Do Proposed Measures in UK’s Mobile Ecosystems Investigation Challenge Market Power?

Megan Kirkwood is a fellow at Tech Policy Press.

The UK’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has released its provisional findings that both Google and Apple should be designated under its new law, the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act (DMCCA). This would designate both companies' mobile platforms as having ‘Strategic Market Status,’ a designation reserved for the largest and most consequential firms operating ‘digital activities’ in the UK, and would impose rules on both the Android and iOS mobile operating systems, their respective native app distribution channels, mobile browsers and browser engines. This is the second of the two current designation investigations under the DMCCA, the first investigating Google search and search advertising.

The reaction to the CMA’s proposed measures was mixed. Epic Games, maker of the gaming app Fortnite, released a statement calling the proposed remedies a “missed opportunity to introduce competition into a currently-monopolized market.” Tom Smith, competition lawyer and a former CMA director, said to The Guardian that the CMA is “ducking issues that would really threaten the entrenched positions of Apple and Google, and which might therefore draw political heat.” Meanwhile, groups like Mozilla and Open Web Advocacy have released statements supporting the aims of the DMCCA and encouraging the CMA to enforce the law in a timely and effective manner, warning that the UK government should not undermine its enforcement.

The CMA has said that its initial remedies will “prioritize measures which complement international action”, pointing to the European Digital Markets Act (DMA), Brazil’s ruling against Apple, Japan’s Mobile Software Competition Act, and litigation in the US such as the rulings in Epic Games Inc vs Apple Inc and Epic Games Inc vs Google LLC. However, much of the disappointment expressed by stakeholders like Epic Games is that the UK’s remedies stop short of some of the obligations that Apple and Google face internationally, such as the obligation to allow third-party app stores. In part, it appears the CMA is waiting to see how enforcements in other jurisdictions pan out before duplicating those obligations.

Meanwhile, more ambitious remedies have been explicitly deprioritized, such as investigating Apple’s App Tracking Transparency privacy policy, despite the acknowledgement by the CMA that such a policy only prevents third-party apps from cross-app tracking and does not apply such restrictions to its own first-party apps. This has the effect of developers increasingly relying on Apple for monetization, ceding control to Apple to dictate the economic model of apps dependent on its platform.

On one hand, it is reasonable for the CMA to use a tiered approach, implementing remedies incrementally and perhaps leaving more onerous remedies as a potential future threat. On the other hand, given the recent Strategic Steer and pro-growth, pro-investment push by the UK government, and its willingness to compromise the CMA’s independence, this could be a signal that the regime is in danger of being watered down. The two roadmaps for this investigation illustrate that the CMA may be taking a cautious approach to addressing Apple and Google’s market power.

What are the proposed remedies?

In Google's and Apple’s roadmaps, the CMA has laid out category 1 measures, which are the remedies that would be immediately prioritized if the CMA concludes that they have Strategic Market Status and will be designated under the law. These include:

• Requiring that Apple and Google review apps to be distributed in the Apple App Store or Google Play Store in a fair, objective and transparent manner, providing explanations for delays or rejections, as well as ensuring that they give fair warning when materially changing app review processes or guidelines.
• Requiring that Apple and Google rank apps in a fair, objective and transparent manner, providing transparency over their ranking methodology.
• Requiring that Apple and Google not use data collected to review apps unfairly, such as for their own app development purposes.
• Requiring that Apple allow app developers to direct their potential customers off the App Store (steering).
• Requiring Apple to fairly and objectively consider requests from third parties for interoperable access to functionality in its operating systems. The CMA highlights functionalities like seamless Bluetooth detection, high-speed connectivity and file sharing, voice assistants and AirPods, interacting with notifications on a wearable, AirPlay casting and receiving, wearable ecosystem APIs, and “Find My” functionality.

The remedies have a significant basis in the CMA’s 2022 mobile markets study, which was a comprehensive analysis of both Apple and Google’s mobile ecosystems, a longstanding duopoly in the UK, and pinpointed areas that are likely reducing competition and what effective remedies could be sought. Explicitly, the study predicts that Apple and Google will meet criteria for Strategic Market Status and that interventions listed in the study should be implemented under the DMCCA.

