many instances at an age where, where the, the brain's not even fully developed yet.

So those addictive impulses are being sort of perfected by the technology. And again, it leaves the users sort of helpless in the face of that. Are you looking at ways to redesign core features like the ones I mentioned to be less manipulative, excuse me, and addictive for users? And can you commit to making some of those modifications here today?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, thank, thank you. We do want to be leading in terms of safety of our users, particularly for teenagers. We were the first to launch a 60 minute watch limit. Yeah, let's talk about the 60 minute launch. And I'm very glad to see people others in our industry follow for many of our recommendations, we'll study them very seriously. We actually have a series of features. Like for example, if you're under 16, you cannot use a direct messaging feature, because, you know we wanna protect those younger users.

If you're under 16, you cannot go viral by default. If you're under 18, you cannot go live. And let me go back to the 60 minute limit because my understanding is that teens can pretty easily bypass the notification to continue using the app if they want to. I mean, let's face it, our our teens are smarter than we are by half, and they know how to use the technology and they can get around these limits if they want to. Are you measuring how many teens continue to exceed the 60 minutes of time on that app? We understand that's how that's working. We, we understand those concerns. What we, our intention is to have the teens and their parents have these conversations about what is the appropriate amount of time for social media. That's why we give the parents what we call family parents.

Rep. John Sarbanes (D-MD)

Let me ask you this question before I run out of time. If you concluded that putting some reasonable limits in place and trying to find a way to enforce them, would lead some percentage of your users to leave TikTok and go somewhere else. Is that something that you're prepared to accept? Yes. Really? Well, I'd love to get the research on how these limits are being implemented, how they're being bypassed, and the things that you're taking the measures you're taking to address those issues going forward. Please bring that information back to our committee as we move forward. I'll be happy to. I yield back.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentleman yields, chair recognizes gentlemen from Kentucky, Mr. Guthrie for five

Rep. Brett Guthrie (R-KY):

Minutes. Thank you Madam Chair for, for yielding. I appreciate the time. Mr. Chew, your terms of service specifically state that TikTok does, and I quote, not allow the depiction promotion or trade of drugs or other controlled substances despite this content being against your terms of service. And I have brought this up with our other service providers, but despite this content being against your terms of service content on your platform related to illicit drugs like fentanyl, drug trafficking and other illicit activity is pervasive and racks up hundreds of thousands of views. For example, in 2020, the Benadryl Challenge resulted in the death of an American teenager. When we heard of another one challenge earlier today that brought a death of a teenager while you were at ByteDance, if you were the CFO for ByteDance, did duh allow related illicit drug trafficking regard challenges resulting in death or injury to kids?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, I represent TikTok here today. I can tell you that TikTok does not allow illegal drugs.

Rep. Brett Guthrie (R-KY):

Do, just do in do it did in China.

Shou Chew:

I believe they don't allow this, but I will need to check. I don't run their business. I can tell you TikTok does not allow this,

Rep. Brett Guthrie (R-KY):

This is what we're concerned about. And, and my guess, and, and it would, would Douyin allow for, for 41 days a threat against a me member of the Chinese Communist Party to stand on their web on their site for 41 days?

Shou Chew:

Again, I cannot speak for Douyin, and I I'm sorry, I didn't hear the second part of what you said.

Rep. Brett Guthrie (R-KY):

Well we had a threat against the chairman of our committee that was on your site for 41 days. My guess is that would not be allowed in China.

Shou Chew:

That that content is, if it's violative, I would look into the specifics and I would, I would, would if it violates our guidelines, you'll be taken down on TikTok.

Rep. Brett Guthrie (R-KY):

Yeah. Surely Yes. It appears that it does. But the problem is it that I'm, what I'm trying to get at is you seem to be able to prevent this content in China, but you, so not even taking it down, just prevent it from being posted. And yet it, it's, it's all, it's on your website. So I have some couple of questions about you, you said earlier, as soon as you find this information, you take it down. So how quickly does your algorithm detect keywords or content that involve illicit drug trafficking before these posts are self-reported or used by others?

Shou Chew:

We have about 40,000 people working on this now together with the machines that we train. I don't think any company in our industry can be perfect at this. This is a real big challenge for our industry, but our goal is to get this, any violative content, including illegal drugs, down to a very, very small number that

Rep. Brett Guthrie (R-KY):

That's the problem. When we have these hearings, we have CEOs of different companies and and of your, your colleagues and competitors. And we always hear apologies and we always hear we wanna do better at this. But it, it just doesn't seem to keep improving. And we see or hearing stories of our, of our children. And, and, and obviously this has been talked about today, so how many posts and accounts have been identified and removed from TikTok due to content posts posted related to illicit drugs or other controlled substances?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, we do publish that in a transparency report. I can get my team to get the information to yours.

Rep. Brett Guthrie (R-KY):

Thank you. I appreciate that. Also, we, we understand that, that the way that people use TikTok or other platforms similar to yours is that they, they ensure flag user content isn't permitted to jump from. So my question, so what we've heard is that the instances the user see a drug advertisement and then give a, a code to go to another site. So my question is, do you work with other platforms to ensure flag user content is a permitted to jump from one platform to others?

Shou Chew:

I will check with my team. I would love to work with our industry to make sure that we stamp out these problems. You know, violative content should not be allowed on any platforms, in my opinion.

Rep. Brett Guthrie (R-KY):

Well, so what's, you know, kind of frustrating to all of us here is that we look at what's happening on, on your sites and others, and particularly that, that we know because we've done a research that you can't have access to illicit drug information, others on Douyin, which is a sister company, as you say, in China. And, and so it, it, it absolutely, if you can prevent it on one and not the other, you obviously have the ability to stop it from moving forward and yet you don't. Would you like to expand how, how one of your sister companies can prevent that? And you're not, I know you don't represent Douyin, but they don't allow it, but it happens on your platform. What's the difference?

Shou Chew:

First of all, the majority of the content on TikTok is fun, entertaining informative and very positive. Our users, like other companies that operate in this country, we have to deal with some bad actors who come and publish some content on illegal, illegal drugs.

Rep. Brett Guthrie (R-KY):

You know, other, bad actors don't seem to be able to access Douyin.

Shou Chew:

The TikTok US experience should be compared to other US companies because this is common change.

Rep. Brett Guthrie (R-KY):

But your parent company has the technology to prevent it because you prevent it in China, but you can't prevent it here. Why? Why? It's a difference. That's why I'm asking.

Shou Chew:

Oh, Congressman, there is no technology that is perfect in doing this. We have to deal with the reality of the country that you were operating in and here in the United States, as with other companies, we, we share this challenge. We are investing a lot to address the challenge, but we are, you know, we, it's a shared

Rep. Brett Guthrie (R-KY):

Challenge. Do you invest a lot to seem to be able to address it in China but not here?

Shou Chew:

Again, you know, I think the comparison has been with, within the, the single country. You know, we face the same set of challenges here in the us.

Rep. Brett Guthrie (R-KY):

What's the difference? I'm sorry, I'm not a temple, but what's the difference in China? And here?

Shou Chew:

Let me give you an example of congressman. In my home country, Singapore, there is lit almost no illegal drug content because Singapore has very strict drug laws.

Rep. Brett Guthrie (R-KY):

Thank you. My time's expired. Now, yield back.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentleman, yields back chair recognizes the gentleman from New York. Mr. Tonko for five minutes.

Rep. Paul Tonko (D-NY):

Thank you Madam Chair. I'm concerned that's algorithm prize praise on vulnerable people, including those struggling with addiction, eating orders, disorders, and other mental health conditions. A platform is designed to push content to users that will watch more frequently and for longer periods of time. Unfortunately, for many people suffering from certain mental health disorders, videos that reinforce their fears or negative self-image are more engaging. On top of that, TikTok has received sensitive patient health information and records of browsing activity from multiple tele-health companies like better Health, health and Cerebral people's personal struggles should not be fuel fork's, profits. People should be able to seek help to address serious medical concerns without being afraid that their information will be shared with social media companies trying to push more products, services, or content at them. So Mr. Chew, will TikTok continue to get information from third parties on its users' health, including their mental health? Yes or no?

Shou Chew:

We will continue the work of experts, yes. If that's the question. To identify this issue,

Rep. Paul Tonko (D-NY):

Will you continue to get information from these third parties including their mental health? Yes or no?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, I'm sorry. I may not understand your question. If your question is, if I'm working with them on these issues, the answer is yes.

Rep. Paul Tonko (D-NY):

It's not the question. It's will you continue to get information from these third parties on its user's health,

Shou Chew:

Get information. We do not get any user health information from third parties, Congressman.

Rep. Paul Tonko (D-NY):

You've talked a lot about user privacy and safety. Will you commit here today to no longer using data about users health, particularly their mental health, to push them content or cell ads? Yes or no?

Shou Chew:

We take our users mental health very seriously.

Rep. Paul Tonko (D-NY):

Yes or no?

Shou Chew:

As far as I'm aware, we don't do that. Congressman, it's not, not what the...

Rep. Paul Tonko (D-NY):

So the answer is no. You'll no longer use data about users health. Tiktok systematically exploits users' anxieties by pushing alarming and distressing content onto their four you page. For example, in May of 2022, the LA Times found as some pregnant users searching for information about their pregnancies on TikTok were then shown information about miscarriages, stillbirths, and delivery room traumas. Your company knows that distressing content can have the perverse effect of feeding user engagement. And for TikTok engagement means money in the course of a week. What percentage of content that a user sees is considered potentially harmful or distressing content?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, we work with a lot of experts on this even before we, the 60 minute time limit for under eighteens, if you spend too much time on our platform, you can try it. If you spend too much time, we will actually send you videos to tell you to go out and get some air and get off the platform.

Rep. Paul Tonko (D-NY):

What percentage of content that a user sees is considered potentially harmful?

Shou Chew:

I will need to follow up with my team and get back to you on that, if that's okay.

Rep. Paul Tonko (D-NY):

Ballpark.

Shou Chew:

I will need to follow up with my team.

Rep. Paul Tonko (D-NY):

So are teenagers in particular shown more distressing content?

Shou Chew:

The opposite is true. We actually put in more restrictions to make sure that our teenagers get a better experience, you know, are,

Rep. Paul Tonko (D-NY):

Are expecting or new parents shown more distressing content?

Shou Chew:

I know of many parents including one I met recently who actually use our platform to find communities to connect with other parents and learn a lot more. I've, I've heard amazing stories of creators who have difficulties, you know,

Rep. Paul Tonko (D-NY):

Reclaiming my time. Are individuals with eating disorders shown more distressing content?

Shou Chew:

We do not re we remove all content that glorifies eating disorders, and we have worked of experts to look at certain inherently certain content that may not inherently be harmful, like diet trends and, and make sure that we disperse them more throughout our algorithm.

Rep. Paul Tonko (D-NY):

What about those with mental health issues? Are they, this is depressing content.

Shou Chew:

If, if a user searches, you know, words that expresses mental health issues, we actually redirect them to a safety page. Like for example if you, I don't know if I should say this in public. If you search, I want to die, we'll redirect you to a safety page, for example.

Rep. Paul Tonko (D-NY):

So what about those suffering from addiction? Are they given more distressing content?

Shou Chew:

I'm sorry, Congressman, I missed that question.

Rep. Paul Tonko (D-NY):

Those suffering from addiction, are they given more distressing content?

Shou Chew:

I missed the first few words. I apologize.

Rep. Paul Tonko (D-NY):

What about those suffering from addiction? Are they given more distressing content?

Shou Chew:

Those suffering from addiction? Addiction? Do you mean drug addiction?

Rep. Paul Tonko (D-NY):

Yes. Or any order of addiction.

Shou Chew:

If people search for content and you can try on the variety of subjects, we were actually direct you to a safety page to give you more resources. And a lot of recovering addicts have actually found their communities on TikTok and it's really helped them, you know, find their voices and the community and the courage to, to really overcome their addiction. I personally have heard stories of that.

Rep. Paul Tonko (D-NY):

Well, I appreciate your answers, but I was looking for yes or no, and we did not get those. And again, I think the more that they watched this distressing content, the more profit TikTok makes. And that's distressing.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentlemen, yields back chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan. Mr. Walberg for five minutes.

Rep. Tim Walberg (R-MI):

Thank you Madam Chair, and we're glad that you're here. Mr. Chew. As Chair Rodgers and representative Burgess mentioned this morning, the Wall Street Journal reported that China will firmly oppose any for sale or divestiture of TikTok. And this is based not on conjecture, but it's on comments provided by the official spokesperson at the Ministry of Commerce who said that any TikTok sale or spinoff would amount to a technology export and would have to adhere to Chinese law and approval. This spokesperson was quoted as saying that Chinese and I quote, the Chinese government will make decisions according to the law, the Chinese government. Mr. Chew, do you agree with this official yes or no?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, I cannot speak on behalf of a Chinese government official.

Rep. Tim Walberg (R-MI):

Do you agree with that official?

Shou Chew:

We will need to look at this because Project Texas is designed to move forward here in the United States, and we are not discussing this. So, I I don't have specifics.

Rep. Tim Walberg (R-MI):

You know, your company is valued at upwards of 50 billion and has been on the verge of for sale or ban for three years at least, correct? Do you expect this committee to believe you haven't already discussed this scenario with your team, and you should have an answer to this, yes or no? I agree with a communist party or I don't agree with a communist party. So I guess I would say at that point you disagree with a Congress Communist party. Explain your discrepancy.

Shou Chew:

Congressman, for two years we spent a billion and a half US dollars to build project taxes. This is after very extensive discussions with Project Texas.

Rep. Tim Walberg (R-MI):

Project Texas is just something expanded for the future. We're talking about now, we're talking about what you're doing now, what your expectations are now, what your relationship is with the Communist Party, which is our major concern of what the impact that will be with a country. Let me rephrase that. With a communist party that doesn't care about America and sees us as standing in their way for, for superpower, that's our concern. And for you to have direct relationship direct ownership with ByteDance, and to not have a character characterization or an agreement or disagreement that you say explicitly with this party policy, it's hard for us to, to believe what you're saying. Let me move on. Following up on what Mr. Latta asked about data access by Chinese engineers in responding to Mr. Latta, you talked about where American user data would be stored in the future, but the question was about access today, storage in the future versus access today. This is total redirection. This blows up any trust we could desire to develop. So to be clear, Mr. Chew, today, do ByteDance employees in Beijing have access to American data?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, we have been very open about this. We have relied on global interoperability.

Rep. Tim Walberg (R-MI):

You have access to American data.

Shou Chew:

Congressman, I'm, I'm answering your question. If you give me just a bit of time, we, we rely on global interoperability and we have employees in China. So yes, the Chinese engineers do have access to global data.

Rep. Tim Walberg (R-MI):

We have access to global data.

Shou Chew:

We have heard

Rep. Tim Walberg (R-MI):

Not storage.

Shou Chew:

No storage has always been in Virginia and Singapore. The, the physical service...

Rep. Tim Walberg (R-MI):

You have no access to storage to American data today.

Shou Chew:

That's not what I said. I said...

Rep. Tim Walberg (R-MI):

So you do have access to American data and you have storage of American data.

Shou Chew:

The American data has always been stored in Virginia and Singapore in the past. And access to this is on an as required basis. Engineers as globally, by engineers for business purposes, by engineers...

Rep. Tim Walberg (R-MI):

A private company ByteDance,

Shou Chew:

ByteDance?

Rep. Tim Walberg (R-MI):

The Communist Party.

Shou Chew:

No, no.

Rep. Tim Walberg (R-MI):

Why? How can you say that? They have access.

Shou Chew:

This is a private business and is like many other businesses, many other American companies, we rely on the global workforce.

Rep. Tim Walberg (R-MI):

So the global workforce that includes ByteDance, which is connected directly to the Chinese Communist Party.

Shou Chew:

That is a characterization that we'd disagree with. Now in the future...

Rep. Tim Walberg (R-MI):

The future, that's not, that's not what we can disagree with. That's a fact.

Shou Chew:

It's not, unfortunately.

Rep. Tim Walberg (R-MI):

The CEO of ByteDance and your relationship to them.

Shou Chew:

Congressman, respectfully, in my opening statement, I said, this is a private company. It's owned 60% by global investors. Th three out of the five board members on ByteDance are Americans. This is a private business.

Rep. Tim Walberg (R-MI):

And you report directly to ByteDance with the CEO who is a member of Communist Party. Let me move on.

Shou Chew:

He's not.

Rep. Tim Walberg (R-MI):

I think we, I think we got the answer. Sadly at this point, I believe my time has expired, so I yield back.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentlemen, yields back. Chair recognizes Ms. Clarke for five minutes.

Rep. Yvette Clarke (D-NY):

Thank you Chairwoman Rodgers, thank the ranking member Pallone for holding today's hearing. Throughout this hearing I also want to thank our witness for being here to testify on what are very important issues before us today. Throughout this hearing, my colleagues have outlined the potential threat posed by the security of Americans', data by TikTok being affiliated, and some would say owned by a Chinese company, foreign adversaries. Having direct access to Americans' data as well as the ability to influence this content, American see on a prolific social media platform, represents an unprecedented threat to American security and to our democracy. However, the problems of social media platforms, content moderation, algorithmic discrimination and safety are neither new nor unique to TikTok.

Mr. Chew, I share the concerns raised by my colleague, Congresswoman Matt Sui, related to algorithms. I believe that without mitigation against bias, platforms will continue to replicate exacerbate discrimination that is illegal under civil rights law, as well as exclude important dialogue about sensitive topics like race from occurring on the platform. For example, I was disturbed by reports that TikTok content moderation algorithm flagged words like black or black lives matter as inappropriate content. So my first question, Mr. Choose, do you agree that platforms like TikTok should be subject to regular audits or transparency requirements to identify whether policies have a disparate impact on communities that are protected classes like race, religion, national origin, or agenda?

Shou Chew:

I think Congresswoman, I think platforms should be very transparent on what they do there and disclose a lot of information. We can get back on the specifics of what we mean by an audit, but I do agree very strongly that platforms should be very transparent and it's a commitment that we are giving to this committee and all our users that our platform will be a place for freedom of expression. We embrace all diverse points of view, all ethnic minorities. You can come and say whatever you want, as long as you don't violate the rules of safety that we've put in place. And we will, we also commit to be free of all and any government manipulation. So I think I'm in strong agreement with a lot of what you said.

Rep. Yvette Clarke (D-NY):

Well, well, thank you. My bill, the Algorithmic Accountability Act would require platforms to be transparent about their algorithms, measure disparate impact, and require risk mitigation. It is vital that the diverse culture of the United States is reflected online, but I'm concerned the algorithms and content moderation practices employed by TikTok are ignorant to the fundamental diversity, while also failing to remove content that is harmful, like child sexual abuse, material hate speech, or domestic terrorism content. My next question to you is, it's my understanding that users must be in good standing to be eligible for compensation from Talk's Creator Fund, for example, they can have violated community guidelines. Is this correct?

Shou Chew:

There are some details there, but directionally yes.

Rep. Yvette Clarke (D-NY):

If talk's algorithm is flagging content incorrectly resulting in creators violating community guidelines, when in fact they have not, those creators would not be eligible to receive compensation under the Creator Fund. Correct?

Shou Chew:

We do have an appeals process.

Rep. Yvette Clarke (D-NY):

You have an appeals process, okay. Yes. In my view, if TikTok employs algorithms that disproportionately misre remove content from black creators, it's disproportionately silences and excludes black creators from compensation opportunities. And this problem happens in parallel to the lack of adequate recognition, attribution, and compensation to black creatives for their content. The exploitation cultural misappropriations, the erasure of black creatives, ownership of their fashion, art, and media is nothing new. We need transparency, accountability, and bold action to mitigate against misinformation, bias, and exclusion of certain communities from the opportunities present on platforms like TikTok. So let me, let me just say this. I'm concerned about transparency. I am concerned about a algorithmic accountability, and I'm not clear that your organization holds those values. So I wanna ask that you take a look at this because this is all part and parcel of what we are concerned about with respect to social media platforms and the misappropriation the the ways in which those algorithms can discriminate within the context of the social media platform. With that Madam Chair, are you,

Shou Chew:

Is it okay if I just very quickly respond? This is a very important topic.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Unfortunately we only have four and a half hours with you, and I'm gonna try to get to every member, so we're gonna keep going.

Shou Chew:

It is very important. I would love to follow up.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Follow up. Well, there will be other opportunities. The lady yields back, gentlemen from Georgia. Mr. Buddy Carter recognized for five minutes.

