India’s Information Politics In A Geopolitical Conflict

This is an analysis of India’s ongoing practices of information politics and an interrogation of how they may have fared when deployed during a geopolitical conflict from a domestic lens. It is not a commentary on its military strategy, and does not analyze the actions of external actors.

In early May, India and Pakistan were embroiled in a 'four-day conflict' in the aftermath of a terrorist attack in Kashmir’s Pahalgam that took place on April 26. During this conflict, those closely observing India’s actions in the public sphere in a domestic context noticed familiar attempts at information suppression and narrative projection being reused in a geopolitical context. Such practices, as has sometimes been the case earlier, were accompanied with the justification that exceptional circumstances warranted such responses.

In earlier pieces for Tech Policy Press, I described the problematic regulatory landscape, and illustrated with recent examples the ways in which India's executive branch applies rules and laws selectively alongside extra-legal and informal methods to the detriment of free expression. In very broad terms, India’s information politics can be placed into two categories: information suppression and narrative projection. Note that there isn’t a formally articulated doctrine to this effect and the categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as the same set of actions can have the effect of doing both.

Before describing aspects of India’s information politics, some relevant aspects of a globally connected information environment are worth describing. These are observability, interpretability and reputational debt. Events once documented, opinions once recorded, stories once published, and so on, are observable by anyone watching. Plus, there is limited control that the observed party can exercise over how these are interpreted. In the current global environment, the bandwidth of external observers may be limited. But, since a substantial portion of these events/opinions, etc. remain documented in some form (with varying degrees of fidelity) they remain observable even at a later date. In this scenario, the observed party has even lesser control over interpretability. A reputational debt, meanwhile, can be said to occur when the sum total of impressions drawn as a result of observability and interpretability is negative. I also hypothesize that reputational debt is sticky / inelastic, in that it will not change rapidly during the course of an outlier event like a geopolitical conflict. In other words, inward-facing information politics, which are generally downstream of broader domestic politics, are observed and interpreted around the world.

Information suppression and narrative projection

A large part of information suppression on the internet is state-driven, with union, state governments and local administrations all playing a part. Reports and information gathered by SFLC.in (Software Freedom Law Centre, India), Access Now, Internet Freedom Foundation and Human Rights Watch show that India routinely relies on internet restrictions for reasons ranging from preventing cheating in public examinations to preempting ‘law and order’ disturbances. While many of them are limited in temporal and geographical scope, regions like Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Manipur have been subjected to state-wide, long-term restrictions. The World Economic Forum has described internet restrictions/shutdowns as a form of collective punishment. Website/app blocking and account restrictions are also frequently used to suppress information. As per responses in India's Parliament, between 2018 and 2024, over 47,000 URLs were blocked under the relevant sections of the IT ACT. It is likely that most of these restrictions were not for political purposes, however, the absence of transparency and disclosures by the executive branch, coupled with confidentiality clauses that prevent internet intermediaries from disclosing the reasons for blocking makes this mechanism ripe for exploitation as a means to curb speech and dissent. Disclosures through press releases are made when there appears to be a political dividend on offer, such as blocking apps (including TikTok) from China, or restricting YouTube channels from Pakistan representing a transparency of convenience rather than genuine transparency.

X, formerly Twitter, has pushed back against arbitrary blocking to some extent, though the Indian government remains satisfied with the nature of compliance across platforms in general. Affected parties, as in the case of a satirical website called Dowry Calculator, have had to wage multi-year legal battles to even see the reasons for their websites/URLs being blocked, and even then unblocking remains rare. The website of India Hate Lab, which documents incidents of hate speech, has been blocked since early 2024, while little action has been pursued against individuals alleged to have made these speeches. Reports of individuals being threatened, detained, prosecuted and arrested for speech on social media on the grounds that they have said something that is offensive, obscene, critical of political figures, or can cause ‘enmity between groups’ are not uncommon (the author sporadically tracks such instances). For example, Mohammed Zubair, co-founder of AltNews, is being prosecuted for documenting an alleged hate speech, with a court refusing to halt proceedings in the case against him. Systematic right to information (RTI) requests by the Internet Freedom Foundation also show that throughout the country, law enforcement agencies are running their own fact-check units, often without adequate safeguards, clearly established procedures, or independent oversight, which creates potential for bias and misuse.