For example, the study highlighted the opacity of app store search ranking metrics, as well as concerns that app development teams and app review teams were not being sufficiently separated, leading to app copying or “Sherlocking.” The market study also recommended that Apple and Google be required to maintain a fair and transparent app review process and allow third parties more access to operating system functionalities. Looking at the proposed first remedies, it appears these recommendations have been taken on board.

Remedies highlighted under category 2 interventions, which are remedies that could be implemented in the first half of 2026, include more of the study’s recommendations, such as requiring Apple to offer access to its Near Field Communication (NFC) functionality (tap to pay) on more equitable terms and interoperability with third-party connected devices, as well as the ability to set new defaults for specific functionalities like digital wallets, browsers and app stores.

What are the policy objectives?

There remain some differences between the original market study and the current proposed remedies. The market study states that “high-level objectives” should involve “addressing the sources of Apple’s and Google’s market power, by opening up the core markets in the mobile ecosystem to greater competition.” Therefore, it includes a wide range of recommendations, like ensuring that Apple cannot self-preference its own ad networks through its App Tracking Transparency policy, ensuring that commission fees charged by Apple and Google for in-app transactions are set at a fair level and requiring improved data transfer and switching APIs to enable users to more easily switch between iOS and Android ecosystems. Yet, these recommendations are either not addressed or have been deprioritized.

The reason for this appears to be a shift in objectives. For example, when explaining why improved data transfer and operating system switching have been removed as an enforcement priority, the CMA writes that such an intervention is “less likely to directly contribute to delivering our overarching goal of unlocking innovation for app developers.” Preference is given here to creating a fairer market at the edges of the platforms rather than interventions that reduce the market power of designated firms. However, both the original mobile market study and an early impact assessment of the DMCCA stated that the CMA should target the “underlying sources of this market power.”

Do the proposed remedies target Apple and Google’s market power?

Taking a step back, how far do these proposed remedies go in correcting the concentration of market power? The CMA recognizes the role of defaults and integrations in tipping the market; for example, the CMA proposes to investigate how Google’s Gemini integration into Android may obscure the market in Google’s favor. There is recognition that the control that Apple and Google maintain over their ecosystems also means they control access conditions, which the CMA plans to improve in specific cases, such as operating system functionalities, mobile wallets and connected devices. The CMA is also intervening in anti-steering practices to ensure that developers have a way to bypass Google and Apple-controlled payment and subscription methods, though they may still incur fees. The CMA is also considering whether to investigate Progressive Web Apps and if intervention is needed to help enable them as a more viable option for developers to bypass the app store entirely, depending on developer demand.

On the whole, the CMA’s proposed remedies will seek to improve competition on the edges, though largely leave Google and Apple able to set and control the conditions that third parties will aim to compete on. Access to these platforms will not be unconditionally opened up. Instead, the CMA will attempt to make the conditions more transparent for those applying for access. While transparency is welcome, this still leaves all the control in gatekeeper hands.

That said, it is commendable that the CMA will seek to prevent Apple and Google from using app developers’ non-public information for their own first-party app development, which is a significant source of information advantage. However, I have previously written that Apple maintains information and ecosystem advantages through its vast governing structures, collecting app download data, in-app purchase data, app review data, including app notarization, app advertising data, including attribution and App Store Ads, and policies like Apple’s Developer License Agreement, which gives Apple unrestricted access to developer information.

Whether the CMA will implement a structural separation to take into account the array of information and ecosystem advantages listed here, or if it will simply concentrate on app review data specifically, remains to be seen. If the CMA aims not to take apart the very sources of information and ecosystem advantages that fuel the market power of Strategic Market Status firms, but prefers instead to encourage competition only at the edges of the platforms, it is unlikely such structural remedies will be pursued. Nonetheless, the DMCCA is designed to be flexible and could still see more structural remedies in future proposed conduct requirements or pro-competition interventions, but it will depend on what the goals of the DMCCA are and how far the CMA is willing to go in tackling massive concentration of power in the digital economy.