Rep. Earl “Buddy” Carter (R-GA):

Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Crew, welcome to the most bipartisan committee in Congress. We may not always agree on how to get there, but we care about our, our national security. We care about our economy, and we sure as heck care about our children. We sure do. And that's why you're here today because two thirds of all the youth and our country are on your, on your app. They spend an average of 95 minutes on your app. And, you know, research has shown that TikTok is the most addictive platform out there. And and the reason for that, as we've been told, is because it has the most advanced algorithm. And the Chinese Communist Party knows this. And I don't speak for everyone, but there are those on this committee, including myself, who believe that the Chinese Communist Party is engaged in psychological warfare through TikTok to deliberately influence us children.

You know, you see behind me, if, if you'll look behind me, Mr. Cre, you see some of the challenges that we've seen on TikTok. You know about 'em, you know about the M milk crate, you know about the about the blackout challenge. You know, about the NyQuil chicken challenge, the Benadryl challenge, the dragon's breath, liquid nitrogen trend are the challenge that promotes car theft. I wanna ask you, as I understand it, there's a sister app in China, D Kin, I'm, I'm sorry if I'm butchering the pronunciation. Do they have these same things over there? Do they have these kind of challenges?

Shou Chew:

Congress in China Congress? Ma'am, I'm, I'm really glad you asked this question. I am.

Rep. Earl “Buddy” Carter (R-GA):

Do they yes or no?

Shou Chew:

I'm not sure because Yeah.

Rep. Earl “Buddy” Carter (R-GA):

Whoa, whoa, come on now. You're not sure.

Shou Chew:

I really am not sure.

Rep. Earl “Buddy” Carter (R-GA):

And remember you took the, the chair ladies, you said you gotta tell the truth. Okay? Do you know whether they have these kind of challenges like this over in China? Because it's my understanding they don't,

Shou Chew:

I'm not sure because I spend my energies running TikTok.

Rep. Earl “Buddy” Carter (R-GA):

And, and you don't look at any of your other competitors or look at anything similar to yours. So you don't know whether they have, they don't have this over in China. I did. We have it here, but they don't have it here. And that's, that's why I'm, I'm asking you this. Why is it that TikTok consistently fails to identify and moderate these kinds of, of harmful videos? Why is it, why is it that you allow this to go on? We've already heard God bless you from parents who, who are here with us, who have lost children. I, I submit to you, everybody up here cares about the children of this country. Tell me, tell me why

Shou Chew:

This is a real industry challenge and we're working very very hard...

Rep. Earl “Buddy” Carter (R-GA):

No, no, no. It's not industry, this is TikTok. his is TikTok we're talking about, we're talking about why is it that you can't control this? And although I believe in giving credit, we're credit's due, I want to thank you. It's my understanding that the video that threatened life with the chairwoman has been, has been removed. Thank you for doing that. Sorry, we had to bring it to your attention here, but it's been removed. Tell me why this goes on.

Shou Chew:

This is an industry challenge for all of us here operating in this country.

Rep. Earl “Buddy” Carter (R-GA):

Industry. Okay, so much for industry challenge. I wanna shift gears real quick. I wanna talk about biometric matrix. And, and I wanna talk specifically. Can you tell me right now, can you say with a hundred percent certainty that TikTok does not use the phone's camera to determine whether the content that elicits a pupil dilation should be amplified by the algorithm? Can you tell me that

Shou Chew:

We do not collect body, face or voice data to identify our users? We, we do not. The only thing...

Rep. Earl “Buddy” Carter (R-GA):

You don't?

Shou Chew:

No, the only face data that you'll get that we collect is when you use the filters to have, see sunglasses on your face. We need to know where your eyes are and

Rep. Earl “Buddy” Carter (R-GA):

Why do you need to know what the eyes are if you're not seeing if they're dilated?

Shou Chew:

And, and that data is stored on your local device and deleted after use if you use it for facial. Again, we do not collect body, face or voice data to identify our users.

Rep. Earl “Buddy” Carter (R-GA):

I find that hard to believe. It's our understanding that they're looking at the eyes. How do you determine what age they are then?

Shou Chew:

We rely on age gating as our key age assurance age gating, which is when you ask the user what age they are, we have also developed some tools where we look at the public profile to go through the videos that they post to see whether, well,

Rep. Earl “Buddy” Carter (R-GA):

That's creepy. Tell me more about that.

Shou Chew:

It's public. So if you post a video that's, you choose that video to go public. That's how you get people to see your video. We look at those to see if you, it matches up the age that you talked about. Now this is a real challenge for our industry because privacy versus age assurance is a really big problem. Look,

Rep. Earl “Buddy” Carter (R-GA):

Look, you keep talking about the industry. We're talking about TikTok here. We're talking about children dying. Do you know how many children have died because of this? Do you have any idea? Can you tell me?

Shou Chew:

Congressman again is heartbreaking.

Rep. Earl “Buddy” Carter's (R-GA):

Can you tell me? How many children in America have died because of challenges like this?

Shou Chew:

The majority of people who use health platform use it for positive experiences. There are,

Rep. Earl “Buddy” Carter (R-GA):

And that's not what I ask you Some I ask you tell me the number of children of us children who have died because of these challenges.

Shou Chew:

Congressman again, the majority of majority of people who come on our platform get a good experience.

Rep. Earl “Buddy” Carter's (R-GA):

I'm not talking about the majority of children. I want to know a number.

Shou Chew:

Dangerous challenges are not allowed in our platform. If we find them, we will remove them. We take this very seriously.

Rep. Earl “Buddy” Carter (R-GA):

Obviously you found one today and you removed it. We had to bring it to your attention and I know I'm out of time. Thank you for being here. Welcome again to the most bipartisan committee in Congress.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentleman yields back. We will now take a brief recess and resume in 10 minutes. The committee stands in recess.

Chair recognizes gentleman from California, Mr. Cárdenas, or five minutes Mr. Cárdenas.

Rep. Tony Cárdenas (D-CA):

Thank you Madam Chairwoman. I appreciate this opportunity for this committee to have this important hearing regarding TikTok and its effect on the American people, especially the American children, and the potential effect, not potential, but the effects that it has had and may have in the future when it comes to our democracy and misinformation and disinformation that permeates on TikTok. It's unfortunate that I think most Americans or most parents think that TikTok is this innocent little thing where kids get on there and they do a little dance or something like that. But TikTok is much, much more as some of my colleagues, and I thank them for bringing up some of these serious issues, literally life and death issues that TikTok is right in the middle of. And also what I'd like the witness to acknowledge is that it appears that Ms. Kaec, my colleague brought up those two posters. And since then TikTok has taken them down since then, not before then. Are you aware of that? Mr. Chew?

Shou Chew:

I was briefed during the break that they are taken down.

Rep. Tony Cárdenas (D-CA):

Conversation. Okay. how do you feel about the fact that they were, it was up for apparently 40 some days, 41 days, and yet in the middle of this hearing, it was brought directly to your attention, and as a result, it has been taken down so quickly.

Shou Chew:

It goes to show the enormous challenge that we have to make sure that although the vast majority of our users come for a good experience, we, we need to make sure that bad actors don't post violative content.

Rep. Tony Cárdenas (D-CA):

Yes. And the way Mr. Chew, that you can make sure is that you can make sure that you choose to invest more resources, more money into more ability to pull down damaging and deadly information from your platform. Are you investing more and more and more every day into bringing down that kind of content? That's my question. Are you?

Shou Chew:

Yes. and I'm committed to investing more in this, in this regard to stay on top of the growth right here in the United States.

Rep. Tony Cárdenas (D-CA):

Many, many languages are used and spoken. For example, TikTok in the United States is being used in many languages, specifically when it comes to Spanish language. Are you dedicating more resources today than you did months ago, years ago, on making sure that you are combing through that content to make sure that if content is dangerous or damaging or deadly, that you are bringing it down as quickly as possible?

Shou Chew:

Yes, we are investing in more Spanish language content moderation, and yes, we will, once we identify Okay. The violative content, we'll take it down as soon as possible.

Rep. Tony Cárdenas (D-CA):

And thank you. And your testimony today isn't the only opportunity for you to commit to answering questions to this committee. So I'd like you to forward to this committee. Again, I'm not asking for trade secrets, but I would like to get some semblance of understanding as to how much you are investing with the number of bodies, the number of people, the number of resources in making sure that you are investing more in pulling down content that is either deadly or dangerous on your platform. Can you forward that to the committee...

Shou Chew:

My team will get back to you on this.

Rep. Tony Cárdenas (D-CA):

Contract? Thank you very much. Appreciate that opportunity. As was mentioned earlier it might sound a little funny, but you have in fact been one of the few people to unite this committee members, Republicans and Democrats to be in agreement that we are frustrated with TikTok, we're upset with TikTok. And yes, you keep mentioning that there are industry issues that not only TikTok faces, but others, you remind me a lot of Mike Zuckerberg. He w when he came here, I said to my staff, he reminds me of Fred Astaire. Good dancer with words. And you are doing the same today. A lot of your answers are a bit nebulous. They're not yes or no. So, I'd like to ask you a question, yes or no, is your revenue going up at TikTok month over month or year over year?

Shou Chew:

Yes. Our revenue is going up year over year.

Rep. Tony Cárdenas (D-CA):

Okay. And with that, some of the answers I'd like you to forward this committee is, are you investing more and more money into making sure that content that is dangerous and or deadly, you're investing more and more resources in that aspect of your expenditures and your commitment to your users and to your, your organization?

Shou Chew:

Yes. I commit to that, and we will, we are investing more, and we will continue to do that.

Rep. Tony Cárdenas (D-CA):

Okay. My last question is this are you a Chinese company?

Shou Chew:

Tiktok is a company that's now headquartered in Singapore and Los Angeles.

Rep. Tony Cárdenas (D-CA):

Okay.

Shou Chew:

Our, we are not available in mainland China. Our uses are in other countries around the world.

Rep. Tony Cárdenas (D-CA):

Okay. Is there a corporation that has any authority above TikTok?

Shou Chew:

Tiktok is the subsidiary of ByteDance, which is founded by a Chinese founder,

Rep. Tony Cárdenas (D-CA):

Yes. And by Douyin is a Chinese company.

Shou Chew:

Well, ByteDance owns many businesses that operates in China.

Rep. Tony Cárdenas (D-CA):

Is it or is it not a Chinese company?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, the way we look at it, it was founded by Chinese.

Rep. Tony Cárdenas (D-CA):

No, I'm not asking you how you look at it. Fact, is it a Chinese company or not? For example, Dell is a company, it's an American company. They have AC activities all over the world. Is it a Chinese company?

Shou Chew:

I frequently have this discussions with others on what is a company that is now global.

Rep. Tony Cárdenas (D-CA):

That that's okay. I prefer you answer the question and stop dancing verbally on a madam chair. My time is expired. Thank you very much,

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentlemen. Yields back chair recognizes gentleman from California and Mr. Obernolte.

Rep. Jay Obernolte (R-CA):

Well, thank you very much. Mr. Chew, it's nice to see you again. If I could just bring us back up to 30,000 feet for a second. I just wanna talk about what we're afraid of here. You know, what, what we fear might happen. Social media companies and TikTok is unique in this is not unique in this. Gather a tremendous amount of user data and then use powerful AI tools to use that data to make eerily accurate predictions of human behavior and then seek to manipulate that behavior. And that's something that it's not just TikTok, it's all our social media companies that are doing this. Ultimately, the solution is to enact comprehensive federal data privacy legislation that will prevent that kind of behavior, or at least allow users to consent to it. And that's, I know, something that the chair is working on, the ranking member.

I hope that this committee will act on that this year. The specific concern here, though, as regards TikTok, is that this type of capability falling into the hands of foreign countries is something that has national security implications, and that's why Congress is getting involved on this issue. So I know that you have proposed Project Texas in an effort alleviate these fears. So I wanted to ask some specific technical questions about Project Texas and the way that you believe that it will solve this problem. So one of the things that you've said in your testimony is that part of Project Texas will have engineers at Oracle going through the source code for TikTok. How, how large is that code base?

Shou Chew:

Well, it is, it's not small, but it's not just Oracle. Congressman. We are also inviting other third party monitors. We're in the process of figuring out who the best sure.

Rep. Jay Obernolte (R-CA):

So we talking we're talking millions, tens of millions of lines of code. How big is the base? It

Shou Chew:

It is significant. But it's something that we believe can be done. And again, I wanna say that I don't, I have not heard of another, another company, American or not. No, no. I understand it's allowed for this to happen,

Rep. Jay Obernolte (R-CA):

But I mean, you're kind of at a unique position having to, to answer these concerns of Congress. So are they going through the code for just the app or the app and the server code?

Shou Chew:

I can get back to you on the, the technical details, but is is, is comprehensive, including the software that powers the, a lot of the software that powers the experience.

Rep. Jay Obernolte (R-CA):

And how long will that review take?

Shou Chew:

I need to get back to you on the timeline, but we are progressing quite well on Project Texas, and whenever we hit a milestone, I committed to be very transparent about it.

Rep. Jay Obernolte (R-CA):

Okay. So I'm wondering, because I'm also concerned as a software engineer about the process in which new code is introduced into the code base. Do you use a software configuration management system at TikTok?

Shou Chew:

The way we plan for new code to be done is that even before the code becomes live, it has to be reviewed. The changes have to be reviewed by, okay, so you,

Rep. Jay Obernolte (R-CA):

The body monitor, you're talking about a, a code review. That was, that was good. That was another question I had for you. So the code review, is it done with a team of engineers or just with a single engineer?

Shou Chew:

Oh, it's going to be a team effort. Okay.

Rep. Jay Obernolte (R-CA):

Yeah. And that's, that's gonna be done at Oracle or elsewhere?

Shou Chew:

It is, it's gonna be done in one of our transparent transparency centers so that we, you know we still need to make sure that the code itself is secure and Okay. You know so

Rep. Jay Obernolte (R-CA):

Yeah, what I'm hearing you say is that even though the code might be written by someone not in the United States before the code is integrated, it'll be reviewed in a code review by a team of engineers within the United States.

Shou Chew:

That that's the plan.

Rep. Jay Obernolte (R-CA):

Okay. And this back to the question about the software configuration management system. How do you, how do you manage the integration of that code change into the rest of the TikTok code base?

Shou Chew:

The long and short of it is we have built a team of American personnel with security credentials. The, the person who leads the team used to work for the secret service.

Rep. Jay Obernolte (R-CA):

I understand, but I mean, there's, there's a software solution for integrating those code changes into the code base. What's, what solution is that?

Shou Chew:

I need to check, get back to you on the details.

Rep. Jay Obernolte (R-CA):

Okay. Well, specifically what I'd like to know is to make sure that this isn't something that TikTok has, has created custom, which many companies do. Because that would mean that you'd have to review the code, source code for that as well. Yeah. For security. How do you protect against threats like the a malicious actor being hired not by TikTok, but by Oracle, for example, or by USDS?

Shou Chew:

The the approach that most companies take for these things is to have several layers of monitoring to make sure that everything, everything that somebody has reviewed, there's a secondary review. So that one malicious actor is not able to create the damage that the malicious actor can do. But you rightly pointed out, these kind of problems are industry-wide problems, right? Every company has to do with them.

Rep. Jay Obernolte (R-CA):

Okay. Well, let me ask a specific question about that. I mean, I, I in thinking about if I, if I were a malicious actor, a software engineer on one of your projects, how I would go about writing a, a malicious code, I wouldn't put it right there and say, Hey, I'm malicious. I would put unrelated lines of code in different sections of the code that work together to do something malicious. How do you think that that could get caught?

Shou Chew:

Again, you know, we have to rely on third party experts to, to help us with that. I think there are enough experts who can catch a lot of these things. The work on security globally on all data security is never perfect. Yeah, I understand. But we can, we can have a lot of oversight to keep it safer than any other experience.

Rep. Jay Obernolte (R-CA):

I, I appreciate the effort. My concern, Mr. Chew, is I don't believe that it is technically possible to accomplish what TikTok says it will accomplish through Project Texas. I just think that there are too, too many back doors through that process to allow that to be possible. And I think a malicious actor would succeed in inserting malicious code in there if they wanted to. I, but I hope we, I see we're outta time. I hope we get an opportunity to, to talk some more about this. I yield back, Madam Chair.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentleman, yields back. Chair recognizes the gentle lady from Michigan, Mrs. Dingell, for five minutes.

Rep. Debbie Dingell (D-MI):

Thank you, Chairman Rodgers and Ranking Member Pallone for holding this hearing. And to Mr. Chew for testifying here today. Good news, you're halfway through with me. As screen time increases, so do inherent risks, and with the proliferation and popularity of new social media platforms, so does the potential reach of dangerous, provocative, and often harmful content. And my fear, the abuse of collected data as a representative from the state of Michigan, I can speak from experience on how social media has been used to target members of the Michigan delegation, including a pate to kidnap our governor, and how it can be weapon weaponized to perpetuate harms towards individuals and communities. And you saw firsthand how it targeted the chair of this committee today. Many of my co colleagues on both sides of the aisle have raised legitimate concerns about protecting children online misinformation and securing our data concerns that I share and has been said by many of my colleagues are bipartisan shared.

I think of many ways these myriad of issues highlight the need for comprehensive di data privacy legislation that would ensure the safety and integrity of every American's data on every social media platform and mi mitigate potential harms. One important area of concern I have regarding data collection is geolocation data and how it can be abused. I've seen it abused. I have seen women die because it has been abused. This subject has dangerous implications for survivors of domestic violence, people seeking medical care and protecting children from potential predators. Mr. Chew, in your testimony, you wrote that current versions of the app do not collect precise or approximate g p s information from US users. Yes or no answers, please. Mr. Chew have any prior versions of talk's app collected precise GP PS information from US users, yes or no?

Shou Chew:

Yes. From back in 2020, about three years ago.

Rep. Debbie Dingell (D-MI):

Are there currently TikTok users who still hold old versions of the app that collect precise GPS information from US users? Yes or no?

Shou Chew:

That could be, but that's a small percentage.

Rep. Debbie Dingell (D-MI):

It's still dangerous. Has TikTok at any time fed precise GPS information collected from US users into algorithms to serve user ads? Yes or no?

Shou Chew:

I will need to check on the details because we do not currently col collect that, so I need to check on the details. Yeah,

Rep. Debbie Dingell (D-MI):

I'm sure there is a yes there. But has TikTok at any time fed precise GPS information collected from US users Intel algorithms? No. I'm happy. Talk today to make inferences about users, yes or no?

Shou Chew:

I'm not sure if they're specific.

Rep. Debbie Dingell (D-MI):

So I'd like answers yes or no after this. Has TikTok at any time sold precise g p s information collected from US users? Yes or no?

Shou Chew:

We do not sell data to data brokers, if that's the question.

Rep. Debbie Dingell (D-MI):

And you've never done that?

Shou Chew:

I do not believe so.

Rep. Debbie Dingell (D-MI):

Has TikTok at any time sold or shared with third parties it, it or <inaudible> inferences that were made using in part or in whole precise g p s information collected from US users? Yes or no?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, I need to check on these specifics. What I can tell you is right now we do not collect precise G Ps location data in the United States. All

Rep. Debbie Dingell (D-MI):

Right. Does TikTok still use inferences that were made using in part or in whole precise GPS information collected from US users?

Shou Chew:

I'm sorry, would you repeat that?

Rep. Debbie Dingell (D-MI):

Does TikTok still use inferences that you've gained that were made using in part in our whole precise GPS information collected from US users in your algorithms?

Shou Chew:

That will be a very technical question. I will have to check and get back to you.

Rep. Debbie Dingell (D-MI):

Has TikTok at any time provided the Chinese government with either precise GPS information collected from US users or inferences made from that data?

Shou Chew:

That I can give you a straight end? No.

Rep. Debbie Dingell (D-MI):

Mr. Chew, even in Congress, even if Congress were to ban TikTok, I'm concerned that China or others would still have access to US consumer data by purchasing it, purchasing it through data brokers. Will you commit not to sell any of talk's data to data data brokers now or in the future?

Shou Chew:

We do not do that. We do not sell data to data brokers.

Rep. Debbie Dingell (D-MI):

Now. Will you commit to not do it in the future?

Shou Chew:

This is a, there are certain me members of our industry who do this. You know, I think this has to be broad legislation to help us, the whole industry address this problem.

Rep. Debbie Dingell (D-MI):

I think I'm out of time. Thank you, Madame Chair. I'll yield back.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentle lady yields back chair yields five minutes to the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Palmer.

