Digital Competition and Data Security Are Critical Complements, Not Rivals
Eric Null, George Slover / Nov 16, 2026
Photo by Dan Dennis on Unsplash
More competition in the concentrated market for digital platforms would benefit the consumers and businesses that use them. Operationally, this means opening up platform services like social media, app stores, and messaging so third parties take advantage of network effects which make it easier to reach a wider audience or customer base. Jurisdictions including the EU, Japan, and the United States have passed or seriously considered new competition laws with this goal in mind.
The interplay between competition and privacy needs careful attention. Competition can strengthen incentives for platforms to improve privacy, but requiring platforms to interoperate and share data with third parties can also create serious privacy issues. Which types of data should be shared with third parties? What if the platform encrypts data but third parties don’t?
These are answerable questions. Legislation, and its implementation, need not undermine privacy in the quest for competition.
Tech competition laws are increasingly common throughout the world. The EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) has become a model, imposing various requirements on large platforms. Japan’s Mobile Software Competition Act (MSCA) imposes similar requirements on mobile operating systems.
In the US, Congress has considered the American Innovation and Choice Online Act (AICOA), and California considered its Blocking Anticompetitive Self-Preferencing by Entrenched Dominant Platforms (BASED) Act. Both bills generally prohibit large platforms from self-preferencing, one aspect of which requires platforms to share data and interoperate. The EU’s DMA and Japan’s MSCA impose similar requirements.
Mandating interoperability should take into account the different ways that various services offered by large platforms use and protect data.
For example, mandating interoperability for end-to-end encrypted applications (where message content is readable only by the sender and recipient) like iMessage and WhatsApp should be done with care. Interoperability with third-party messaging applications that provide secure end-to-end encryption promotes competition, but it is important to ensure that encryption is never broken. Any break makes the message potentially readable by anyone — including a government, potentially for warrantless mass surveillance.
Additionally, browser engines require a particular kind of access to a platform to interoperate most effectively. This access should be provided in a way that ensures it does not compromise security on the platform or the device on which it is running. This continues to be a focus in implementing the DMA.
Further, large platforms may protect data in ways third parties don’t; a third party accessing data through interoperability may use, share, or sell data extensively. Encrypted messages cannot be accessed and used for targeted ads, but mandated third-party interoperability, without effective protections, could enable such use. For example, a platform that encrypts user data, like message notifications or location, may be prevented by the DMA from requiring third parties to encrypt, allowing those third parties to use the data for other purposes, like advertising.
Importantly, a large platform should not misuse professed concern for security or user privacy as pretext for refusing access or data sharing that is safe, pro-consumer, and pro-competition. Users should have options; they should be able to avoid being beholden to a single large, dominant company. Interoperability is a key way to foster those options.
Legislation should accomplish both: require platforms to interoperate to the fullest extent possible without hindering a platform’s ability to protect legitimate user privacy and security interests.
Tech competition legislation has taken various approaches to privacy. Japan’s may be the most effective. A large mobile operating system may refuse to interoperate or share data with third parties to prevent criminal conduct and cybersecurity threats. The Japan Fair Trade Commission evaluates refusals case by case. This approach — if there’s a rigorous, technical, and fair regulator — enables a platform to assert specific serious risks, and the regulator can determine if the risk and safeguard are well-founded.
In the US, the AICOA would give a platform an “affirmative defense,” currently subject to a higher burden of proof, that its refusal to interoperate or share data was necessary to protect user privacy or security. Because the platform may incur substantial litigation costs before it has an opportunity to establish that the refusal is justified, this approach may deter legitimate privacy protections.
Platform actions required by privacy law do not violate competition law. However, privacy actions not required by privacy law could implicate competition law. In France, Germany, and other EU jurisdictions, regulators concluded that Apple’s required user consent prompt for apps on the iPhone to share data with third parties violated competition law because Apple did not impose the consent prompt on itself — noting that the prompt was not required by GDPR. (Apple does not engage in data sharing with third parties, so Apple has claimed the prompt does not apply to it; nonetheless, Apple released a new version of App Tracking Transparency in the EU.)
Competition and privacy are inextricably intertwined, as access to data can provide a key competitive advantage. Tech competition laws should take privacy concerns into account, as legitimate privacy issues exist with mandating sharing of data and interoperability of services. But powerful platforms also should not be permitted to use privacy as pretext for anticompetitive behavior. Addressing both of these issues can lead to the best of both worlds: increased competition and stronger privacy protections.
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