Narrative projection is driven more by diffuse actors and surrogate operators, some of whom may align themselves with political forces for ideological or monetary reasons, even as political actors and parties invest heavily and claim dominance and expertise. Often there are cross-platform networks of coordinated activities, while detailed and comprehensive studies are rare, a series in The Guardian in 2021 alluded to the mercenary nature of such networks suggesting this is largely a non-partisan phenomenon. On multiple occasions even celebrities have posted similar messages aligned with the union executive’s position. The diffused nature makes direct attribution difficult even if it is possible to establish ‘closeness’ between such actors and political figures based on social media interactions, presence at ministry offices, and so on. In some instances, documents containing sample tweets have been discovered or inadvertently posted publicly. In one case, such a document was modified to convey a different narrative, which appeared to have been posted mechanically. Such activity is not limited to positive messaging about the government and political actors. Television broadcast media’s histrionics also contribute to the general state of dysfunction as they relentlessly focus their programming on targeting/questioning opposition/dissenting/minority voices and platform/amplify jingoistic positions/viewpoints.

It should also not be presumed that most narrative projection is inorganic or coordinated, nor that its effects are limited to the information domain. It often involves targeting individuals and communities along religious, caste, and gendered lines using fear and dangerous speech. Islamophobia is a prominent trend domestically but even extends to events around the world (example) with one study attributing a large percentage of geolocated tweets to accounts from India. Misogyny is common, too, and women are attacked or questioned just for expressing themselves or merely existing, particularly when there is any discourse related to alimony or protection from marital rape. Attempts to question or hold power to account are met with a barrage of trolling and abuse. Brands are attacked for perceived transgressions. Political parties (such as the BJP, presently the leading coalition administering the union government) have posted Islamophobic memes, animated videos, and campaign messages from their official party handles/accounts. Efforts that create incentives for people to contribute to a stream of ‘positive messaging’ are also taking shape.

Suppression and projection during the conflict

In the aftermath of the attack, some of these tactics were visible in internet discourse in India. Initially sporadic over India’s baseline, they peaked around May 8 and 9, to coincide with India’s military operations, codenamed “Operation Sindoor.” While there was gradual tapering off after the conflict paused around May 10, some effects still persist. Medianama has compiled a number of state-driven information suppression actions.

Government Advisories/Press Releases/Directions:

While the April 26 advisory directing media channels not to report on the movements of security forces is understable, many of the others listed amounted to censorship that could even be counterproductive. On April 28, Indian media reported that the Ministry of Home Affairs had recommended blocking 16 YouTube channels from Pakistan. Another advisory on May 8 addressed streaming platforms and intermediaries advising them to “discontinue… with immediate effect” streaming content originating from Pakistan “in the interest of national security.” Digital rights bodies termed such a notice unconstitutional especially as it sought blanket restrictions based on where the content originated from without considering proportionality. Notably, it also relied on problematic amendments to the IT Rules in 2022, which effectively threatened intermediaries with liability for not proactively removing certain kinds of content. Until this amendment, they were only required to inform users not to publish these categories. It was also unclear whether it was possible for user generated content platforms to effectively do this. When critiqued, commentators drew parallels with the European Union’s sweeping restrictions against Russia-based news and information sources following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

A particularly egregious case was the blocking of TheWire’s website for reporting a story originally published in CNN that cited a source in the French Defense Ministry about the possibility of one or more Rafale fighter jets being lost in combat. In circumstances that echoed Vikatan’s case, the entire website was blocked after orders were issued to ISPs. To complicate matters, these blocks were inconsistent across ISPs and in different parts of the country, leading many to accuse the website of making false claims. The Ministry of Information Broadcasting cited technical limitations when TheWire sought to determine why the website was blocked. It was also asked to appear before an Inter-Departmental Committee (IDC). The block was lifted after TheWire agreed to remove the story in order restore access to its website and following procedural lapses on the ministry’s part. Once again, by disregarding due process, the ministry was able to secure an indefinite restriction. No action appears to have been initiated against the original report on CNN.

Social Media Platforms:

Apart from public advisories/directions, India’s executive branch also sent content blocking requests to platforms like X (formerly Twitter), Instagram, and YouTube. Between April 28 and May 7 accounts belonging to journalists, celebrities, sports personalities, politicians, and government offices from Pakistan were restricted in India (see here). It wasn’t clear in these cases whether all the accounts had even commented on the conflict or not. On May 8, the day after India’s military response, X’s Global Government Affairs account posted that it had received orders to block over 8,000 accounts in India, with threats of fines, liability and imprisonment of local representatives (see here). After this post, the account was withheld for a day and then restored. Journalist Aditi Agrawal noted that, as per government sources, there was no order to restrict this account.