Rep. Gary Palmer (R-AL):

Thank you. When the Chinese Communist government bought a shear of ByteDance it's been described as, as the Chinese Communist government's way of quieter form of control. And it companies have a little choice in selling a stake to the Gov government if they wanna stay in business. And what I'd like to know is when the Chinese Communist government moved to buy shares of, of ByteDance, were you informed beforehand, yes or no?

Shou Chew:

No. Congressman ByteDance were,

Rep. Gary Palmer (R-AL):

Were you or anyone with TikTok ask for your opinion about the sale of shares of ByteDance to the Chinese Communist government? Yes or no?

Shou Chew:

It just, this hasn't happened.

Rep. Gary Palmer (R-AL):

Did you or anyone employed by or affiliated with TikTok state any objections or concerns about the possibility of the Chinese com Communist government once they had shares in ByteDance, exercising control over content using your platform for conducting misinformation campaigns or restrictions, ensuring nothing is posted, reflects badly on the Chinese Communist government or for surveillance and data collection for use against anyone? Did any of your, you or anyone affiliated with TikTok raise any concerns about that?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, we do not collect. We do not call.

Rep. Gary Palmer (R-AL):

I didn't ask you. That's...

Shou Chew:

We do not promote...

Rep. Gary Palmer (R-AL):

Did you raise any concerns about it? Because that's why we're here,

Shou Chew:

But we do not promote or remove any on the behalf of the Chinese government. I didn't. If you

Rep. Gary Palmer (R-AL):

Communicate in any form or fashion with the directors of ByteDance, that there might be concerns about government control over content. Did yes or no? Did you either did or you didn't?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, I just wanted to make this clear. We do not remove or promote content at the request of the Chinese government.

Rep. Gary Palmer (R-AL):

Tiktok insiders have already said that the company is tightly controlled by ByteDance. It even gets down to the hours they work. So obviously you didn't say anything. There's a serious concern by Chinese companies, privately held companies about doing anything against what the Chinese Communist government wants. I wanna ask you this. Does TikTok screen against manipulative content from child predators? Yes or no?

Shou Chew:

Do we screen?

Rep. Gary Palmer (R-AL):

Do you you screen against them?

Shou Chew:

Yeah, we do. This about child predator.

Rep. Gary Palmer (R-AL):

How about drug cartels, screen

Shou Chew:

Drug cartels, child predator content. This is all violative.

Rep. Gary Palmer (R-AL):

Yeah. The drug cartel that was engaged in a police chase was Spanish authorities, and they posted it on TikTok and got over a million views. Why wasn't that taken down? And are you doing it with human traffickers or terrorists? I mean, do you withhold content from nations that might be committing crimes against humanity? Yes or no?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, our platform is ...

Rep. Gary Palmer (R-AL):

Yes or no.

Shou Chew:

The freedom of expression.

Rep. Gary Palmer (R-AL):

Talk about that, but yes or no, do you screen against content from nations that commit crimes against humanity?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, our users comment,,,

Rep. Gary Palmer (R-AL):

Yes or no? Yes or no?

Shou Chew:

Comment presenting, any points of views that. And it's a commitment to keep this.

Rep. Gary Palmer (R-AL):

Ask you. There's Michael Beckerman, who is your vice president and head of public policy for, for Americas, right? Is he part of the team that helped you prepare for this meeting, yes or no?

Shou Chew:

Can I clarify who you mean?

Rep. Gary Palmer (R-AL):

Michael Beckerman?

Shou Chew:

Yes, he is.

Rep. Gary Palmer (R-AL):

Okay. Where is he at this moment?

Shou Chew:

I'm sorry?

Rep. Gary Palmer (R-AL):

Where is Mr. Beckerman at this moment?

Shou Chew:

He's probably here.

Rep. Gary Palmer (R-AL):

No, you know, he is here. He's sitting right behind you. I wanna know why. When Mr. Beckerman was on with Jake Tapper on CNN and asked repeatedly to condemn Chinese treatment, Chinese communist government's treatment of the Uyghurs when that treatment has been classified by the United States as a genocide, when a UN report classified that as a crime against humanity, why? After multiple questions, Mr. Beckerman refused to address that. Are you afraid of the Chinese Communist government?

Shou Chew:

No, because you can find that content on our platform, any content that our users...

Rep. Gary Palmer (R-AL):

Why couldn't he comment on this issue...

Shou Chew:

Public really available in the

Rep. Gary Palmer (R-AL):

Guy who's head of public policy for the Americas, an American, on an American television news channel? Why couldn't he say, why couldn't he condemn that?

Shou Chew:

I think it's very important to look at our platform. And if you use our and open our app, we're not talking platform.

Rep. Gary Palmer (R-AL):

I'm asking about your personnel now, because personnel is policy. Everybody in this room understands that, except maybe you, personnel is pro. Let me, let me just conclude with this. And I hate to bring this up because I, this is part of the stuff that I've said, but deception is fundamental of the Chinese Communist Party's political intelligence and military strategy. And you have repeatedly used the word transparency throughout this hearing. And every time you've said it, what I've heard is deception. I yield back.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentleman yields back. Chair recognizes gentlemen from Texas, Mr. Veasey for five minutes.

Rep. Marc Veasey (D-TX):

Thank you, Madam Chair. I, I gotta tell you, Mr. Chew as a father of a 16 year old that likes social media the, a lot of your evasiveness today in answering many of these questions really disturbs me. Cause I can tell you that the teenagers of today, they really don't want to be on Facebook. They, they, they want, they want your platform. And you were asked to come before this committee to testify about many things. And, and a lot of us are worried about our kids' personal data. As the co-chair of the Congressional Voting Rights Caucus also worry that TikTok is the world's most powerful and extensive propaganda machine allowing the Chinese Communist Party to use talk's platform to influence public opinion and undermine the integrity of our democratic elections.

And I have a report called TikTok and Facebook Failed to Detect Election Disinformation in the US while YouTube succeeds. And this report was published by the nonprofit Global Witness and the Cybersecurity for Democracy team at NYU. And the purpose of the study was to test platforms like TikTok and whether or not they can detect and tick down false political ads targeted at US voters, young voters ahead of last year's midterm elections. And according to this report, 90% of election disinformation ads tested were approved by your platform. Again that is 90% of ads containing false and misleading election misinformation went undetected on TikTok. And just to add some color to the type of misleading ads that were approved by TikTok this included ads that were live on TikTok that said the wrong election day and actually encourage people to vote twice. You do know that voting twice is a felony, Mr. Chew, you do know that it's legal to vote twice.

Shou Chew:

Congressman any misinformation that comes around political election is something we take very seriously.

Rep. Marc Veasey (D-TX):

I'm particularly troubled about this type of information because it can run rampant on TikTok. And given that TikTok again y'all are appealing to a very young and diverse user base, that is exactly the people that we've seen targeted time and time again with voter suppression campaigns run by malicious actors. Mr. Chew, do you agree with me that is, that it is completely unacceptable that 90% of these ads were undetected on your platform? And can you detail for us right now's policy regarding election misinformation and paid political ads, and how the company monitors such information and how you plan to get that number down to zero?

Shou Chew:

While TikTok is a place for our users to come and express their points of views freely we do take misinformation, dangerous misinformation, particularly around an election very seriously. And we'll work with third party experts to identify mis misinformation and can...

Rep. Marc Veasey (D-TX):

You call allowing 90% of false content, political content on your platform to be taken call, you call that you define that as being taken seriously.

Shou Chew:

I need to look into the specifics. I'm, you know, not sure where the number came from, but I can tell you, Congressman, that we are the only platform that I know of that doesn't actually take political ads. We don't, we don't accept money. I don't think other platforms can say that.

Rep. Marc Veasey (D-TX):

Mr. Chew, can you detail how you responded to that report? Did you respond to that report that I just mentioned?

Shou Chew:

I need to look at the specifics of the report. Congressman and I can get back to you on that.

Rep. Marc Veasey (D-TX):

All right, Mr. Chew, I, wanna shift to Project Texas. I know that we've discussed this initiative throughout today's hearing, but I want to dive deeper into your notion that promises about Project Texas should give us any confidence in TikTok s ability to localize US data and discontinue access to that data to ByteDance employees in China. Why? Because we've already had a TikTok executive appear, appear before Congress. Congressman gives sworn testimony about the comfort that we should take in TikTok s US-based resources, while TikTok data security practices were being scrutinized by the US government. And unfortunately we've since found out from a from journalists and recorded conversations that those assurances were were worthless. In your testimony, you also mentioned that Oracle has already begun inspecting TikTok source code and has access to the platform's recommendation algorithm. Why should this give the American public any great assurance as particularly given that Oracle now owns a stake in TikTok in San to gain monetarily the more revenue that TikTok and its algorithm generates?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, not only is project tech this unprecedented in our industry in protecting us user data and interests, we are inviting third parties to come in and monitor this, and we will, you know, be transparent in that process. And this is more beyond most comp all companies that I know of now.

Rep. Marc Veasey (D-TX):

Thank you, Madam Chair at time.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentlemen, yields back. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida for five minutes. Mr. Dunn,

Rep. Neal Dunn (R-FL):

Thank you very much. Madame Chair. Mr. Chew, I'm aware that on arriving in DC this week, you appeared on TikTok Bo, that you had 150 million US users, 5 million US businesses, that that represents a lot of data. You also referenced your appearance before this committee as a chance to share all that TikTok is doing to protect Americans using the app. Mr. Chew has ByteDance spied on Americans at the direction of the Chinese Communist Party.

Shou Chew:

No.

Rep. Neal Dunn (R-FL):

I, Madam Chair, I'd like to enter into the record this October 20th, 22 Forbes article entitled TikTok Parent ByteDance Plan to use TikTok to monitor a physical location of specific US citizens without objections. The order. Thank you. The project assigned the this to a Beijing leaded team, and they were going to follow individual American citizens. I ask you again, Mr. Cha has, ByteDance sped on American citizens.

Shou Chew:

I don't think the spying is the right way to describe it. Alright. This is ultimately

Rep. Neal Dunn (R-FL):

We can differ on

Shou Chew:

This is ultimately an internal investigation.

Rep. Neal Dunn (R-FL):

Tiktok or ByteDance data that is viewed, stored, or passes through China is subject to the laws of China. One party authoritarian state, hostile to all American standards of privacy. China's court system reports to and false under the Chinese Communist Party. And like Fentanyl analogs, which we all know are also manufactured in China, although they are illegal there, I fear Tac will, TikTok will grow into a much bigger problem, a cancer, if you will. And I'm deeply worried that it may be too late to stop the spread of this cancer like Fentanyl, another China export, which causes addiction and death. Dangerous algorithms and Chinese Communist Party are not good for Americans, not good for our families, and definitely not good for the United States. Mr. Chew, prior to serving as the CFO of ByteDance, you served as a CFO and director Global operations for show me from 2015 to 21. Is that correct?

Shou Chew:

Are you asking me in 2015? Very good. Would you mind rep repeat repeating that, please?

Rep. Neal Dunn (R-FL):

Madam Chair, I'd like to enter another article into evidence. This is from the National Cybersecurity Center in Lithuania without objections ordered. Thank you. This report outlines numerous data security risk, including how the privacy of European users was violated in clear cases of unauthorized collection of user data. By show me, this sounds exactly what many of my colleagues have been talking about today, were she at, to show me phones sold to Europeans had a list of 449 words and phrases, which would be automatically censored on the device. Censored phrases included the Voice of America and Democratic movement among others. This analysis was conducted on devices which are manufactured and sold to Europeans while you were the head of operations for. Show me it does not follow that. You expect us to believe that you would not censor on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party since you've already done so.

Shou Chew:

I wanna be unequivocal on this. We do not remove record or promote content on behalf of the Chinese...

Rep. Neal Dunn (R-FL):

Well, TikTok, in your words, strives to deliver on their mission to inspire creativity and bring joy to American users. I assure you that is not the mission or goal of the Chinese Communist Party, which runs the People's Republic of China that TikTok’s parent company ByteDance is domiciled in.

Shou Chew:

Mr. Congressman. You can check with our users, see the experience that they're getting

Rep. Neal Dunn (R-FL):

You have not given straightforward answers. We don't find you credible on these things. And with that Madam Chair, I'd like to yield the balance of my time.

Shou Chew:

Congressman, you have given me no time to answer your questions. I reject the characterizations.

Rep. Neal Dunn (R-FL):

I yield to Mr. Obernolte.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Mr. Obernolte. Okay.

Rep. Jay Obernolte (R-CA):

Well, thank you Madam Chair. Mr. Chew, I'd like to continue our discussion of Project Texas, if we could. Part of Project Texas is that engineers at Oracle will review the algorithms used by TikTok to confirm that they're free of foreign influence. I have a question about that because we're talking about ai, that's a very generic term. Do you use machine learning to influence the algorithms at, at TikTok.

Shou Chew:

In this gets very technical and we have published several blocks about this, which I can forward to your team. Okay. but yes, it's mainly based on interest signals. Right? Okay.

Rep. Jay Obernolte (R-CA):

So, yeah. So here's my question. How could looking at the algorithm confirm that it's for free from foreign influence? Because the algorithm is just a neural net architecture with inputs and outputs and weights and how to train that. I mean, the, the influence is an external factor. So I'd appreciate it if you could, if you could give us I see we're outta time again a written answer to that. But again, I'm concerned that what you're proposing with Project Texas just doesn't have the technical capability of providing us the assurances that we need. Ayo back, Madam Chair,

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentleman, yields back chair recognizes Ms. Custer.

Ms. Barragan for five minutes.

Rep. Nanette Barragán (D-CA):

Thank you Madam Chair. Mr. Chew TikTok warns users when content is graphic or disturbing and labels state affiliated media accounts to ensure the viewers aren't seen propaganda. Does TikTok provide similar information to Spanish speakers, users as well as English speakers?

Shou Chew:

I believe so. Congressman, I will get back to you on that.

Rep. Nanette Barragán (D-CA):

Okay. And do you know if TikTok has a specific strategy for tackling Spanish language content that violates its trust and safety guidelines?

Shou Chew:

We do. I will get back to you on the specifics on that.

Rep. Nanette Barragán (D-CA):

Okay. when offensive English language search terms or hashtags are blocked for violin community guidelines in English, is the Spanish translation of the term or the hashtag auto automatically blocked as well?

Shou Chew:

I believe so. But let me check the specifics. And I, back to you.

Rep. Nanette Barragán (D-CA):

Do you have any idea how many people that you might have working at TikTok that addresses Spanish misinformation?

Shou Chew:

I know ballpark, it's quite a significant team, but I can get back to you on the signi on the details.

Rep. Nanette Barragán (D-CA):

Well, you said significant. So are you saying it's, do you have a ballpark at all you can give us? Would you say it's like 10% of your force or

Shou Chew:

More than it's an important number, so I want to be precise and I'll get back to you.

Rep. Nanette Barragán (D-CA):

Okay. Do you happen to know how TikTok, how, if a TikTok can effectively ensure that Spanish speaking users between the ages of 13 and 17 are not being targeted by a promoting harmful content?

Shou Chew:

We have very strict policies for our users who are in the teenage age group. And regardless of what language they, they speak. So we wanna make sure that they are given a very safe experience on our platform, regardless of the language. They,

Rep. Nanette Barragán (D-CA):

Well, I know, I'm just trying to f I'm I'm trying to, to ascertain resources you may be putting into Spanish speaking and Stan Spanish language. Last year, the Congressional Hispanic Caucus met with TikTok. This was one of the conversations and a source of the discussion was addressing Spanish language disinformation and misinformation. It remains an urgent priority for the Congressional Hispanic Caucus. As Hispanics across the country increasingly turned to social media for vital information. We heard earlier in this hearing that there was, you know, video there was a, a TikTok post threatening the chair of the committee, and it took some 40 days to take it down. So I guess I'm a little concerned if you, if your team doesn't have the resources and the capability to flag that, what kind of capability is it gonna have to bring down misinformation, disinformation to Spanish speakers, which I'm assuming is a smaller fraction of the workers that you've have at TikTok?

Shou Chew:

Tiktok is a place for, you know, all our users to come and express their very diverse views. And, you know, we, we are open to all ethnicities, you know, and we are open to all everyone to come here and express their freely expressive views. So it is our commitment to make sure that the safety of those users, regardless of the language, you know, and of course, you know, the Spanish language user base is super important to us. Okay. So you need to make sure that we continue to, okay.

Rep. Nanette Barragán (D-CA):

Okay. So you don't, you don't have an answer then. Okay. I, I will look forward in, in your coming, you're coming back. We've heard a lot about the, the concerns about children who may be on TikTok. Mr. Chew, at what age do you think it would be appropriate for a young person to get on TikTok?

Shou Chew:

We have three different experiences here in the United States. There is an experience for under thirteens, which is highly,

Rep. Nanette Barragán (D-CA):

Highly restricted. I'm asking what you, I'm asking what you think would be the appropriate age to have a child get on TikTok?

Shou Chew:

Our approach is to give differentiated experiences for different age groups and let the parents have these conversations with their children to decide what's best for their family.

Rep. Nanette Barragán (D-CA):

So you think that there is a sufficient safety mechanism for an eight-year-old to be able to access TikTok?

Shou Chew:

An eight year old's experience on TikTok will be so highly restricted that every single piece of content he or she will see will be vetted by common sense, our third party child safety expert. And the, the ADL will not be able to post, and the ADL will not be able to see any personalized feed and zero advertising in that experience. So I believe yes, it is the appropriate experience for an adult.

Rep. Nanette Barragán (D-CA):

Well, then why don't you let your eight year old child on TikTok?

Shou Chew:

I have seen these news articles. I would like to address that my kids live in Singapore and in Singapore, we do not have the under 13 experience. If they lived here in the United States, I'll let them use the under 13 experience.

Rep. Nanette Barragán (D-CA):

Okay. So you're saying it's because of the country you live in, it doesn't have the same mechanisms. Is there a reason you don't have those same mechanisms everywhere?

Shou Chew:

In, in principle, we wanna provide, you know, a good experience for our users in general. We don't, we don't want to monetize from people who are under 13 in the us We are COPA compliant. And as part of that, we will deem as a, I wanna get this specifics right. I want, we, we will deem as a particular type of audience, makes audience app make, wanna make sure that that's right. And as a result of that, we have to provide an experience to our under 13 users in this country as well. My

Rep. Nanette Barragán (D-CA):

Time is expired. Thank you. I yield back,

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentlemen, yields back chair recognizes gentlemen from Utah. Mr. Curtis.

Rep. John Curtis (R-UT):

Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Chew, my children are getting ready to run a marathon, and I know the jury, this hearing that they'll be running for about the same amount of time that you'll be sitting in that chair today. Unfortunately, I only get you for five minutes. So instead of a marathon, I'd like to do a sprint with you. And I want to, I wanna go back up to that 30,000 feet level. W would you agree with me that Section 230 was created to protect platforms like yours from lawsuits when you distribute information?

Shou Chew:

I...

Rep. John Curtis (R-UT):

Don't overcomplicate it. Just like a thousand feet.

Shou Chew:

I understand.

Rep. John Curtis (R-UT):

Yeah. Yeah. So then would you agree that there's a line drawn between publishers of, of information and distributors of information in, in specifically in the Section 230 language?

Shou Chew:

I think 230 is a very complex topic.

Rep. John Curtis (R-UT):

Yes, I understand. But remember word at 30,000 feet. So in short, your plat form distributes content that other people's publish. One of the early challengers to Section 230 was when AOL refused to take down a post of somebody that had inappropriately put a phone number, associated a phone number with the Oklahoma City bombings, the courts ruled that AOL was not liable for that post because of Section 230. Now, I want you to do a hypothetical with me because I, I'm gonna use the absurd to try to make a point here. Let's suppose hypothetically that AOL, instead of just posting that actually in Magni, wanted to magnify that voice. And so they took out an ad in the Wall Street Journal linking that phone number with the Oklahoma City bombing. And I suppose they didn't stop there, but they went further and they took out a Super Bowl ad linking that phone number with the Oklahoma City bombing. And I suppose hypothetically, they didn't stop there. They sent a flyer to every home in America linking that phone number to the, the bombing. And I guess the question is, would AOL have moved from a distributor to a publisher in this made up example?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, I think respectfully, I think everybody can see it's hard...

