Instagram Banned—Türkiye’s Latest Internet Restriction

In my late May article in Tech Policy Press analyzing a landmark freedom of speech victory in Türkiye, I emphasized that despite this victory, significant issues remain unchallenged within the internet regulatory framework. Although the Constitutional Court declared Article 9 of the Internet Law (No 5651) unconstitutional—an article that previously allowed arbitrary access-blocking and content removal by criminal judges to prevent personal rights violations—the Court has not addressed the structural problems or the constitutionality of Articles 8 and 8/A of the Internet Law.

Without such comprehensive judicial scrutiny, Türkiye has recently seen another nationwide access-blocking order issued by the Information and Communications Technologies Authority (ICTA), this time targeting Instagram. On August 2, 2024, Instagram was blocked in Türkiye with no clear explanation from the ICTA. This block affects 57.1 million Turkish users, Instagram’s fifth-largest user base globally, and severely disrupts the operations of small businesses that rely heavily on the platform.

Later, the Minister of Transport and Infrastructure, Abdulkadir Uraloğlu, stated that Instagram had ignored "sensitivities" and violated certain "catalog crimes" under Article 8 of the Internet Law. However, he did not specify which crimes the platform was accused of violating. Media reports, however, suggest that the block was related to Instagram’s content moderation policies regarding the Israel-Hamas war, using catalog crimes as a pretext. This can also be extracted from the remarks of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Head of the Directorate of Communications, Fahrettin Altun.

Catalog crimes and enforcement practices

Under Article 8 of the Internet Law, an access-blocking or content removal decision can be issued if there are sufficient grounds for suspicion that the content constitutes any of the listed crimes, known as catalog crimes, such as incitement to suicide, sexual exploitation of children, obscenity, and crimes committed against Ataturk. The article grants enforcement capabilities to two authorities: judicial authorities and the ICTA.

Judicial authorities can issue content removal and/or access-blocking orders as a precautionary measure during investigation or prosecution stages if a delay would pose a risk. On the other hand, the ICTA can issue such orders as an administrative measure. Importantly, in early 2024, the Constitutional Court declared the ICTA’s authority to order content removals unconstitutional because such administrative measure violates the presumption of innocence in the absence of a final court decision about the alleged crime. Yet, the ICTA retains the authority to issue access-blocking orders for catalog crimes. According to the EngelliWeb project, in 2022 alone, the ICTA issued most access-blocking decisions under Article 8, involving 109,037 domain names—79% of the total.

Despite the Constitutional Court’s limitation, the ICTA’s broad authority remains largely unchanged in practice because Article 8/A of the Internet Law still allows the entity to issue both content removal and access-blocking orders if a delay would entail risk to life or property, national security, public order, public health, or the prevention of crimes. This article became well-known when Wikipedia was blocked in Türkiye for two and a half years on the grounds of maintaining national security and public order. More recently, a similar action was taken against the storytelling platform Wattpad.

Insights from Instagram’s Transparency Report and Jurisprudence

It is currently unclear which specific catalog crimes Instagram is alleged to have violated in Türkiye or whether these laws are being used to pressure the platform to align with government policies. Notably, Instagram parent company Meta released its Türkiye Transparency Report for content removal requests from January to June 2024 just two days before the access-blocking decision was made. The report reveals that Instagram received 1,849 removal requests from the ICTA out of a total of 2,953 requests under Articles 8 and 8/A of the Internet Law. These requests targeted 2,580 pieces of content. Instagram responded by removing 504 pieces for policy violations and restricting 1,941 pieces in Türkiye based on local law (2,445 in total). In other words, Instagram has demonstrated strong compliance with the removal requests from authorities, addressing 94% of the content (2,445 out of 2,580) mentioned in these requests by effectively removing or restricting them.

Given this high level of compliance and the lack of clear communication from the ICTA, it is unconvincing to conclude that Instagram is in violation of catalog crimes, as some authorities have suggested. Furthermore, Article 8(17) of the Internet Law specifies that blocking access to an entire website should be a last resort, to be used after attempts to block specific content have failed. This principle is also supported by several court rulings. For instance, in the Keskin Kalem Yayincilik ve Ticaret A.S. case, the Constitutional Court emphasized that blocking access to online media should be an exceptional measure, used only when less intrusive methods have proven ineffective. Similarly, in the case concerning a nationwide ban on Wikipedia, the Constitutional Court found that a complete block of the Wikipedia website was a disproportionate infringement on freedom of expression. Additionally, in the Birgun Iletisim ve Yayincilik A.S. case, the Court warned that access-blocking measures can easily become tools of censorship, and therefore, the government's discretion in such cases should be strictly limited.

Conclusion

The Turkish government has a history of using legal measures to pressure social media platforms into complying with its policies and to suppress dissenting voices. This often includes imposing access restrictions under the pretense of legal compliance. Given this context and the lack of clear communication from the ICTA, it is understandable why some have suggested that access-blocking of Instagram may not have been solely due to alleged violations of catalog crimes. This situation highlights why it would be useful for services like Instagram to clarify, when possible, the underlying reasons for such access-blocking decisions and not refrain from seeking recourse mechanisms when necessary. Otherwise, without this transparency or legal challenge, there is always a risk of ongoing arbitrary interference within this regulatory framework.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed are solely the author’s, do not reflect or express the views or opinions of his employer or affiliates, and should not be considered as legal advice.