The list was not restricted to accounts from Pakistan, and also included “international news organizations and prominent X users.” It was all too common to read a conversation about the conflict and find that a number of posts were restricted in India. Instagram and YouTube haven’t publicly indicated how many takedown orders they received, nor if and how they complied with the May 8 notification. This censorious approach was counterproductive since it meant people in India were working with an information deficit – a major disadvantage in the 21st century conflict settings where narrative contestation is expected. The Indian government’s decision to block TikTok after the Galwan clashes in June 2020 also meant that its narrative presence was not significant during this conflict.

Not enough is known about how global platforms make decisions during geopolitical conflicts. Accounts belonging to India-based digital publications like Maktoob Media, 4 PM News were restricted on X and YouTube respectively. The X account of Outlook India was blocked and unblocked on the same day. Even individual accounts of journalists like Anuradha Bhasin (editor of Kashmir Times) and some critical political content creators were not accessible in India for some period. BBC Urdu also had its account withheld, while Turkish and Chinese state media their X accounts were briefly restricted after the pause on 12 May. It isn’t clear what the specific basis for these restrictions were. The rapid nature of these actions (and, in some cases, reversals), especially on X, also raises questions about whether additional processes/avenues were created to facilitate restrictions at scale. If so, platforms must disclose these publicly as they are unlikely to be covered by any confidentiality clauses. Indian Express reported that the government reused a setup for election-related content monitoring, and received additional personnel for it. What is unknown is why the executive branch is performing a role that a constitutional body should, and on what basis additional personnel were recruited or what their credentials were.

Law Enforcement Actions:

Law enforcement agencies across the country have filed cases/investigations against individuals since April 28. A sedition-like clause (in May 2022 the Supreme Court had placed the sedition clause in abeyance, but new criminal codes enacted in 2024 introduced a clause that could play a similar role) in India’s new criminal codes have been invoked against a singer, a satirist, a college professor, and a student, just to name a few. The reasons varied from praising Pakistan, to critiquing political figures and the framing of the military operation’s name. Reports in the media also suggest multiple arrests and instances of prosecution have taken place in Gujarat (12), Assam (81), Uttar Pradesh (30), Bengal, and Maharashtra. There are likely to be more cases in these and other states beyond those that have received press coverage (look for the tag “2025 India Pakistan Conflict”).

The case of the college professor is notable. Prof. Ali Khan Mamhudabad, through two posts on Facebook, was supportive of the military response while questioning all-out war, called for restraint and the rejection of hate-fuelled politics. He was summoned by the state of Haryana’s Commission for Women for “disparagement of women in uniform, misrepresentation of facts through terms like “genocide” and “dehumanisation,” vilification of military actions, potential incitement of communal unrest, violation of women’s dignity under the Constitution and Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and breach of University Grants Commission (UGC) ethical conduct regulations,” and subsequently arrested based on multiple police complaints including one filed by the commission. During his bail hearing, the Supreme Court took a rather troubling position on his posts and refused to suspend the actions against him, imposing conditions which effectively silenced him while ordering him to cooperate with the investigation. The court implied his words had a “double meaning” and directed Haryana state’s police to constitute a team to investigate. And in a subsequent hearing, the court refused to relax restrictions on him. Even though he was granted bail, the court’s position appears to set back both the professor and the broader landscape for expression in the country.

Non-state narrative projection:

Organic and inorganic narrative projection continued throughout this period as well. The spouse of a deceased victim (who was a navy officer) was trolled for saying she did not want the terror attack to be used as a reason to target muslims and people from Kashmir. So was another survivor who said that she considered those who helped her escape as ‘brothers.’ Individuals suggesting or reporting about the possibility of aircraft being lost were abused and threatened, as were Vikram Misri, India’s foreign secretary, and his family (particularly his daughter) after he communicated that military operations had paused. India’s TV broadcast media put out a litany of falsehoods including absurd claims of territorial gains in different parts of Pakistan, and commentary on the internet later justified it as being a part of “information warfare.” In her column for TheWire, Sarayu Pani astutely notes the impact of trolling and abuse on public discourse turning it “insecure and aggressive ” and the need to look at its global impact.

India’s current brand of information politics doesn’t serve it well during peace-time, and due to poor observability and interpretability are a liability during a conflict, too, incurring a high degree of reputational debt for the country in all cases. Optics, however, should not be the primary reason for eschewing suppression and threats of intimidation as tools of information politics, which itself emerges from broader political incentives and attitudes. They must be set aside, because they are objectively bad instruments of administration.