Rep. John Curtis (R-UT):

This is not a hard question, moving that far away from the intent would've moved them to a publisher. So my question is, is platforms are protected because they post content. But, but I want this room to see not just you. The protection has limits. And if AOL moves to a distributor instead of a publisher, they, they go outside of those limits. Now, let's talk algorithms just super quickly. We've thrown that word around a lot today. Let me, let me hear again. Go 30,000 feet and we'll use another platform. So it's, so, it's not sensitive, but Pinterest, I like to go on Pinterest. My home and wife and I are building a home, working on the yard. Right now, if you went on a pin, my Pinterest page, you would see swing sets and things made for my grandkids.

Now, another hypothetical. Let's suppose that there's some devious intent inside Pinterest, and they decide they want to influence John Curtis with these algorithms, and they want me to believe it's the end of the world. And all of a sudden now I'm buying bomb shelters instead of swing sets for my kids. Have they become a publisher? And I should not be protected from Section 230. And if you don't feel com I'm, I, I'm pretty sure the room understands that they have crossed this line and you, you can tell me if you think they have or not.

Shou Chew:

Congressman, I will have to study that specific example and get back to you.

Rep. John Curtis (R-UT):

It's a hypothetical, but you can see the, at some point, they've crossed a line and they have become a publisher and a distributor. So we've touched on this today, but I wanna be super specific. Is it possible that TikTok had enough data, could get enough data on me, that you could use artificial intelligence and your algorithms and, and machine learning to write an algorithm that could persuade me to change How I view a policy issue is that possibility exists.

Shou Chew:

The way we look at it,

Rep. John Curtis (R-UT):

30,000 feet.

Shou Chew:

The way we look at it is our users come in and express whatever view they want...

Rep. John Curtis (R-UT):

But that's not the point. The point is, you couldn't write an algorithm that would change. And we've actually seen the Washington Post reported, the Stop The Willow campaign shows how TikTokers are tackling climate change. I think that's all fine, right? And all good, unless somebody has interjected into that and magnified or diminished voices in that. And, and what I'm proposing to you today is that that pushes them cross across the line from a distributor to a publisher if they make those decisions. Now, serious allegations have been made against your platform and others, many of them here today. And you're not new to these, right, to these allegations. This isn't your platform. But some time ago there were, there was an allegation that a platform recommended ISIS related videos. We've talked about the weight loss videos we've talked about. We didn't talk about it, but there's still in the elections, whatever the motivation. I'm trying to point out that as you move from a publisher by, as you manipulate this data with algorithms, that you step out from the protections as text Section 230. Do you see that's logic?

Shou Chew:

This, this is a very complex...

Rep. John Curtis (R-UT):

I understand it's very complex, but you see the logic in your mind. Has TikTok ever stepped across the line from a distributor to a publisher?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, again, this is a very complex topic. I will need to get back to you on this.

Rep. John Curtis (R-UT):

I understand that. Okay. And finally, you, very quickly, you produced a, a, a video that now is well known about your visit here in today in Washington, dc Can you tell me a hundred percent that no TikTok employees manually manipulated that to get more views?

Shou Chew:

I did. I, I checked, and as far as I know, there was no boosting and heating. I went viral organically.

Rep. John Curtis (R-UT):

Okay. Madam Chair, I'm sorry. I'm out of time. I yield my time.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentleman yields back chair. We're gonna recognizes Ms. Blunt Rochester. Five minutes.

Rep. Lisa Blunt Rochester (D-DE):

Thank you, Madame Chair. Mr. Chew, as I'm sure you know, this hearing is part of an ongoing effort by our committee to examine data security and other concerns with social media companies broadly. And I have to tell you, I came to this hearing interested to hear the actions that TikTok is taking to combat misinformation, protect our young people and ensure our national security. But I, I've not been reassured by anything you've said so far, and I think quite frankly your testimony has raised more questions for me than answers. As some of my colleagues already noted, platforms like TikTok can easily manipulate and undermine user autonomy with addictive features, invasive data collection practices, and disseminating misinformation and disinformation. That's why I will be reintroducing the Detour Act to mitigate this harm. Mr. Chew, yes or no? Would you oppose legislation that banned the use of intentionally mani manipulative design techniques that trick users into giving up their personal information?

Shou Chew:

In principle it's...

Rep. Lisa Blunt Rochester (D-DE):

Just a yes or no.

Shou Chew:

In principle, I agree that that kind of practices is not, and

Rep. Lisa Blunt Rochester (D-DE):

Can TikTok users opt out of targeted ads, yes or no?

Shou Chew:

At this moment in time, we believe that this is a very important part of the experience,

Rep. Lisa Blunt Rochester (D-DE):

Yes or no. Time is

Shou Chew:

Ticking. It is an important part of the experience.

Rep. Lisa Blunt Rochester (D-DE):

If even if someone wants targeted ads do you give a user a clear opportunity to prevent TikTok from using tools like pixels to collect their data and track them off of the TikTok platform?

Shou Chew:

We give our users a lot of tools to control their privacy set settings on our app. And by the way, if you're below 16 is private by default, so you cannot even go viral.

Rep. Lisa Blunt Rochester (D-DE):

In August of 2022 response to a letter I wrote to your company on abortion misinformation, TikTok asserted several actions to address abortion misinformation. In light of recent attacks on safe and effective medication abortion, I'm remained worried by this misinformation. And following on, MS get's questioning, how many posts did you actually take down that contained abortion misinformation?

Shou Chew:

We contents and views on both sides of the on abortion is allowed on our platform is just freedom of expression. If it's dangerous misinformation, we rely on third party experts to help us identify and move them. I can get back to you on specifics.

Rep. Lisa Blunt Rochester (D-DE):

Yes, please get back with us on the specifics. Mr. Chew, in your testimony, you indicated TikTok has taken several steps to implement Project Texas. You've said you've spent in your testimony, 1.5 billion, you've hired 1500 full-time employees. Can I ask for some specifics about the implementation? This 1.5 billion, what was it used for the employees? Were they people that you already had that you just transferred over? And what types of roles will they have?

Shou Chew:

Oh, okay. This billion and a half US dollars is spread across many things, including the infrastructure we have to build the migration of the data to a new cloud infrastructure, you know, and all the third party security partners that we're hiring, and of course the new employees. Now, this team will now be run by a gentleman who used to be this who, who has spent his career as a chief security officer in other companies. And another gentleman who used to work, I believe in if you could just one of the national

Rep. Lisa Blunt Rochester (D-DE):

Follow up Yeah. With us. That would be very helpful.

Shou Chew:

I will, I will.

Rep. Lisa Blunt Rochester (D-DE):

Because we would really like to understand the details. Where's the money going? How many people are and what will they be doing? Okay. You know, as I put just kind of a finer point on this, one of my concerns is that we came here hoping to hear some actions that would alleviate some of our concerns and our fears. We got family members, we have a lot of folks here that are constituents that are content creators. And for us, we were looking for action. We wanted to see, make us feel like we really can trust, as you use the word. What I leave here with is thinking about the fact that your company is, I, I learned that your, you have personalized data advertising for kids as young as 13. And we've heard until Project Texas has supposedly stood up, engineers in China still have access to personal data, and that that means engineers in China have access to personal data of 13 year olds in the United States. And I think that really summarizes why you see so much bipartisan consensus and concern about your company. And I imagine that it's not going away anytime soon. Thank you Madam Chair. And I yield back,

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

General lady yields back yield to the lady from Arizona, Ms. Lesko for five minutes.

Rep. Debbie Lesko (R-AZ):

Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Chew, do you agree that the Chinese government has persecuted the Uyghur population?

Shou Chew:

Congresswoman, you, if you use our app and you open it, you'll find our users who get all sort of, that's not

Rep. Debbie Lesko (R-AZ):

My, my question is, do you agree that the Chinese government has persecuted the Uyghur population?

Shou Chew:

Well, it's deeply concerning to hear about all the accounts of human rights abuse. My role here is to explain what our platform does on this.

Rep. Debbie Lesko (R-AZ):

I think base of it's a pretty easy question. Do you agree that the Chinese government has persecuted the Uyghur population?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, I'm here to describe TikTok and what we do as a platform and as a platform we allow our users to freely express on this issue earlier. Any other issue that matters to them?

Rep. Debbie Lesko (R-AZ):

Well, you didn't answer the question earlier today. Chairman Rodgers asked you and I quote, have any moderation tools been used to remove content associated with the Uyghur genocide? Yes or no? Your answer, we do not remove that kind of content yet. In 2019, TikTok suspended the account of Feroza Aziz, an American 17 year old, after she put out a video about the Uyghur genocide. So your answer, sir, does not align with history.

Shou Chew:

That particular case was a mis moderation. I believe that video had a picture of Osama Bin Laden. So we thought it was content was inappropriate.

Rep. Debbie Lesko (R-AZ):

Yeah, I looked it up. That was a different post that they banned.

Shou Chew:

I can get back on the specifics.

Rep. Debbie Lesko (R-AZ):

Yes. my next question. India banned the use of TikTok in their country in 2020. New Zealand has banned the installation of TikTok on devices connected to the country's parliamentary network. Canada banned the installation of TikTok on government devices. The United Kingdom has banned the TikTok app from government owned devices. Belgium banned the TikTok from government phones. The European Union banned the installation of TikTok on government devices, all cited security risks with the company's data collection and connection to the Chinese Communist Party. Recently, our US F B I director Christopher Ray, said about TikTok quote, this is a tool that is ultimately within the control of the Chinese government. And it, to me, it screams out with national security concerns. Mr. Chew, how can all of these countries and our own FBI director have been wrong?

Shou Chew:

I think a lot of risks that are pointed out are hypothetical and theoretical risks. I have not seen any evidence. I'm, you know, eagerly wait, awaiting discussions where we can talk about evidence and we then can address the concerns that are being raised.

Rep. Debbie Lesko (R-AZ):

Yes. My next question revolves around an article. India banned TikTok in 2020. In March 21st, Forbes article revealed how troves of personal data of Indian citizens who once use TikTok remain widely accessible to employees at the company. And its Beijing based parent ByteDance. A current TikTok employee told Forbes that nearly anyone with basic access to company tools, including employees in China, can easily look up the closest contacts and other sensitive information about any user. This tick current TikTok employee also said, quote, if you want to start a movement, if you want to divide people, if you want to do any of the operation to influence the public on the app, you can just use that information to target those groups. Why would a Mr. Chew, why would a current TikTok employee say this if it wasn't true?

Shou Chew:

This is a recent article I have asked my team to look into it. As far as I know there is, we have rigorous data access protocols. There's really no such thing where anybody can get access to tools. All right. So I disagree with a lot of the conclusions of that.

Rep. Debbie Lesko (R-AZ):

Madam Chair. I request unanimous consent that the Forbes March 21st, 2023 article be added to the record without a object. And I have would like to turn over the rest of my time to Mr. Obernolte.

Rep. Jay Obernolte (R-CA):

Thank you Madam Chair. Mr. Chew, I'd like to continue asking the, the question that we were ran outta time last time. So as part of Project Texas, you're going to have engineers at Oracle review the algorithms, the machine learning algorithms that TikTok uses to ensure that they're free from foreign influence. But as you and I were discussing reviewing the algorithms doesn't do anything. The algorithms was simple. That's not where the secret sauce is. The secret sauce is in the data used to train them and the outcomes that you're asking them to predict. Would you agree with that?

Shou Chew:

No. I actually believe that with third party monitoring, you can identify a lot of the motivation of the code. And with enough third party expert, you can identify a lot of what the code is designed to do.

Rep. Jay Obernolte (R-CA):

But how would you, how would you how would you verify that you couldn't ask the algorithm for a different outcome than the one that the, the rest of the source code is asking for?

Shou Chew:

The, the algorithm will be trained with this against very technical, but it will trained based on weights, for example. And, and those are things that we can verify, you know, what weights are you putting on

Rep. Jay Obernolte (R-CA):

Lights? If you could give us a written response to that, I'd appreciate it because I'm interested. Thank you Madam Chair. Yield back.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Lady yields back, general man, general lady yields back chair, recognizes for five minutes. Gentlemen from Florida, Mr. Soto.

Rep. Darren Soto (D-FL):

Thank you, Madam Chair. The genie's really out of the bottle on this now, so to speak. 150 million Americans are now on TikTok, that's almost half of America. They're expressing themselves in art and music, poetry, short film, comedy among other creative expressions. And many of them are inspiring, talented young people. But we also on the committee recognize there's a darker side to it, right? Violence, adult themes, drug and alcohol, sexualization, suicide, all major issues on TikTok, but also Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and other social media platforms. So the solution, as I see it, is to regulate TikTok and other social media platforms. And that job Mr. Chew, as you know, really falls to us. There are real concerns, bipartisan common ground. We've already had, we had a, a federal device ban that was voted on bipartisan in the omnibus. And I co introduced a bill with my dear friend, representative Cammack, about notices of that federal ban.

Madame Chair, I think the first key is privacy. We have to pass the conference of legislation that got out of this community, but alluded us in the last Congress. I'm really hoping we could get that done. And I'm really excited about hearing that from folks. The other thing is that TikTok needs to be an American company with American values and, and its chi ties to the Chinese Communist Party. This is something that'll be critical as we look and go forward. And then three, we all agree we have to protect our kids. The committee should consider banning the use for children under 13 of not just TikTok, but all social media platforms, or at least empower parents. In addition, have rules of the road for teens that are 13 to 17, so that families can do what's right for their families. So for privacy, that's on us.

Internet privacy is on us as far as being an American company. Mr. Chew, as you know, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States at the Department of Treasury reviews foreign investment that affects national security. Right now, they've negotiated with your company about this Oracle setup that you've talked about, servers in an American company in, in American, Texas, and then Oracle would monitor the algorithms, but pressure's mounting. So, Mr. Chew, would TikTok be prepared to divest from ByteDance and Chinese Communist Party ties? If the Department of Treasury instructed you all to do so?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, as I said in my opening statement, I think we are need to address the problem of privacy. I agree with you. I don't think ownership is the issue here. With a lot of respect, American social companies don't have a good track record with data privacy and user security. I mean, look at Facebook and Cambridge Analytica, just one example. So, I do think that, you know, it is not about the ownership. It is a lot about making sure we have project taxes, making sure that we're protecting and firewalling us user data from Mount one Foreign access, giving third parties to come in to have a look at this and making sure that everybody is comfortable. We're giving transparency and third party monitoring, and that's what we are doing for Project Texas.

Rep. Darren Soto (D-FL):

Well, I would at least encourage y'all to start having the dialogue should that be where the present and the Congress ends up going. That the third thing is on, on parents. I, I had a constituent of mine, Brandy of Lake Nona say, I'm a parent of two teenagers, 14 and 18 years old, both of whom have been harmed by social media talk's, algorithms supply my 14 year old son with a continuous stream of inappropriate content and has negatively influenced his perception of all females. I noticed the attention demand of both of my teens has changed or decreased dramatically and social media has made my daughter insecure leading to an eating disorder and ultimately depression. What safeguards do you have and what should we tell Brandy of Lake Nona about how we can help her protect her children?

Shou Chew:

We have a differentiated experience. I mentioned just now about the experience. If you're below 13, very, very restricted. If you're below 13 to 17 congressmen, we actually have a whole series of things. First, the content that you see you know, we make sure that we remove things that could be mature themes from your, from your feet. We also, by default, do not allow under sixteens to use direct messaging. We do not allow under sixteens to, we, we set the accounts to private by default, they can go viral. If below 18, we shut off some features for you. Like, for example, you're not allowed to post live streams, neither are you allowed to send virtual gifts. So we take this very seriously and we wanna continue to build to ensure that we're giving our under 18 teenagers on our platform. Although they, today, they are only a minority of our user base today, but we still take it very seriously.

Rep. Darren Soto (D-FL):

Mr. Chew, I'd encourage you to continue thinking about how to get the word out to parents across the nation on some of these tools as well as we hear craft a privacy law that will help provide well needed regulation social media companies across the nation. Thank you. And I yield back.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentleman yields back chair recognizes gentlemen from Indiana, Mr. Pence for five minutes.

Greg Pence (R-IN):

Thank you Chairwoman Rodgers and ranking member Pallone for holding this hearing. I love both of your opening remarks. Like my colleagues have discussed today, our increasingly digital world leaves Hoosiers and all Americans in the dark about who has access to their information. For TikTok users that could be third party data brokers, advertisers, or the Chinese Communist Party, TikTok aggressively feeds addictive content to users to glean massive amounts of personal data that's worth a fortune for Hoosiers watching at home. This isn't just Dad about your favorite sports team. You know, if there really are 150 million users in the US, this suggests to me that the CCP has a finger on the pulse of almost half our nation's population. I find that hard to believe, but this week I decided I would ask my constituents in southern Indiana to share their stories with me. Went out Monday night and we got 800 responses in less than 12 hours.

Okay, let me share a couple of those with you. One of my constituents shared, I quote, I'm a mental health counselor. Most of my teenage clients are on TikTok. They spend hours online being negatively influenced by others. I have seen kids experience self-harm, gender dysphoria, and many mental illnesses they have picked up from TikTok. I will not allow my children to have TikTok. The the creators know the algorithms are addicting. Our children, they know that children are suffering more anxiety and depression from scream time, but they do not care. They will not change their algorithms because it's financially lucrative for them to keep their kids addicted. Another parent said, we let our child, our daughter, try it out. The feed was continuously suggesting sexually explicit, stupid and vulgar videos. We discontinued it within a week. And there's been many more, many more, like, like I said, 800.

Okay? In your testimony, Mr. Chew, you walk through a number of supposed actions taken by your company to create a safe environment and power parents to oversee content shown to their children. But virtually everything we've heard reflects the opposite. And some of your answers are a little confusing. You know, all of those sitting here and maybe watching on CSPAN, this is the 32nd hearing we have held about privacy and big tech. Each hearing I've been part of, we've heard the same stories about our constituents' experience, and the same promises for big tech to do better. The truth of the matter is this disgusting and dangerous content littered across your platform is not justifiable, and it's uncontrollable. American's data is not safe, and big tech is doing nothing to protect it. Putting aside the dangers of the CCP involvement, and after these 32 hearings, I believe it's actually chimed to change the narrative, change the focus, and change the outcome by talking about the money you are making at TikTok. Mr. Chew, I have a question. How much revenue is generated per user?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, we

Greg Pence (R-IN):

Private company, and your not gonna tell me, does each user receive a comparable benefit for the amount of profit their data brings to your company?

Shou Chew:

We do share some revenue with some creators who produce say one minute plus informational content.

Greg Pence (R-IN):

Thanks. When am I gonna get paid for the data that you are selling or you're have, you're getting revenue from advertisers? When am I gonna get da, get paid for the data you're getting from my children, my grandchildren, my neighbors? I think that's the only way to get your attention is to talk about the money you're making and maybe that'll get you all to do what you're supposed to do.

Shou Chew:

I respect and understand your opinion. The vast majority of our users have a great experience. I sent a video recently as well. I got hundreds of thousands of comments.

Greg Pence (R-IN):

But what am I getting? It's a great experience. What about these 800 bad experience that people in the Indiana six district have been getting?

Shou Chew:

We were looking into them, and a lot of these...

Greg Pence (R-IN):

You're gonna look into, but this is my 30, this is a 32nd big tech hearing, and you're always gonna look at it. Frankly, I think you're all stalling is what you're doing. You're just trying to buy time while you're making the 18 billion perhaps whatever you're making,

Shou Chew:

The majority of our users have a great experience on our platform. It is our duty to keep it safe. I agree with you. That's why our commitment is to make sure that safety,

Greg Pence (R-IN):

I think it's a priority. I think it's your duty to pay attention to what you're doing and maybe, maybe you, you paying people for the information that you're getting from her is a way to get that done. Thank you. You back,

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentleman yields back chair recognizes gentle lady from Washington, Ms. Schreyer for five minutes.

Rep. Kim Schrier (D-WA):

Thank you for being here, Mr. Chew. I, I'm really concerned about everything that we are hearing in this conversation today, and I appreciate your good intentions, but the actions are really falling short. As a pediatrician and the parent of a teenager, I'm particularly concerned about how social media generally and TikTok specifically, is affecting our kids and teens. We just heard a lot about this from testimony from a psychologist. Last year, the American Academy of Pediatrics sounded the alarm about our children's mental health crisis. And as a pediatrician, I know this has been going on for more than a decade. In fact, it tracks perfectly with social media engagement. And during the pandemic teens who are missing out on in-person interactions turned even more to social media to connect with friends. Social media is designed to be addicting. That's the business model, and your platform is the most addictive of all.

And this endless mindless scrolling takes teens away from human relationships. And here's what's important. It keeps teens awake all night, well past their bedtime at a time in their lives when sleep is critical for brain and physical development. In fact, sleep deprivation alone, ignoring even content alone, can cause depression, anxiety, social withdrawal, inattention, poor coping skills, and academic failure. So Mr. Chew, I just wanna follow up a little bit on what my colleague Mr. Sarbanes was discussing. It is your business model to keep eyes on the app, to keep it addictive. I know you likely have experts who have advised you on how to design this to keep those eyes on your platform for the longest possible time. So, I wanna know if you have psychologists or other health experts on staff looking at screen time hours of use and sleep.

Shou Chew:

We worked with the Digital Wellness Lab, congresswoman, at the Boston Children's Hospital, and we came up with a 60 minute default limit for any users under 18. We were the first to do it in, in our industry.

Rep. Kim Schrier (D-WA):

That is an opt out. And I can tell you they're gonna immediately opt out. It is addictive

Shou Chew:

We also give tools...

Rep. Kim Schrier (D-WA):

18 smoker not to take the next cigarette. It is not gonna happen. And by the way so f first I have a question, then I'll go, go back to Boston Children's. Mr. Sarbanes asked earlier, what is the percentage of teens who actually adhere to the 60 minute limit?

Shou Chew:

I would need to check on those numbers and get back to you on specific.

Rep. Kim Schrier (D-WA):

I'd appreciate those numbers. Yes. I'm guessing it is an incredibly low percentage who actually heed that. Mm-Hmm. <affirmative>. Now, as far as Boston Children's goes, I know you're referring to them as a source for these ideas about gets, you know, go outside, get some air, take some time out. But I can tell you as a pediatrician, I'm guessing their suggestions were a little stronger than that. And so I'm wondering what the, what is the next step? What are you doing when you find out that almost nobody is really opting out after 60 minutes to take this burden off of the kids and off of the parents and change your algorithms to make them not so hooked?

Shou Chew:

We give our parents, as you pointed out the family safe, the family parenting tool. And in that tool, if you pair it with your teenager's phone, you can actually set a restriction how many minutes? And I, we believe it's very important for parents to have these conversations with their teenagers. So to decide what's best for their family. I also, congressman, right? A lot of people come to our platform to have a really informative experience. Like I said, they were 116 billion pieces of content on stem. And we are, we are creating a fee dedicated to that book Talk has 115 billion.

Rep. Kim Schrier (D-WA):

We've also heard today that well over 20% of the information is misinformation. We heard that about medical remedies that are not really remedies. We've heard it about mental health topics. I mean, this becomes very dangerous, especially when people who are not trained to think very critically are being given information and thinking that it's true. And you've said many times that the destructive information isn't available to kids, but it is, like, we keep seeing examples here. And so I'm just wondering, what are you gonna do with the algorithms? I mean, just because you're removing something that says anorexia bulimia, or eating disorder, that doesn't do it. If you show girls repeatedly skinny bodies and advice on how to cook meals that are less than 300 calories, that's dangerous.

Shou Chew:

We we have worked with, first of all all anything that glorifies eating disorders, we remove that from our platform is violative. We're working with experts now. It's a challenging problem for our industry, but we actually identify some, identifying some of these themes that you're talking about and trying to build models where that kind of content is not chained up for the younger users. So it's something we take very seriously too.

Rep. Kim Schrier (D-WA):

We're seeing eating disorders in elementary age kids now. And I need you to expedite that process as much as possible because parents out there are worried, and I'm worried as a pediatrician, parents can't take themselves off of these platforms. Kids, there's no way they're gonna take themselves off. And we need you to do your part. It may affect your bottom line, but it could save this generation.

Shou Chew:

I share your concerns and I commit to doing more.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentle lady yields back. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Joyce.

Rep. John Joyce (R-PA):

Thank you, chair Rodgers and ranking member Pallone for holding this hearing. According to an August, 2022 article on the New York Times talk's in-app, web browser can track every individual keystroke made by a user. We have heard today about the various ways in which the app's code could be used to monitor or track users. And likewise, we've heard concerns that this data may not be fully isolated from access by the Chinese Communist Party. That said, I'd like to know more about the historical non-public US personal data that your company has already amassed Mr. Chew. You have publicly stated that the non-public information of TikTok users in the United States is being transferred to an Oracle-based cloud infrastructure because of safety concerns. Will that be completed by the end of this week? By the end of this month? What's the outline for dealing with that data that you've already amassed?

Shou Chew:

All new data is already stored by default in this Oracle cloud infrastructure with the, no,

Rep. John Joyce (R-PA):

I'm talking about the data that you've already amassed.

Shou Chew:

We, we are in the process of deleting.

Rep. John Joyce (R-PA):

What timeline will that data be able to be stored?

Shou Chew:

We will, we, I believe we'll be able to get it done this year. I'm hiring…

Rep. John Joyce (R-PA):

This year. Thank you. It's not going to occur anytime soon to be clear until that data transfer happens. User data remains accessible to the Chinese Communist Party on March 1st of this year. The committee asked you, when you plan to delete non-public historical US user data, are you aware of this?

Shou Chew:

Congressman? I disagree with this assessment that the Chinese government can get access to. The data is really for look, this is a private company. This is what Chinese employees….

Rep. John Joyce (R-PA):

You responded in writing to this committee. I have the response that we got back from you on March 7th. Just six days later, your attorneys wrote the company, I'm quoting, that the company plans to begin the process of deleting non-public historic US user data this month and anticipates that the process will be completed this year. You came up with a supposed plan in the summer of 2022, specifically based on our concerns that the communist Chinese government was spying on US users. But you only just came up with the idea to delete historic non-public US data. Just two weeks ago. Let me read it again. On March 7th, your attorneys wrote, and I quote, the company plans to begin the process of deleting non-public historical US data this month and anticipates that the process will be completed this year. Mr. Chew, did you just come up with this plan? Only because we asked about it on March 1st?

Shou Chew:

No, we started deleting this

Rep. John Joyce (R-PA):

Because that's what it looks like to me.

Shou Chew:

We hired a third party to help us with this.

Rep. John Joyce (R-PA):

Wouldn't you agree that awaiting even minutes for this personal privacy protection is absolutely wrong and it is not in the best interest of your users?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, respectfully, there are many companies that use a global workforce. We are not the only one. We are just taking action after the hearing,

Rep. John Joyce (R-PA):

Given the delay...

Shou Chew:

Other companies have data and...

Rep. John Joyce (R-PA):

We've already established about the ability of the Chinese Communist Party to access personal user data. Would you agree that no US government electronic devices should have access to TikTok platform as your lack lesser security currently stands.

Shou Chew:

I disagree with that characterization. Like I said, the

Rep. John Joyce (R-PA):

Do you think that any individual should be utilizing that on any government platform?

Shou Chew:

I think the government devices should have no social media apps to be honest. But, and, and particularly not targeted to us.

Rep. John Joyce (R-PA):

Mr. Chew, during this hearing, you have mentioned several times that there is a quote, different experience, your words for children under the age of 13.

Shou Chew:

That is correct. Different experience.

Rep. John Joyce (R-PA):

Mr. Chew, do you allow your children under the age of 13 to participate in TikTok? Yes or no?

Shou Chew:

I did just explain this in detail. This experience doesn't exist in Singapore or my children live if my children lived here, then yes.

Rep. John Joyce (R-PA):

Based on what we've heard today, it's clear to me that TikTok as a company cannot be trusted and that Americans remain significantly at risk because of the TikTok app. I still contend that TikTok is the spy in Americans' pockets. I want to acknowledge that TikTok does have the ability to make those changes, but unfortunately, we have not heard that from you today. We have not heard a commitment to be able to protect the personal privacy that Americans expect and that Americans deserve. Thank you, Madame Chair, and I yield a remainder of my time.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentleman yields back chair recognizes Ms. Trahan for five minutes.

Rep. Lori Trahan (D-MA):

Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Chew. Many big tech CEOs have sat where you're seated today and tried to run out the clock during a hearing like this one. They were trained not to answer questions and just wait for the new cycle to pass so that they could get on with business. As usual. Those same executives want this moment, talk's moment under the microscope to distract Congress and the American people from the very real issues that exist on their platforms, you have an opportunity to turn the tables on them. While US-based social media giants have regressed on protections for children and teens on protecting our data privacy and on embracing transparency, you can lead and you should lead. Last month you announced that TikTok would expand access to its researcher api, but I'm concerned that your new policy could be more bark than bite.

That it won't actually lead to the rigorous research that we as lawmakers and that parents and everyday TikTok users need. In fact, your terms of service demand that researchers delete their data at talk's unilateral direction. It puts onerous restrictions on how researchers findings can be published, and it only allows access to public data, which researchers already have access to within the app in order to actually address the content moderation and algorithmic amplification concerns that my colleagues have raised here today, and that I've heard about directly from parents in my home state of MassaChewsetts. Independent researchers, not just other tech companies like Oracle, need to be able to evaluate how's algorithm is making decisions to promote content. Mr. Chew, will you commit to expanding your API to include data that would let researchers investigate how your algorithm is pushing content to users, whether it's showing up on your for you page, the hashtag page, or somewhere else

Shou Chew:

We are. One of the commitments I gave in the opening statement is a commitment to transparency and third party monitoring. So congresswoman, I will look into the details of that and get back to you

Rep. Lori Trahan (D-MA):

And as well as the algorithm including data on what types of users were targeted by the algorithm so that researchers can fully understand what content is being prioritized and who it's being pushed to.

Shou Chew:

Again, we have a commitment to transparency. These are very important questions and I will get back to you on the specifics.

Rep. Lori Trahan (D-MA):

Under the same proposal, you require that researchers give TikTok quote, worldwide free, non-exclusive and perpetual rights to their papers. This threatens to clash directly with well-established practices of exclusive publication rights in research journals. Mr. Chew, why does TikTok need those rights?

Shou Chew:

I would need to get back to you on that specifics, if that's okay.

Rep. Lori Trahan (D-MA):

Yes. I don't see how we can expect researchers to do their work under these terms and then tout transparency. I'm gonna shift gears with the time that I have remaining Mr. Chew. I'd like to talk about talk's efforts to protect children and young users. In 2021, the UK's age appropriate design code went into effect mandating 15 standards that companies like you need to follow to protect children on your platform. You still operate in the United Kingdom, which means you should be in compliance with this code. So my question is simple, will you commit to extending the protections currently afforded children in the UK to the millions of kids and teens who use your app here in the United States?

Shou Chew:

We, we take the safety of the younger users on our platform very seriously.

Rep. Lori Trahan (D-MA):

This is a good way to prove it.

Shou Chew:

Every country is a little bit different in context and in so let me, let me look at the specifics and bring some of the best practices across the world.

Rep. Lori Trahan (D-MA):

Well, those best practices are in, they're being executed around the world. We just want the same for our kids here in the United States. I mean, Mr. Chew, when we spoke a couple of weeks ago, you indicated interest in taking steps to earn trust, our trust, and to me, it hasn't happened today so far. But rather you've ducked behind industry standards and comparables to your competitors, which we know are woefully insufficient. I strongly urge you to consider these terms, these commitments make the case for why you're different from your American competitors and do better than them on transparency, which you've mentioned countless times today, but, which we don't really have anything tangible to point to.

Shou Chew:

Yes, I I don't wanna make excuses for our industry or ourselves. I think there's a lot of work that needs to be done. We take this very seriously. Nothing is it's not perfect. We need to keep investing to stay ahead of our growth. So I, I agree that, you know, we need to prioritize safety and continue to do that as part of our company. And well, I

Rep. Lori Trahan (D-MA):

Look forward to getting back your comments and your commitments and those updated terms of service when you write back to the committee. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

General lady yields back, Chair recognizes the gentlemen from North Dakota, Mr. Armstrong, for five minutes.

Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND):

Thank you, Madam Chair. You know, we've heard a lot today about the procedural safeguards, independent code review server locations and the corporate independence between ByteDance and the CCP. But I think there's something else, a little more telling. You know, when you were asked about Chinese censorship, you pivoted immediately to drug use in Singapore, you have absolutely tied yourself in knots to avoid criticizing the CCP’s treatment of the Uyghur population. And I think it begs the un it begs the first question before we ever get to Project Texas, which I'll get to in a section. If the CCP demanded that ByteDance hand over all of the data that they had on user, on US users in their possession, indite ByteDance refused. I wonder what would happen. I wonder if Jack Ma might have an opinion on that, and I wonder if he'd be allowed to give it.

But let's talk about Project Texas for a second. Project. Texas envisions a new US-based TikTok subsidiary. You have stated that this arrangement is unprecedented. I'd argue the reason it's unprecedented is because it requires continual oversight and monitoring by the US of a private business because it poses a national security threat. The new SUBSIDIARY'S board would report to and be approved by CFIUS. CFIUS will also specify hiring requirements as well as interact with Oracle as it performs its data role. That is an extraordinary corporate governance structure. I have questions whether it complies with corporate law and fiduciary duty to shareholders, yet the core concern is that the proposes unparalleled integration with the US government with a private company, which will require significant government resources. All of that to allow a continued operation of a social media platform that has serious national security implications and CFIUS workloads already dramatically increased in recent years with a 30% increase in declarations and a 45% increase in joint voluntary notices. And there's bipartisan consensus that CFIUS needs to be expanded as we speak. The only, Mr. Chew, can you identify any, a similar corporate arrangement that requires the federal government to expand such resources to monitor and allege data privacy and national security risk?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, I am not an expert on this matter. I believe that there are certain similar arrangements, but I'm not the expert on this matter.

Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND):

Well, the only one I could find was the UK created the Huawei Cybersecurity Evaluation Center in 2010 to assess Huawei's Tech and to detect malicious activity and guard UK's networks. That's worked so well that the United Kingdom is now planning on kicking Huawei out of Great Britain. You stated that TikTok has invested 1.5 billion in Project Texas. Are you aware of any discussions or proposals that entail TikTok, that entail TikTok funding or offsetting the cost of CFIUS role?

Shou Chew:

Those discussions are I need to get back to you down to the specifics, but I can tell you yes, we did spend approximately one and a half billion US dollars on our side.

Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND):

You spent one and a half billion dollars on Project Texas. But do you have any, I mean, you agree that if CFIUS takes on this role, they're gonna need a massive influx of dollars in human resources. Right?

Shou Chew:

I cannot speak on behalf of CFIUS, Congressman,

Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND):

Should the US government expend such resources to create this extraordinary arrangement for TikTok, especially considering alleged data privacy and national security risk.

Shou Chew:

Congressman, I cannot speak on behalf of the United States.

Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND):

Well, the Project Texas doesn't work without CFIUS, right? Project Tech Projects Project Texas, as you guys have proposed, it does not work without CFIUS involvement.

Shou Chew:

The idea behind Project Texas is the firewall of US user data. Make sure it's stored by an American company overseen by American personnel, and we will invite third party monitors to monitor this. So that in essence, at least as far as I know, is the majority of the cost because it will rely on not just us building the infrastructure, but us, you know, finding and hiring these third party monitors who are vetted to come in and monitor this structure.

Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND):

You talked earlier about the shareholders ownership of TikTok and you said 60% is global investors, 20% is employees, and 20% is original founders. Are all those voting shares the same?

Shou Chew:

No. The founder has waived the voting rights as is common in our industry.

Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND):

So do you, as far as a voting block of shares zoned in ByteDance, do you know if the Chinese Communist Party now, Chinese government Communist party officials, the Chinese Communist Party, do you know what their percentage of the actual voting block share of ByteDance is?

Shou Chew:

The Communist Party doesn't have voting rights in ByteDance.

Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND):

Chinese Communist Party members is a different question. Do the founders control the voting block of ByteDance's shares?

Shou Chew:

I do know that the founder himself is not a member of the Communist Party, but we don't know the political affiliation of our employees because that's not something we ask.

Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND):

Does the Chinese government know the political affiliation of their Chinese citizens?

Shou Chew:

I cannot answer that question on their behalf.

Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND):

I yield back.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentleman yields back yield to the lady from general Lady from New Hampshire. Ms. Custer, five minutes.

Rep. Ann Kuster (D-NH):

Thank you, Madame Chair. Mr. True. I just wanna say I agree with all of the comments of many of my colleagues today that we need to take a close look at whether TikTok poses a national security risk for today. I'm gonna focus my limited time on how TikTok can better protect its youngest users. And I think a number of us have identified as parents today and have serious concerns as we relay to you. Just this week, I heard from a parent in my district in Nashua, New Hampshire, whose child was served harmful content on TikTok and has needed counseling as a result. This experience is not unique to this family and it underscores the need for better child protections on your app. I'd like to dig further into talk's current safety and privacy controls for children. I understand that TikTok restricts certain app capabilities for users underage 18 and has additional restrictions for users underage 16 or 13, such as limiting who can interact with them on the platform. However, these protections are worthless if any savvy child can easily bypass these age restrictions by deleting their own account and creating a new one with a different age. And by easily, I mean, you can literally go in and open another account using the same email address. So I've been made aware by child safety groups, including Fair Play for Kids and common sense that it is that simple for young users to bypass the age restrictions on TikTok. Yes or no? Are you aware of this issue?

Shou Chew:

I apologize. I think that's a great issue that you raised. If a user implementation is blocked, my understanding is that if the user tries to do it again within a short period of time and I won't disclose publicly.

Rep. Ann Kuster (D-NH):

We did it in our office yesterday. You can go right back in, use the exact same email address and open a new account. So can I get your commitment that you will at least fix that bug?

Shou Chew:

I will go and have a look at it, yes.

Rep. Ann Kuster (D-NH):

Thank you. If we're here today to talk TikTok and not other platforms, but I'm happy to look at legislative solutions and the interim, TikTok has a responsibility to do more to protect its young users, and I will accept your commitment to take a look at fixing that issue. Will you let's see. Sorry. I recognize that TikTok has made efforts to provide parents and Guardian increased options to monitor and limit their child's activity on the app, including family pairing and time limit features. But I still have concerns that in order to access family pairing, parents then must download the app onto their phone. And this sounds like a design to lure more users onto the app rather than a practical safety feature. Furthermore, downloading the app may not be a viable option for many patients. Parents. Mr. Chew, will TikTok commit to developing other methods for parents to monitor their child's use of the app without having to download the TikTok app on their phone?

Shou Chew:

I can look into that specifically and get back to you. Okay. But the family par that you mentioned is a very good tool that we develop. I encourage parents with teenagers to use,

Rep. Ann Kuster (D-NH):

But it's not a perfect tool. And let me just say, one of my concerns is that the minimum time limit TikTok lets parents set for their children is 40 minutes, which for a young child is a very long period of time. Actually giving parents control would mean providing them the freedom to set the screen time that makes sense for their family. Now, I've got a copy of the app page that shows just the options. Would you commit to adding another option so that the parent can easily set their own screen time limit?

Shou Chew:

I can take a look at that.

Rep. Ann Kuster (D-NH):

I think it's important. I think parents are looking for control. They're looking to allow their family to use these apps without TikTok taking over their child's media use. I've heard r use reports, I've heard reports of users struggling to access the feature. And so I will look forward to hearing back from you on adding another so that a parent can add a custom limit. So finally, I ask that you commit to report back to this committee and the American public on how TikTok addresses these safety issues and the steps that you are taking to default children's accounts to the most protective possible settings. And with that Madam Chair, I yield back.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentle lady yields back. I yield to chair yields to the gentleman from Ohio. Five minutes. Mr. Balderson.

Rep. Troy Balderson (R-OH):

Thank you Madam Chair. Thank you Mr. Chen for being here today. I would like to start by inserting into the record a report entitled TikTok ByteDance and their ties to the Chinese Communist Party, which was published by the Australian Parliament just over a week ago. If I could add that to the record, please.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

No objection. So ordered.

Rep. Troy Balderson (R-OH):

Thank you Madam Chair. Mr. Chew, we know that your company's algorithm has been exposed for delivering videos to China that encourages them to develop eating disorders, promotes challenges that have caused children to accidentally commit suicide, glorifies the use of drugs and pornography. Despite the constant media coverage of this issue, your company continues to feed our children this dangerous and harmful content. Can you explain to parents back in my congressional district why it should be their burden and not to set up that guardian parental controls for their children so that they do not view content, which is encourages eating disorders or committing suicide?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, I take these issues very seriously. If the user is a teenage user on our platform, we actually have a differentiated experience, including certain models that we are building with experts to help identify certain content that's not inherently harmful, but could lead people to eating disorders. Anything that glorifies eating disorders is, is violative of our platform, and we remove that. And I, I want to assure you that I take this very, very seriously, this commitment.

Rep. Troy Balderson (R-OH):

Okay, Mr. Curtis, my colleague mentioned the use of a heating tool on your platform to make specific videos go viral or get more views. Does TikTok use a cooling tool where employees can manually limit the amplification of content that TikTok should hide? Like content that promotes eating disorders, drug use, or suicide among children?

Shou Chew:

The only promotion tool that we have is approved by the local teams. So in the US, by the US team, and it's for commercial purposes. Like, like Taylor Swift, you know, I think when she onboarded, we, you know, hit had a

Rep. Troy Balderson (R-OH):

Little yes or no.

Shou Chew:

I just wanna make sure that I'm answering your question with specifics.

Rep. Troy Balderson (R-OH):

If this exists, why isn't it being used to cool then? The spread of dangerous content? I mean, why is it still happening?

Shou Chew:

Dangerous content, that violates. We remove them when we see them. We actually remove them from the platform.

Rep. Troy Balderson (R-OH):

Okay? the fact of the matter here is that despite whatever action you take that TikTok is taking to protect teens, your algorithm continues to promote harmful content. Wouldn't you agree that indicates there is something inherently wrong with the algorithm your platform employs?

Shou Chew:

I do respectfully disagree with that. The algorithm drives a great user experience for many, many users. Well, I talked about STEM content that has 116 billion views on our platform. I want one more example. Book talk is a trend that happened on our platform to encourage people to read. And globally it has 115 billion views and it's fantastic. I've heard people telling me that they're reading more because of book talk. So there is a lot of good and joy and positivity that can be derived from the TikTok experience. Yes, there's some bad actors who come in and post violative content and it's our job to remove them. But the overwhelming experience is a very positive one for our community.

Rep. Troy Balderson (R-OH):

But if it's your job to remove them, it's been said many times here today about the 41 days that that video stood up with addressing the chairwoman.

Shou Chew:

After this, I'm going to go and look into the specifics of that.

Rep. Troy Balderson (R-OH):

Alright, thank you Madam Chair. Yield back.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentleman, yields back. Chair recognizes the lady from Texas, Ms. Fletcher for five minutes.

Rep. Lizzie Fletcher (D-TX):

Thank you. Chairwoman McMorris Rodgers, and thanks to ranking member Pallone for holding today's hearing. And thank you Mr. Chew for appearing today. It's been a long day, but we're here to learn about a complex set of issues that relate to TikTok and how to address them. And I think that's what we're hearing from colleagues on both sides of the aisle today is a real effort to grapple with the challenges that we see for national security and for the safety and protection of American citizens, especially our children and young adults. And we've already covered today a lot of the information about the extensive use of the app, the number of users who are children and young adults. But I think it bears repeating as Mr. VC mentioned that TikTok is the preferred platform of young Americans and they use it for all kinds of creative and important things.

And we have seen that. But there are also some dangerous things that I know it has and continues to be used for. And that also means that the data that's collected is posing additional dangers. And that's, that's what we're here for. Most people using TikTok do not realize that TikTok is collecting data about their keystrokes or about their browsing history on other sites and so much more. And I agree with my colleagues that we need a comprehensive set of data privacy laws here in the country, and we've heard some very good ideas today. Mr. Chew, you've mentioned several times today that these are industry-wide issues, and I agree with you that there are industry-wide challenges here, but there are also some specific things relating to TikTok that I wanna focus my questions on and really wanna understand where there's a difference in how we can craft legislation that addresses the very real challenges that we've been hearing about today. As you know, states across the country have joined an ongoing investigation into possible violations of consumer protection laws by TikTok as they pertain to talk's effect on the mental health of American children and teenagers. As part of this investigation, states have requested to review internal TikTok communications that takes place on Lark. That's TikTok's primary instant messaging system. Is that right?

Shou Chew:

Yes.

Rep. Lizzie Fletcher (D-TX):

Okay. And does every TikTok employee have a Lark account?

Shou Chew:

It is very similar to companies that use Slack or any other instant messaging tool,

Rep. Lizzie Fletcher (D-TX):

But Lark is a proprietary instant messaging tool. It's not Slack

Shou Chew:

Is something that was developed Yes. By, by ByteDance.

Rep. Lizzie Fletcher (D-TX):

It was developed by TikTok?

Shou Chew:

No, it's developed by ByteDance.

Rep. Lizzie Fletcher (D-TX):

It's developed by ByteDance. Okay. And so a couple questions stemming from that. Is it true that Lark video conferencing has a translation feature in which Chinese is translated to English text and vice versa?

Shou Chew:

That is correct. It helps with global inter cooperation.

Rep. Lizzie Fletcher (D-TX):

Okay. And those translated conversations are somehow saved into the Lark system.

Shou Chew:

We need to get back to you on the specifics. Okay. there is you know, I'll get back to you on the specifics.

Rep. Lizzie Fletcher (D-TX):

Okay, that would be great to know. And I neglected to ask, but does every TikTok employee have a Lark account?

Shou Chew:

Yes, I believe so, yes.

Rep. Lizzie Fletcher (D-TX):

Including you? Do you have one?

Shou Chew:

Yes, I believe so.

Rep. Lizzie Fletcher (D-TX):

And then do you have a, there's some kind of profile for your instant messaging system. So every employee identifies their manager and their department, who they work for, what they do. Is that all included in their log profile? Do you know?

Shou Chew:

It's very common for companies to have enterprise messaging tools that Sure companies use.

Rep. Lizzie Fletcher (D-TX):

It does. And I guess I'm asking specifically about Lark since it's specific to TikTok, whether it includes information like identifying who, for example, your manager is. Do you know whether that's something that's identified in Lark?

Shou Chew:

Yes. Again, some of these HR features are built into a lot of enterprise tools that we use.

Rep. Lizzie Fletcher (D-TX):

Yeah. So like for your own profile, does it identify who your manager is?

Shou Chew:

Yes, it does.

Rep. Lizzie Fletcher (D-TX):

And who does it identify as your manager?

Shou Chew:

I report to the CEO of ByteDance.

Rep. Lizzie Fletcher (D-TX):

Okay. And so that is Zhang Yiming, is that identified as your manager?

Shou Chew:

That's the former CEO. He has stepped down from the board.

Rep. Lizzie Fletcher (D-TX):

Okay.

Shou Chew:

And so as the CEO....

Rep. Lizzie Fletcher (D-TX):

Okay. So Mr. Rubo is identified now as your manager on the system. Okay. and as you mentioned, it was developed by ByteDance, so it's not just used by TikTok employees, it's also used by ByteDance employees. Is that right?

Shou Chew:

Also by other companies. Now I think Lark is selling it. It's a good tool for instant messaging.

Rep. Lizzie Fletcher (D-TX):

So Lark is available to third parties outside of the ByteDance system as well, like Slack? Yes. And do you personally ever use Lark to communicate with ByteDance?

Shou Chew:

With employees at ByteDance? Yes, I do.

Rep. Lizzie Fletcher (D-TX):

You do? Okay. Well, I'm running out of time and I'm sorry to say cuz this is really interesting. I do think it underscores some of the concerns that have been raised in this hearing. So I think it's clear we have work we need to continue to do here in the Congress to adjust data protection and privacy. And with that Madam Chairwoman, I thank you and I will yield back.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

General Lady yields back. Committee stands in recess and will reconvene immediately following the third vote being called.

Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX):

Being here, Mr. Chew, I am one of six Texans on this committee. I'm over here. So when you invoke the name of Texas, you get my attention. Ms. J, when you were the CFO of ByteDance, did the Chinese government instruct you on how content was to be moderated on Doyen or, or TikTok? Yes or no?

Shou Chew:

Sorry. Congressman, would you mind repeating that question?

Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX):

When you were the CFO of ByteDance, did the Chinese government instruct you on how content to be moderated was to be moderated on Douyin or TikTok?

Shou Chew:

I was not in charge of that as the CFO.

Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX):

You were not? We have a, we have a, a discrepancy there. Reports have shown that TikTok accounts managed by media links to be a propaganda arm of the CCP pushed divisive content before the recent midterm election. Mr. Chew, yes or no has, to your knowledge, has the CCP coordinated or utilized TikTok to influence users through algorithms state paid content creation or in any other capacity?

Shou Chew:

No, they do not do that. We do not promote or remove any content on behalf of the Chinese government.

Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX):

You don't, but did the Chinese government, do you have any knowledge of that?

Shou Chew:

We do not do Congressman, we have only one process of removing content on our platform. Okay. And the process is done by our content moderation team headquartered in Ireland and Dublin, sorry, Ireland and the US and we will only remove content if it violates our guidelines, and that's something that we audit, you know, or if there's a valid legal order.

Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX):

Okay. Several reports, hearings and leaked internal documents have indicated that TikTok has repeatedly censored or de-amplified content that is critical of Chinese Communist party's pol party policies in the US and abroad. Are you aware of those reports?

Shou Chew:

I don't think that's accurate. Congressman.

Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX):

Are you aware of those reports?

Shou Chew:

There could be some reports that say that, but that, that action itself is not,

Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX):

But your testimony here today is that you can keep up with stuff and make it as cleaned as possible, quote unquote. Are you aware of those reports?

Shou Chew:

I wanna make it very clear that we, we, there is content on TikTok that's great and fun. There is content that's critical of China and it's not what,

Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX):

That's not what I'm saying. Are you aware of the reports citing that fact?

Shou Chew:

Again, like I said, the fact is if you go onto our platform, you will find content that is critical of China.

Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX):

Well, we're gonna talk about that now. This committee is looking at reforming Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which has already been mentioned here today. Do you think that censoring history and historical facts and current events should be protected by Section 230 s, good faith requirement?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, that is a more complex topic. I will need to speak to my team and get back to you on the specifics.

Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX):

Is your team behind you?

Shou Chew:

It is my other team. I will speak to them. I'll get back to you, okay.

Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX):

It's always good to have folks behind you, isn't it?

Shou Chew:

Not them.

Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX):

No. Oh, okay. I got you. Here are my concerns with TikTok. Your claims are hard to believe. It's no secret to us that TikTok is still under the thumb of CCP influence. And let's be honest, TikTok is indoctrinating our children with divisive woke and pro CCP propaganda, all while threatening our national security with Chinese spyware. In fact, in fact, let me look at my notes here. You have an exchange with Anna Esh00 in your exchange with Congresswoman Eshoo, you said that quote, extreme fitness videos shouldn't be viewed too much. Do you remember that exchange here today?

Shou Chew:

What extremist video?

Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX):

With Anna out of California?

Shou Chew:

I, any content that has extremist content, okay, Is not allowed on our platform. It will be, we identify them. It will …

Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX):

Was that also true about the gun video that you saw today? Was that extreme content that should have been taken down?

Shou Chew:

I would need to look at the specifics of the whole video. There was a bit of lag just now. We couldn't see the whole video.

Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX):

Okay. You know what threatened our committee chair here?

Shou Chew:

That is unacceptable. Okay. And you know….

Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX):

You're aware of that extreme video and why did it take 40 plus days to get it down? Does it take literally an act of Congress? Should we plan to have a committee hearing every time, every day, every time there's something brought up so that we can limit the content on to should Congress plan to do that? Mr. Sch

Shou Chew:

Congressman? We work very hard to remove violative content on our platform.

Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX):

Okay, well, let me, let me move on with Congress and Hudson. He asked you about your wages and your stocks and you said you're pro, you prepare, you prefer to keep that information private. Now you know how we feel about the American public's information. We prefer to keep it private as well, and we don't think TikTok does that. So Madam Chair, my time is up and if this committee gets its way, talk's time is up.

Shou Chew:

Chair my response to an earlier….

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentleman... I'm sorry. Gentleman's time has expired. Chair recognizes Mr. Ruiz from California for five minutes.

Rep. Raul Ruiz (D-CA):

Thank you. Chair Rodgers. I echo my colleagues' concerns about TikTok’s, impacts on the health and wellbeing of the American public. As a doctor and the ranking member of the select subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic, I'm troubled that TikTok is rife with medically inaccurate information, including dangerous misinformation and the intentional disinformation about Covid 19 and Vaccines Talk's. Community guidelines state that the com company will remove content or accounts that involve misleading information that causes significant harm. However, since the early stages of the pandemic, TikTok has been used as a platform for people pushing misinformation, disinformation, including by those casting doubt on the safety and efficacy of lifesaving vaccines. And despite talk's pledge to address harmful misinformation, these videos are being viewed millions of times. For example, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue found that a sample of 124 TikTok videos containing vaccine misinformation were viewed 20 million times. And media matters found that a sample of 18 videos with Covid 19 misinformation were viewed over 57 million times. Here's another shocking study. The Journal of American Medical Informatics Association found that when searching hashtag coronavirus on TikTok, almost 30% of the videos that came up contained misinformation videos in that sample containing a high level of misinformation were viewed a median of 9.4 million times. Mr. Shu, what are these? Why are these dangerous videos through the cracks of your company's efforts to enforce its own community guidelines and remove harmful misinformation?

Shou Chew:

Before, before I answer that in my response to another question, Representative...

Rep. Raul Ruiz (D-CA):

No, you're Mr. Chew you're in my time. Answer my question.

Shou Chew:

I understand, but if I would like to clarify something,

Rep. Raul Ruiz (D-CA):

I'll clarify. I have five minutes. Okay. In my time. You're in my time now. Answer my question.

Shou Chew:

Yes. Any dangerous misinformation is partner. We partner with third party experts to be able to identify and help us with subject domain expertise and with the expertise that we recognize, we rely on those to develop policies to recognize and remove content.

Rep. Raul Ruiz (D-CA):

Well, your efforts are, have failed and they're dangerous. Okay? It's public health risks that you're putting millions of people's lives at risk for not being able to do a better job. And I'm concerned that talk's features make it users uniquely vulnerable to the spread of this misinformation. For example, TikTok makes it extremely easy to reuse audio and videos to create content which allows misinformation to quickly spread through the platform and talk's. Algorithm to recommend videos means that a user viewing one video containing misinformation can easily result in their quote unquote for you page becoming filled with videos containing similar misinformation. This is a dangerous feedback loop. So is TikTok taking any action to modify these features so that they no longer facilitate the spread of this misinformation or this misinformation feedback loop?

Shou Chew:

Congressman? Again, like I said, any dangerous mis or disinformation we work with third parties to recognize and it's proactively removed from our platform. Okay? So, so it doesn't need to get into those loops at all.

Rep. Raul Ruiz (D-CA):

So, so I, so I can, I can go back and read you the, the data and the, and the Journal of American Medical Informatics. 30% of videos after searching for hashtag coronavirus had misinformation, one, like almost one out of three, your third party and your and your company are missing one, almost one out of three misinform videos. So you're telling me what you're doing. I'm telling you the data shows that you are grossly failing at that effort. The other thing, the other question I have for you is that TOS is also in Spanish. And Spanish speaking populations have been specifically targeted to misinformation when it comes to many aspects, especially medical misinformation. And as chair of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, we reached out to you last Congress on this issue. So what is your intent, or how does your team look to address Spanish versus English? How many staff do you have focusing on Spanish versus how many staff do you have focusing on English misinformation?

Shou Chew:

Congressman? I was like I explained just now the Spanish speaking population is very important to our platform. We do have a lot of Spanish speaking moderators and we will continue to. So

Rep. Raul Ruiz (D-CA):

How many Spanish speaking staff versus English speaking Spanish staff or misinformation do you have?

Shou Chew:

I can get back to you on the specifics, but misinformation, dangerous misinformation is moderated regardless of language,

Rep. Raul Ruiz (D-CA):

Not to the degree that it needs to be.

Shou Chew:

We, we are, we can continue to work hard...

Rep. Raul Ruiz (D-CA):

When there's misinformation, people base their decisions that oftentimes put them at risk in exposures and their families at risk. And with the coronavirus, especially prior to the vaccines they, they, the risk was their life. Thank you.

Shou Chew:

Madam Chair. I would like to clarify something in the follow up question to representative Dan's question just now. I misunderstood the follow up about Biden spying on, on behalf of the Chinese government. My answer to that question should be a no because it came very rapidly. I just wanna clarify that

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentleman's time is expired. Gentlemen or the chair, chair recognizes gentlemen from Idaho, Mr. Fulcher for five minutes.

Rep. Russ Fulcher (R-ID):

Thank you. Mad chairman. Mr. Chew. We've been going a long time here by now and a lot of questions have been answered and a lot of 'em have not been answered. And the primary thing I wanna do is just share some thoughts of what I've seen, learned today, been exposed to. First of all, I've gotta compliment you on having a product that's impressive. It is a very influential tool. It is, it is addictive and that's what you want users to be exposed to is something addictive. And it is a data gathering masterpiece. So clearly it's got the potential to sell products, connected like-minded people with that artificial intelligence capability in a viral, viral fashion. And perhaps spread information quicker, better than anything else that's been developed out there. Now I'm, I'm just gonna tell you, I'm not a subscriber, at least a willing subscriber, but probably in that database somewhere is my preferences with colors or foods or who I've spoken to or what I've said, or my favorite newspapers, I don't know if that's available to be sold or given to whomever or whatever.

And the whatever is what bothers me. And I'll use myself as an example again, if for whatever reason I became a target in this, I became somebody you didn't like. And I know that'd be hard to believe cuz you gotta like me. But let's say you didn't or a company didn't, or for whatever reason I became an app, app target, that artificial intelligence algorithm could be shared or spread selectively to a targeted audience that with negative information that maybe they has been paired up with that knowledge and that app to make me look really, really bad. Or to the converse, same thing could be done to make me look really, really good. Here's a problem, it's someone else or some artificial intelligence algorithm that has inordinate power to subjectively combine strategic data with strategic audiences to shape whatever thoughts and news they want.

And I've equipped it not even knowing it, that process could apply to anyone or anything. There's the danger. It could be the president of the United States, it could be their kids, it could be a company, it could be a political party, it could be a news outlet. Anything could be targeted for that selective viral spread of just some information. Mr. Chew, this may be genius. In fact, that doesn't make it fair. It doesn't make it good and it doesn't make it accountable. I wouldn't want my government to have that ability. I wouldn't want a company or a political party or my friend August here or my mother to have that capability. And I certainly don't want that to be accessible to anyone in China. Now there's no question. It's got immense value and as proof of that you're here cuz this hasn't been a fun day. I know that hasn't been a fun day for us either.

Artificial intelligence is difficult to manage once it's on auto cruise control and it's, as we've talked about, nearly impossible to wall off data. I know the idea. No little bit about databases, I know a little bit about corruption of those databases. It's very difficult to wall things off and in, unfortunately, there's this thing in co human nature where there's some dark components from time to time. There's always a temptation to monetize sayings or perhaps use some of these tools for nefarious purposes and they can have absolutely devastating consequences. So, Mr. Chew, I'm gonna wrap up my comments and just say that this is so attractive. Tiktok poses as a Mr. Rodgers neighborhood, but It acts like Big Brother. And that's gotta stop. Madam Chair, I yield back.

Rep. Morgan Griffith (R-VA):

Would the gentleman yield?

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentleman yields back.

Rep. Morgan Griffith (R-VA):

Gentleman yield?

Rep. Russ Fulcher (R-ID):

Oh, gentleman yields.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Yield. Yield to Mr. Morgan Griffith.

Rep. Morgan Griffith (R-VA):

I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. Chew. Earlier we had submitted into evidence the TikTok, ByteDance and their ties to the Chinese Communist Party report that was filed as an exhibit last week with the Senate in Australia.

If you have any comment, I'd like to get it on this paragraph out of their summary. Our research confirms beyond any plausible doubt that TikTok is owned by ByteDance. ByteDance as a PRC company. And ByteDance is subject to all the influence, guidance, and defacto control to which the Chinese Communist Party now subjects all PRC technology companies, we show in this report how the CCP and the PRC state agencies together, the party state, have extended their ties into ByteDance to the point that the company can no longer be accurately described as a private enterprise. You keep calling it a private enterprise, but all the countries in the world are saying it's not a private enterprise. It's part of the Chinese Communist Party. What say you, sir? Yes or no? Is it part of the Chinese Communist Party as everybody thinks? Or are you still living in some mystical world?

Shou Chew:

I disagree with many conclusions.

Rep. Morgan Griffith (R-VA):

So you're living in the mystical world. I yield back.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentleman, yields back chair recognizes Ms. Democrat, sorry, the lady, general lady from Minnesota, Ms. Craig, for five minutes.

Rep. Angie Craig (D-MN):

Well, thank you so much, Madam Chair for yielding. Mr. Chew, I'm, I'm probably like a lot of parents who are also members of Congress out here. I know a number of us. When you testified earlier today, you mentioned that the over 35 segment was a growing group of potential users as if over 35 is old. And I realize that my own children think that I'm ancient, are four boys. But like a lot of us up here we understand that there is some potential good, and of course many of your influencers are doing what they're doing for all the right reasons. But one thing in your testimony, you said a lot was safety. But as a mother and as a member of Congress, and as someone who's very concerned about drug use in our country, I was surprised that that didn't come up once in your testimony.

No, nil. Real reference to it here today. You know, I've raised my concerns in general about social media platforms serving as an illegal marketplace for in prior big tech hearings, and I plan to continue that focus during today's hearing. Mr. Chew a March 8th, 2023 article in the Washington Post detailed the fact that TikTok has made little progress in combating the sale of illegal drugs on your platform. In fact, Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser said that getting drugs on platform like yours was nearly as convenient as using a phone to order a pizza or call an Uber. That same article mentions that law enforcement agencies have been frustrated by talk's lack of competition in the form of data sharing. In my my view, TikTok has taken little action in response to this crisis. According to a May, 2022 blog post from TikTok, you donated $125,000 or 0.001% of your 22 revenue to an anti-drug effort on your platform in the form of ad credits.

You also redirected hashtag drugs, hashtag fentanyl and other obvious hashtags away from posts selling drugs to a community resources page as if a teenager looking for drugs is going to look for them at hashtag drugs. Drug dealers have easily worked their way around this using emojis and slang to communicate that they have drugs for sale. To this day, it is possible for anyone to log into your platform and acquire drugs, and the consequences of that can be fatal. What are you doing to move past these token efforts to prevent teenagers from accessing drugs on your platform? Look, as parents up here today we not, we may not understand everything about your platform. I'm not an a tech guru. Many of us up here may not use exactly the right language, but we know when our kids are at risk and our kids are at risk on your platform. So what are you gonna do to move past these previous token efforts?

Shou Chew:

Congresswoman, we do take illegal illegal drugs content on our platform very seriously. It violates our guidelines, proactively identify and move them. And as you point it out, if anybody searches for any drugs on our platform, we do point them to resources to help them with that. At the same time, we have also taken product changes. Like for example, we don't allow our under 16 users to use the right messaging. And the reason is because, you know, we wanted to. That was the trade off here. And we believe that, you know, it will protect these younger users better from getting con from getting contacts from people trying to push illegal activity. So we'll continue to work on it. Again, no company can be perfect at this. We're not saying....

Rep. Angie Craig (D-MN):

Mr. Chew, I, with all due respect, the no company can be perfect line has been used way too much today. I'm gonna reclaim my time. You know, clearly in the three plus hours you've been before us today, what you're saying about Project Texas just doesn't pass the smell test. My constituents are concerned that TikTok and the Chinese Communist Party are controlling their data and seeing our own vulnerabilities. If you were an American company, we could look at your 10 K, we could see who your shareholders are. The answer you provided earlier today, you'd rather not tell us what your compensation is or how it's derived. Well, no American CEO would like to tell us that, but they have to because they're an American company. So what you're doing down in Texas is all well and good, but it is not enough for us to be convinced that our privacy is not at risk. So how can you say that you're protecting American users' privacy? With the CCP being so heavily involved with bike dance, it's not possible China won't even carry your product. How is it that you can convince us that our privacy is not at risk? And more than that our kids' privacy is not at risk in this country?

Shou Chew:

In my opening statement...

Rep. Angie Craig (D-MN):

Thank you Madam Chair.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentle ladies' time is expired. We're, we're gonna have to continue on. Gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Allen's recognized for five minutes.

Rep. Rick Allen (R-GA):

Thank you Madam Chair and thank you Mr. Chief for being here today. September, 2021, the Wall Street Journal published an article titled How TikTok Serves Up Sex and Drug Videos to Minors. This article gives a chilling depiction of the types of content that TikTok’s algorithm is curating for our children. This article claims that your application served an account that was registered as a 13 year old quote, videos about drug use referenced in reference to, to co cocaine meth addiction and promotional videos for online sales of drugs. The algorithm was also found to have delivered countless videos depicting quote, pornography and other adult content to the device of an account that was registered as a 13 year old. Could you please explain to the members of this committee and parents across the country why your company deems it acceptable for such inappropriate content to be prominently featured on a child's page?

Shou Chew:

A lot of the content that you mentioned, congressmen are violative of our, of our own policies, and we are, we don't think they're acceptable and we will remove them when we identify them. We take this very seriously. I mentioned this, this is an industry-wide challenge. We're investing as much as we can. We don't think it represents the majority of the user's experience on TikTok, but it does happen. Some bad actors try and come in and pose some of this content, and we're doing our best to invest as much as we can to remove them.

Rep. Rick Allen (R-GA):

Well, I would say you're not doing enough. I have 14 grandchildren. Mr. True. You personally believe that such content is appropriate for minor children to consume.

Shou Chew:

A lot of the content that you mentioned, like porn, for example, is not allowed on our platform. So no, I do not think that is acceptable for young people to consume.

Rep. Rick Allen (R-GA):

Earlier this week, the Wall Street Journal published an article, title quote, Chinese partner has another, another wildly popular app in the US. This app is called CapCut, is a video editing tool to help users go viral on TikTok. While for obvious reasons, most of our attention is focused on TikTok and ByteDance, other companies and their applications are also continuing to exploit the privacy of Americans. Tiktok, CapCut, Lark, FaceU. All of these apps are also controlled by ByteDance. Serious privacy concerns. In 2022, it was reported that top buzz, an international version of ByteDance censored Chinese news app was used to spread pro-China messages to Americans. When it comes to the data privacy of Americans, we must have a clear set of guidelines to ensure Americans' data is protected and not passed along to unknown third party actors who could pose a threat to our security. I urged my colleagues to continue to work together to pass a national data privacy bill, not just one out of the House energy and Commerce committee, but also through the house of this Congress. It is the only systematic way we can address privacy concerns. Unfortunately, I've been given no reason to believe that TikTok does not pose a threat and cannot be trusted to follow our laws when they conflict with the desires of the Chinese Communist Party.

Your firewall that you're talking about if you had a bad actor in what you call your Texas initiative, could get through that firewall and send any information that they wanted to send anywhere direct to the and to directly to the Chinese Communist Party. Would you deny that

Shou Chew:

Congressman, this risk that you talk about exists for every company's bad actors?

Rep. Rick Allen (R-GA):

I'm talking about TikTok, sir.

Shou Chew:

In fact, the risk is lower for us because these, it

Rep. Rick Allen (R-GA):

Is a risk, correct?

Shou Chew:

The personnel will be vetted. Yeah. So the risk is actually lower than most companies in the industry.

Rep. Rick Allen (R-GA):

Well, that is why we have to deal with your company. And with that Madame Chair, I yield back.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentleman, yields back chair recognizes gentleman from California, Mr. Peters for five, five minutes.

Rep. Scott Peters (D-CA):

Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Chew. Thanks for being here today. You know, your testimony discusses an effort your company has named Project Texas and the investments your company has made in creating a firewall between the United States user data and entities in China susceptible to influenced by China's government. And with your company's recent announcement by CFIUS, that CFIUS has instructed TikTok to separate itself from ByteDance or face a ban, this commitment to retaining this firewall is at a crossroads. So I want to ask you some questions about your company's long-term plans to ensure the safety and security of American data. And this for me is the crux of the concern for me about TikTok. First of all, does the Chinese government need to approve Project Texas for TikTok to agree to it?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, we have designed Project Texas to move forward in the United States. This is something that we have described at length in the written testimony and in my opening statement, the firewall of American data stored on American soil by an American company overseen by American personnel. This, this is designed to move forward in the United States,

Rep. Scott Peters (D-CA):

But does the Chinese government need to approve Project Texas for you to agree to it?

Shou Chew:

We do not believe so.

Rep. Scott Peters (D-CA):

How is TikTok considering the future of Project Texas in the event of a sale or other ownership changes? Are there elements of the Project Texas that TikTok TikTok would change prior prior to, or

Shou Chew:

I cannot speak on this hypothetical or on, you know, yeah, on potential, you know, owners who would I cannot represent?

Rep. Scott Peters (D-CA):

Okay. You don't know.

Shou Chew:

I don't know. Yes.

Rep. Scott Peters (D-CA):

Despite Project Texas's plan positive changes, it does include several broad exceptions that would allow large amounts of US user data to routinely leave the country. I wanna know a little bit more about these exceptions so I can understand whether Project Texas can live up to its promise protecting Americans user user data. I understand that under Project Texas business data and public data will be permitted to regularly leave the United States. Is that correct?

Shou Chew:

Almost all the data is under the DEF that's not public. It's under the definition of protected data. This accepted data that you mentioned, I can get back to your team on this, is really for interoperability purposes to make sure that the business can still operate and American users are still getting the benefit of a global platform.

Rep. Scott Peters (D-CA):

Can you tell us what data, where the data goes and how it's used by the company?

Shou Chew:

It will travel outside of the United States. But I can get back to you on the specifics. Okay. It's data that doesn't, it cannot be used to identify users, you know, so it really is data that ensures the interoperability of the platform

Rep. Scott Peters (D-CA):

And understand that. I think we would want to have some understanding of how, how we would distinguish that by definition and then also how it would be enforced.

Shou Chew:

I can get back to you on those specifics.

Rep. Scott Peters (D-CA):

How is the US data used to promote certain content back in the United States market, for instance?

Shou Chew:

I'm sorry.

Rep. Scott Peters (D-CA):

So at what you'll have US, US data feed the All right. How, how can you discuss, when you discuss where the data goes and how it's used by the company, how and at what points of data transfer to the US data feed the PRC developed algorithm used by TikTok? How would the data that you're talking, we,

Shou Chew:

We, we, TikTok does not, it's not available in China.

Rep. Scott Peters (D-CA):

The PRC developed the algorithm used by TikTok. How does US data get fed by that?

Shou Chew:

The US algorithm that leads to the US app is in the Oracle cloud infrastructure and is trained by US and global data, again, TikTok does not, is not available in mainland China.

Rep. Scott Peters (D-CA):

How can we trust that these exceptions for Project Texas won't be abused by China's government or by foreign adversaries?

Shou Chew:

We can, we, this is the fourth commitment, transparency, third party monitors, including the definitions of this exceptions. And, you know, we want to be very transparent on how they're used.

Rep. John Joyce (R-PA):

Okay. I guess, I guess my question will be that you want to get back to me in writing, that's fine. But how would we distinguish between the data for interoperability that you suggest needs to be shared with what data wouldn't be shared? Yeah.

Shou Chew:

It, it's again, you know, it's first of all, public data is not part of the protected data definition because public data is what users want to share globally. So if you post a video and you want someone in France to see it, just by definition it has to leave the United States. Otherwise the world cannot see it. Now, there are certain aggregated and anonymized data sets that's useful for interoperability, for, for advertising, for example. Right? And that is part of what we are talking about, right? I can get back to you on the specifics, but I

Rep. John Joyce (R-PA):

Think we'd also want to know how it's anonymized and how, what, what oversight and enforcement we can count on.

Shou Chew:

Okay. I can get back to you on specifics.

Rep. Scott Peters (D-CA):

Thank you. I yield back

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentleman, yields back gentleman from Texas. Mr. Fluger is recognized for five minutes.

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

Thank you. Madam Chair. Mr. Chew, I got, I gotta hand it to you. You've actually done something that in the last three to four years has not happened except for the exception of maybe Vladimir Putin, you have unified Republicans and Democrats, and if only for a day, we are actually unified because we have serious concerns. Do you, does TikTok support good? I mean, is TikTok a platform for good, just yes or no?

Shou Chew:

I believe yes.

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

Okay. Does TikTok support freedom of speech?

Shou Chew:

Yes. It's one of the commitments I've given this committee.

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

Do you personally support the First Amendment?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, I'm here to talk about…

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

As the CEO of TikTok.

Shou Chew:

I'm here to talk about TikTok.

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

As the CEO of TikTok. Do you support…

Shou Chew:

Tiktok supports freedom of…

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

Thank you. Does TikTok support genocide?

Shou Chew:

Again, Congressman, I'm here to talk about TikTok.

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

Does Tiktok support genocide.

Shou Chew:

No.

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

Okay thank you. But, I’m here to talk about, so I'm reclaiming my time. I'm gonna go to a video now, and, and it's from Ens Cantor Freedom. And I'd like you to see En Cantor Freedom, who has spent his entire career post B fighting against human rights violations within the Chinese Communist Party. Go ahead and play this video, which highlights a situation that allegedly shows some human rights violations inside China. Please play Mr. Chew. This was a video that was posted on TikTok by Enes Kanter Freedom. Are you familiar with this basketball player?

Shou Chew:

I'm not familiar with the specifics of this. Yeah, but I can tell you that.

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

Are you familiar with the player Enes Kanter Freedom.

Shou Chew:

Congressman? I'm not specific. I'm not. You just have to open TikTok and just search for this kind of content. It really exists.

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

I've read the moderation policy. Lemme just quote what you've talked about content moderation. Tiktok has a moderation policy.

Shou Chew:

Yes, we do have community guidelines that we…

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

One of the one of the guidelines says material that in the sole judgment of TikTok is objectionable. Is this an example, banning Enes Kanter Freedom, is that an example of objectionable material inside the Chinese Communist Party in mainland China?

Shou Chew:

We do not, we do not take down content simply because it's critical of China.

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

He was banned one week after this video.

Shou Chew:

We do not, we do not do that. And I can check…

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

If you need a, if you need a note, go ahead.

Shou Chew:

The note says he's not banned.

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

<Laugh>, His account was taken off one week after.

Shou Chew:

We can check on the specifics.

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

We can check. Yeah. So let, let, let's get to some other questions. Thank you for the slide. Your privacy policy states that you collect a great array of data, keystroke patterns, app file, names and types, sometimes approximate location, GPS location are keystroke patterns and rhythms, part of TikTok gathering the data that is gathered by Tek.

Shou Chew:

If you're talking, Congressman, specifically about keystrokes, you know, keystrokes, we do not, we do not engage in keystroke logging the monitor, what the users say is to identify bots. Okay? It's for security purposes. And this is a standard industry practice.

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

You, you gather a lot of data. It's safe to say.

Shou Chew:

We don't gather, we don't believe we gather more than any other social media company.

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

Tiktok gathers a lot of data because your value proposition, as you sat in my office and told me, was to connect people to each other around the world. You told me this in my office. So you gather data on what they like and what they don't like, and then you showed them things that they don't know they like, but eventually they may, you told me this.

Shou Chew:

I don't think that's what I said. What I said is that we connect people together. Yes. Are you interested in notes? And that doesn't mean that we collect more data.

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

Are you aware of any instances of TikTok distributing content from Chinese state media?

Shou Chew:

I'm sorry?

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

Are you aware of any instances of TikTok distributing content from Chinese state media on the platform?

Shou Chew:

We will label them clearly too, for our users to understand that.

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

Do you disagree with FBI Director Wray and NSA Director Nakasone, when they said that the CCP could have the capability to manipulate data and send it to the United States? Do you disagree with their statement?

Shou Chew:

Their statement says…

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

So do you disagree with that?

Shou Chew:

No, I don't disagree with that.

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

Okay. So it is possible that the CCP under the auspices of ByteDance, which is your parent company, which you get paid from, has the ability to manipulate content that is being shared with 130 million Americans.

Shou Chew:

Yes. Congressman, I just wanna make sure I'm understanding all these questions. I don't disagree with them. That their data risk in general, that's what I meant.

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

There's a big data risk.

Shou Chew:

Because on us specifically…

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

Are there engineers located inside mainland China that work on TikTok? Not Douyin, but TikTok,

Shou Chew:

We are not the only company that has that.

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

Are there engineers inside mainland China currently working on the algorithm for TikTok?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, like I said….

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

As you told me in my office…

Shou Chew:

There are other, there are other companies that, as I told you in your office, the other…

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX):

By the way, I'm gonna reclaim my time. Please rename your project. Texas is not the appropriate name. We stand for freedom and transparency, and we don't want your project. I yield back.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentleman yields back. Gentle lady from Tennessee's recognized for five minutes. Mrs. Harshbarger.

Rep. Diana Harshbarger (R-TN):

Thank you Madam Chair. And thank you Mr. Chew for being here today. Both President Trump and now President Biden back forcing TikTok to sell to an American company. However, the Chinese Communist Party has put export controls on algorithms, ByteDance owns that power on TikTok. And of course, this has created a gauntlet of regulatory hurdles in China and the US that prevented the sale of TikTok. Now, as a longtime business owner, I want to tell you, Mr. Chew, that waiting until your hands are forced will only drive down the price of your app. And right now, both your hands are tied and you're gonna have to make a decision about whether you choose freedom from the CCP or you continue to be an agent of the CCP. And I, I'll tell you why I say it that way. As a former member of Homeland Security, a pointblank ask FBI director, Ray, is TikTok a national security threat? And without hesitation, sir, he looked at me and said, yes, congresswoman, it is Now, how much data is ByteDance collecting through TikTok that's worth continuing to fight this regulatory gauntlet. You know, why not take the money and run like any other company would do?

Shou Chew:

Congresswoman, we built project taxes in order to safeguard, and we listen to the concerns that have been raised, and we are building that's unprecedented that no other company is offering to protect us user interests. And we believe it is rigorous and robust, and it, you know, we are even offering third party transparency and monitors to come in to verify this. Frankly, I haven't heard any good reason why this doesn't work. I've heard, I've heard a lot of, I've heard a lot of rhetoric around this, but I haven't heard a good reason why it doesn't work. Well look forward to these conversations, by the way, with you.

Rep. Diana Harshbarger (R-TN):

Absolutely. Well, let me, let me go down this road. When TikTok was unveiled to the public, its business model was solely based on generating revenue from advertising. Of course, ByteDance operated a separate app called Dorian for the Chinese marketplace. Tiktok is embarking on becoming a so-called Super app. In other words, it's a one-stop shop with everything you do. As representative Falter said, it's reported that talk's algorithms are so powerful that owner ByteDance has begun to license it to other companies. Talk's. Recommendation engine drives usage on the platform, and this leads to promises of quick exposure and fame that leads to pe leads to even more people joining. And when you sign up, TikTok starts collecting data about you, your location, your gender, your age, your facial data. The user never gets to the end of the content. And that's by design. And obviously that makes you a lot of money. Now, I know that the Chinese Communist Party is preventing ByteDance from selling TikTok due to export restrictions on the technology. And this causes me to question, how are you going to power TikTok with your Oracle servers located in the US with that Texas project with ByteDance technology? If it can't leave China, how, how's that going to happen? That I just want you to explain how it's gonna happen.

Shou Chew:

Congressman, the way that we design this is so that any piece of software, software that is impactful to the code that enters, you know the tech that some technical details around this will be reviewed by a third party or a few third party monitors just to make sure that we are all comfortable with the code. I wanna say this again, I don't know of any other company in my industry who is offering this level of transparency.

Rep. Diana Harshbarger (R-TN):

Well, why are there two different versions of apps? One in China and one in the United States.

Shou Chew:

It's just a different business.

Rep. Diana Harshbarger (R-TN):

Hmm. Well, I think we all know the reason that the Chinese get a different version because ByteDance puts China first in America last. And you know, TikTok has, with everything we've heard today, sir, when you see 13 year olds, 16 year olds, you see the degradation that's happening to our youth and our society. You know, it's deceptive and it's destructive comment and it's comments. And the worst thing is that it's deliberate, sir. And that's not acceptable. And with that chairwoman, I yield

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Back. Gentle lady, yields back, gentle lady from Iowa. Ms. Miller-Meeks is recognized for five minutes.

Rep. Mariannette Miller-Meeks (R-IA):

Thank you Madam Chair. And just like to thank our witness, Mr. Chew. Having been in the hot seat, so to speak before when I was in the state Senate. I know how challenging this can be, and thank you for your demeanor throughout all of this. But certainly as you can see in a bipartisan way, we have concerns and those concerns are valid. And this is a yes or no question, does TikTok track users individual keystrokes

Shou Chew:

Only for security purposes for like, for example, like detecting bots, but we don't monitor what users say.

Rep. Mariannette Miller-Meeks (R-IA):

So the only purpose that you would monitor keystrokes is for security purposes.

Shou Chew:

I can get back to you on more specifics, but this is not unlike what many other companies in the industry does.

Rep. Mariannette Miller-Meeks (R-IA):

So the keystroke monitoring does not go beyond what common industry practice in comparison to platforms like Facebook or Instagram use?

Shou Chew:

Yes, I, yes, I believe so.

Rep. Mariannette Miller-Meeks (R-IA):

Okay. And does TikTok keep records of users' credit cards and passwords?

Shou Chew:

I am not aware of that. You, you don't need that to log in. Of course, I can get back to you on specifics if you make a transaction on an e-commerce platform. But regardless, all that US data will be stored within the Project Texas firewall you know within the Oracle Cloud infrastructure and overseen by an American person.

Rep. Mariannette Miller-Meeks (R-IA):

So you would store credit card and password information.

Shou Chew:

I need to check on the specifics. We are launching a pilot e-commerce plan, and we're making sure that that data is very secure within the Oracle Cloud infrastructure.

Rep. Mariannette Miller-Meeks (R-IA):

And I think you've made a point of saying that your platform is not different than other platforms on social media and therefore are no more responsible than Facebook or Instagram or, or Twitter or in the other social media platforms. The concern, however, comes with where the technology is generated and whom it is owned by. And in the case of other companies, it is generated in the us under US guidelines, under US privacy laws, with, with certain parameters versus generated through a parent company bite bands, which as we know is is susceptible to the laws of the Chinese Communist Party, which has access to all of that data and information. And I understand that TikTok has just reinstated Enes Kanter's account recently. So our concern in the question I have for you is why would China or the Chinese Communist Party be opposed to a forced sale of TikTok?

Shou Chew:

I cannot speak on behalf of the Chinese government. I can say that we designed Project Texas to take it forward here in the United States. And again, and I believe it offers unprecedented protection for US user data. Yeah,

Rep. Mariannette Miller-Meeks (R-IA):

I think the problem is when there is a lack of transparency, then that leads people to believe that there's something more nefarious and that there is in fact data that is captured, is stored and poses a risk not only to children in the United States but also poses a risk to national security. With that, I yield the rest of my time to my colleague Jay Obernolte

Rep. Jay Obernolte (R-CA):

Thank the general lady from Iowa for yielding. Mr. Chew, I'd like to continue our discussion about Project Texas and the technical details about what you're proposing to do. So you are migrating all storage of US user data to the Oracle Cloud infrastructure. And you think that that'll be done by the end of the year, was that right?

Shou Chew:

Again, I can get back to you on the technical parts of it, the migration today, by default, all us new US data is stored by default.

Rep. Jay Obernolte (R-CA):

Sir, I'm just using what you said in your testimony, in your opening here.

Shou Chew:

It is stored there by default. What I said in my testimony is I'm deleting legacy data, the system, see Virginia and Singapore, that's the difference.

Rep. Jay Obernolte (R-CA):

Who, when this migration is complete, who will have access to that data?

Shou Chew:

Right now a team called TikTok, US Data Security that by American personnel has access to that. We have begun these operations already.

Rep. Jay Obernolte (R-CA):

Okay. But the app itself has access to the data, correct?

Shou Chew:

Only through them, you know, any employees that have that data.

Rep. Jay Obernolte (R-CA):

Oh, no. What I mean is like if I use lose my iPhone and I reinstall the app and I put in my username and password, my app will reconnect to the mothership and download some of that data. Am I setting…

Shou Chew:

That's not the way it works. No, that's not the way it works. It will go through the Oracle call infrastructure and that team that looks after this.

Rep. Jay Obernolte (R-CA):

No. Yes, I realize that. So let me ask you this, what would prevent someone with detailed technical knowledge of the way the app is constructed from creating an almost identical version of the app that could also access that data?

Shou Chew:

Yeah, that's what we are giving you third party monitors and transparency. No, but

Rep. Jay Obernolte (R-CA):

They're monitoring the source code for your app. I mean, ByteDance. These engineers have been working on this app for years. What would prevent them from making an app that could also access that data?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, I think we're going into the area where, you know, what if there's a hacker, what if there's this, you know, this is a common industry problem, as you know. That's, well,

Rep. Jay Obernolte (R-CA):

I mean, it's just I I see my time's expired. It illustrates the point. Okay. I'm just skeptical that your technic gentleman's

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Time is expired. Mr. Chew, I recognize that we have run over. I appreciate your time. We have just a few members left and would appreciate the chance for them to get to answer or ask their five minutes worth of questions. Gentlemen, from Virginia, Mr. Griffiths is recognized for five minutes.

Rep. Morgan Griffith (R-VA):

Thank you very much. Madam Chair. Mr. Chew, you share legal counsel, lawyers with ByteDance, yes or no?

Shou Chew:

Yes, we do.

Rep. Morgan Griffith (R-VA):

And you testified that you prepared extensively with your legal team for this hearing, yes or no?

Shou Chew:

With my team in DC.

Rep. Morgan Griffith (R-VA):

Including the legal, including some of your legal counsel? Yes. Okay. And did they tell you about the report to the Australian Senate of March 14th that I referenced earlier? Did they tell you that that report was out there? Yes or no?

Shou Chew:

I cannot recall how I found out about the report,

Rep. Morgan Griffith (R-VA):

But you know about the report.

Shou Chew:

I, I can check and...

Rep. Morgan Griffith (R-VA):

Yeah. And did they tell you to favorably cite the Citizen's Lab in your written testimony today? Yes or no?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, I need to get back to you on specifics.

Rep. Morgan Griffith (R-VA):

They helped you with the preparation of your written statement, though, didn't they?

Shou Chew:

A team prepares Yes.

Rep. Morgan Griffith (R-VA):

Yes. And did they tell you that the Director of Citizen Lab says he has called out your company for misrepresenting their report repeatedly and, and did so as ladies yesterday? Did they tell you about that? Yes or no?

Shou Chew:

Congressman, the Citizen Lab is saying they cannot prove a negative, which is what I've been trying to do for the last four hours. All

Rep. Morgan Griffith (R-VA):

Right, but you cited it favorably as saying that it did positive things for you. That being said, let me ask you this. You keep talking about transparency, but you haven't been transparent with us here today. You were asked earlier by Mr. Hudson, if you owned Stock in ByteDance. You said you didn't wanna reveal that. Well, we're trying to figure out what the ties are between ByteDance and TikTok. I'm not gonna ask you how many shares you own, but do you own shares in ByteDance, sir?

Shou Chew:

Yes, I do. All

Rep. Morgan Griffith (R-VA):

Right, there you go. How about in TikTok

Shou Chew:

Right now, all employees own shares and why? Yeah,

Rep. Morgan Griffith (R-VA):

Sure. I expected that. I just don't understand why you didn't tell Mr. Hudson that and were transparent earlier. Instead, you made us drag it out of you. All right, now let's talk about the kids. You told several of our folks that there was a 60 minute deadline. You also told us that if you were under the age of 18, you couldn't access the live section, the live option. So I texted my 17 year old and my 15 year old, and I basically got scoffs back scoffs when I said, are you all limited to 60 minutes? My older son said, well, there is a notice I get from time to time that says I shouldn't be on more than 60 minutes, but it never kicked me off. And my younger son said, oh, I'm on as long as I wanna be. So I'm just informing you whoever told you, particularly if it was your legal team, that that's not accurate, that they're on for more than 60 minutes and they can access the live section. I believe it was Mr. Carter that you said they couldn't under 18 access the live, you know, being on live section. He's done it. So whatever it is you think you're doing, it ain't getting done. Now let's talk about the law for a minute.

You shared a legal team, but you keep talking about how you got a firewall between you and ByteDance. You can't have an effective firewall under the United States interpretation of such if you're sharing legal counsel, because anything that you say to your legal counsel, they can share internally. If you've got the same lawyers. Now, maybe you have two different teams of lawyers in the law firm, but that's not what you said to us today. You said you share lawyers. There is no firewall legally, I'm just telling you. So if you want to clean it up and be transparent, you need to do something about that. Wouldn't you agree? Yes or no? But you need to do something about that.

Shou Chew:

Congressman, I look into it rest.

Rep. Morgan Griffith (R-VA):

You'll look into it. You've been looking into it all the time. All right. You told Dr. Burgess when asked if your employees, if, if, if your employees who were members of the Chinese Communist Party had access to TikTok data from the US you said you didn't know who was a member of the Communist Party, but then Congressman Wa took Congressman Wahlberg. You said that the CEO of TikTok was not a member of the Communist of the Chinese Communist Party. And to Congressman Kelly, you said the founder of TikTok was not a member of the Chi Communist Chinese Party, sir, either you know, who is and isn't a member of the Chinese Communist Party, or you don't, which one is it? I submit that, you know, and you just aren't giving us the straight story clearly, you know, but you denied that to Congress,

Shou Chew:

Dr. Burgess. I can ask one or two people, but we have no policy to the employees. I can ask one or two people, but I, you know, who are in,

Rep. Morgan Griffith (R-VA):

In. But it's reasonable to assume that with a significant number of members of the co of the country of China being members of the Chinese Communist Party, logic would tell us your logical man. I assume Logic would tell us that there are a fair number of your employees who are members of the Chinese Communist Party, at least a dozen or so who have access to this data. Isn't that so?

Shou Chew:

Again, like I said, I can ask one or two people. I we don't have a policy to ask everything I

Rep. Morgan Griffith (R-VA):

Said earlier. You're, you're living in some kind of a cloud world cuz either you know or you don't know, I yield back. Thank you ma'am.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentleman from South Carolina, Chair recognizes for five minutes. Mr. Duncan.

Rep. Jeff Duncan (R-SC):

Thank you Madam Chair. I think what's been revealed today, there's not a degree of separation between ByteDance and TikTok. I'd like to enter in the recordHeritage Foundation document TikTok Generation: A CCP Official in Every Pocket.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Without objections, so ordered.

Rep. Jeff Duncan (R-SC):

And I'd like to yield to balance of my time to Kelly Armstrong from North Dakota.

Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND):

Thank you Madam Chair. Mr. Chew, the TikTok privacy policy details, extensive data collection on users. One line states that we may collect information about you from other publicly available sources. What publicly available data is TikTok collecting and adding to the profiles of users?

Shou Chew:

It will be publicly available, but I can get back to you on specifics.

Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND):

Okay. What is the purpose of obtaining even more data on your users beyond the data collected from the platform?

Shou Chew:

We collect data we wanna give our users, by the way, a lot of transparency on what data we collect. We give them choices on the controls of their own privacy settings. And it really is to serve them a better experience. This is the reason why so many people left the app. It's a great experience.

Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND):

So how does, so how does the non TikTok related data service provi or relate to the service provided?

Shou Chew:

I need to check the specifics and understand the question and get back to you.

Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND):

Okay. Do you think the average TikTok user knows that you are and understands that's data collection extends the information outside the use of the app?

Shou Chew:

We do give transparent information on this, and like I said, we, I, we don't, I don't believe we collect more information than most of the social media platforms out there.

Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND):

Well, and the reason I ask this is cuz I'm gonna go back into the corporate structure. You, you described that TikTok is a subsidiary of ByteDance. Mr. Griffith just said that you guys share the same lawyers. You have stated that your direct report is the CEO of ByteDance, but you've also stated that at certain levels, TikTok operates without direct daily control from ByteDance. You have used content moderation as an example for that privacy policy that states that you may share user data within your corporate group. Does that corporate group include ByteDance?

Shou Chew:

If you are talking about that one entity that has the share for the, for Chinese media licensing purposes, I think it's called Beijing to in services. If you talk about that entity, the government share, the answer is, you know, we have cut off, you know, all excess US data sets to that. So employees of the entity <laugh>,

Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND):

But your user privacy, so your corporate group ByteDance is part of your car worker.

Shou Chew:

ByteDance is the, is the, is the top company. So yeah, you're talking about the other entities within the group.

Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND):

So you just testified that you firewalled this, does that statement are, so you're saying the TOS executives, you've, that operate independently of ByteDance, but does that statement not hold for sharing of access to data?

Shou Chew:

Well, I I was talking about that one entity that has that many of you have raised some concerns. You know, that's the, that's the entity that I'm talking about, the entity with the, the Chinese government's investment that has, that is for the purpose of Chinese internet licensing for the Chinese business.

Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND):

Let me ask it a different way. What other entities have access to TikTok user data?

Shou Chew:

Well, after Project Texas, we're gonna move it so that only TikTok user data security has, ACC has controlled the access of that data.

Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND):

Okay? So, and we could bring you back either in After Project Texas is done, but right now what other entities have access to talk's user data

Shou Chew:

Today only by requirement. It's really only by requirement. Certain employees may use, may need the, require some excess of data to help build the product. But for us, you know, we have moved it from Project Texas and by the end of this year, it'll be all the way.

Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND):

But this is your privacy policy today. Like I, I understand what you're telling us, what's potentially gonna happen in the future. I have concerns again about CFIUS and government involvement, private organization, all of that. I'm just saying this is your user agreement today. So your user agreement says that you share access with your corporate group. You know, you're, you're telling me what's gonna happen whenever Project Texas gets done. I'm asking you today, who has access to talk's user data

Shou Chew:

In our user agreement, Congressman in our privacy policy, we also added a link so that users in the US can be informed about Project Texas. The link is there.

Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND):

So the link is there to private, but I understand what you're trying to do moving forward. I have my own concerns about that. But we're sitting here today in a hearing and your privacy policy is different than your testimony. Your privacy policy specifically says that you can share user data within your corporate group. So you're saying even though your privacy policy says that you're not doing it.

Shou Chew:

Like I said, I don't think there's any contradiction here. Like I said, Project Texas, when it is done, we firewall off the data, we still have some legacy data in Virginia and Singapore that we started deleting and will be done by the end of this year.

Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND):

So at the end of this year, then you won't share it. Does that mean you're sharing it today?

Shou Chew:

I don't, I don't believe so. But there is some data then...

Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND):

Why haven't you changed your privacy policy? Why haven't you, why haven't you updated

Shou Chew:

It? We did update it and we gave our users more information on Project Texas. We did update it.

Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND):

<Laugh>. Sorry.

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentlemen yields back. Gentlemen from Texas chair recognizes for five minutes, Mr. Crenshaw.

Rep. Dan Crenshaw (D-TX):

Thank you Madam Chair. Thank you Mr. Chew for bringing Republicans and Democrats together. Appreciate that. I wanna get right to the critical point of concern. So TikTok is able to collect massive amounts of personal data. We all know that that means it could, if it desired to use this data to influence narratives and trends, create misinformation campaigns, encourage self-destructive behavior, purposefully allow drug cartels to communicate freely and organize human and drug trafficking. Now, to be fair, all social media companies could do that. But here's the difference. It is only TikTok that is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. All these other social media companies are not Mr. Chew, do you agree that TikTok is controlled by the CCP?

Shou Chew:

No.

Rep. Dan Crenshaw (D-TX):

Okay. I thought you'd say that. I disagree as you thought. I might say. Here's why I disagree. Your parent company is ByteDance, right?

Shou Chew:

That's correct.

Rep. Dan Crenshaw (D-TX):

It is correct. So many of the workers who work at ByteDance, they're communist party members, right?

Shou Chew:

I wouldn't know.

Rep. Dan Crenshaw (D-TX):

Well I think for example the chief editor at ByteDance Zhang Fuping is the Communist Party secretary. Correct?

Shou Chew:

He works on the Chinese business, not on TikTok.

Rep. Dan Crenshaw (D-TX):

Right? He works for ByteDance, the parent company.

Shou Chew:

He works on the Chinese business.

Rep. Dan Crenshaw (D-TX):

The parent company of TikTok.

Shou Chew:

The Chinese business is called [inaudible].

Rep. Dan Crenshaw (D-TX):

Yeah. But it's associated with ByteDance, right?

Shou Chew:

So ByteDance owns a number of businesses, right? They are…

Rep. Dan Crenshaw (D-TX):

You all report to ByteDance. Everybody's part of ByteDance. Okay? And do you know of any other employees that work for ByteDance that are part of the Chinese Communist Party?

Shou Chew:

Like I said, you know, they are, ByteDance owns Chinese businesses and they operate in China.

Rep. Dan Crenshaw (D-TX):

You don't know how many, but you acknowledge many must be card carrying members of the CCP right there in the Chinese business.

Shou Chew:

Yes.

Rep. Dan Crenshaw (D-TX):

Yeah, I mean, the CCP holds what's called a golden share in ByteDance that allows the CCP to control one board seat in ByteDance.

Shou Chew:

That's not correct. It's not correct.

Rep. Dan Crenshaw (D-TX):

It's been publicly reported. They admitted to it.

Shou Chew:

You can on our website, we have updated it. So we can give people more transparent information on this. They have a share in a subsidiary that is only for the Chinese business. It has nothing to do with TikTok and it's for the purposes of content licensing in China.

Rep. Dan Crenshaw (D-TX):

So there, there's not an internal CCP committee, which is a regular thing that happens in China. They have a CCP committee internally inside the company.

Shou Chew:

I run TikTok. I cannot represent the Chinese business.

Rep. Dan Crenshaw (D-TX):

I'm talking about Bytdance. No arrangement in Bytedance? So here's here, here's the main point of concern. China's 2017 national intelligence law states very clearly that quote, any organization or citizen shall support, assist and cooperate with state intelligence, work in accordance with the law and maintain the secrecy of all knowledge of state intelligence work. In other words, ByteDance and also your TikTok employees that live in China, they must cooperate with Chinese intelligence whenever they are called upon. And if they are called upon, they're bound to secrecy. That would include you. So Mr. Chew, if the CCP tells ByteDance to turn over all data that TikTok is collected inside the US even within Project Texas, do they have to do so according to the Chinese law.

Shou Chew:

Congressman first, I'm Singaporean.

Rep. Dan Crenshaw (D-TX):

That's fine. But there are employees of yours and ByteDance’s in China.

Shou Chew:

We understand this concern. In my opening statement, we said, we hear these concerns, we didn't try to avoid them or, you know, trivialize them. We build something where we take that data and put it out of reach. This is what we did. We put it outta reach out reach.

Rep. Dan Crenshaw (D-TX):

But they own you.

Shou Chew:

No, we put it outta reach by le by touring them

Rep. Dan Crenshaw (D-TX):

ByteDance owns TikTok. If ByteDance is to, and, and the CCP owns ByteDance because the CCP owns everybody in China. So by law they can make them do whatever they want. And they say that by law you can't tell anyone about it. So they can make you hand over that data. Is that correct?

Shou Chew:

Data is stored here on American soil by an American company.

Rep. Dan Crenshaw (D-TX):

Oh, we say that it is overseen by Americans, we've got that. But leaked audio from 80 internal TikTok meetings shows that US user data has been repeatedly accessed from China. When you said it hasn't been. And here's the other thing, following back on my colleagues' line of questioning. In your own privacy policy, it says that you may and share information within your so-called corporate group is ByteDance part of that corporate group.

Shou Chew:

If you're talking about the, the share of the, the entity with the, with the share. I, like I shared with the previous...

Rep. Dan Crenshaw (D-TX):

Is ByteDance part of the corporate group?

Shou Chew:

ByteDance as a holding company, is part of the corporate group.

Rep. Dan Crenshaw (D-TX):

Yes. It's part of the Groper group. Yeah. Okay. So your own privacy policy says you have to share data with ByteDance. And if the CCP says, Hey, ByteDance, you're gonna do what we say and you can't tell anyone about it because by law, according to that 2017 national intelligence law, they have to do it. That's our concern. Maybe you haven't done it yet, but my point is that you might have to, and that's where our concerns come from. I mean, over 300 TikTok employees have worked for China's state run propaganda media. That's just from looking at their LinkedIn profiles. Okay, so here, and, and my last point is this. I wanna say this to all the teenagers out there and then TikTok influencers who think we're just old and outta touch and don't know what we're talking about, trying to take away your favorite app.

You may not care that your data's being accessed now, but it will be one day when you do care about it. And here's the real problem with data comes power. They can choose what you see and how you see it. They can make you believe things that are not true. They can encourage you to engage in behavior that will destroy your life, even if it is not happening yet, it could in the future. The long-term goal of the Chinese Communist Party is the demise of the American power. And that starts with our youth. At any moment, they could demand that all of talk's data be used to design an AI algorithm with the sole purpose of promoting Chinese interests and destroying our society from within. You wanna know why that's Democrat? Why that's do I, Democrats and Republicans have come together on this. That's why we are so concerned. Thank you. And I yield back,

Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers:

Gentlemen yields back. I remind the members they have 10 business days to submit questions for the record. And I ask our witness to respond to the questions promptly pursuant to committee rules. I ask unanimous consent, enter the documents from the staff list and to the record without objection. So ordered members should submit their questions by the close of business on April 6th. Without objection, the committee is adjourned.