Assessing the Trump Administration's About-Face on International Tech Policy
Mark Scott / Apr 30, 2025Mark Scott is a contributing editor at Tech Policy Press.

President Donald Trump holds a cabinet meeting, Wednesday, February 26, 2025, in the Cabinet Room. Secretary of State Marco Rubio is at his side. (Official White House Photo by Molly Riley) Wikimedia
When it comes to President Donald Trump’s agenda, international tech policy does not rank high on the list of priorities.
But in the 100 days since his new administration has taken over the White House, the United States has fundamentally pulled back from global alliances around digital mainstays like internet governance, artificial intelligence standards, and semiconductor supply chains.
That has left Washington’s global partners scratching their heads about how to engage with the new Trump administration. It has also increasingly isolated US officials in promoting their tech policy agenda from Berlin to Tokyo to Brasilia.
The about-face on international tech policy marks a departure from how Washington, for decades, led the democratic world in promoting fundamental rights online and in pushing back against authoritarian regimes’ attempts to manhandle the future of the internet.
It has put long-standing allies on the back foot and potentially undermined so-called “open internet” principles — including the ability for all content to be treated equally online — that were fundamental in allowing one-time Silicon Valley minnows to become global tech giants.
No one expected the returning Trump administration to embrace European-style tech regulation. Previous Democratic and Republican Party administrations have all bristled at global efforts to corral the tech industry — a sector that Washington viewed, legitimately, as a core US export.
But the abrupt shift in longstanding bipartisan efforts around digital governance represents a significant change in America’s wider policymaking objectives that few, if anyone, had anticipated before Trump regained the White House on January 20.
Few domestically are aware of how much US officials lead the way on technical negotiations around global data flows, governance standards for AI, and thorny horse-trading about future internet governance protocols. Washington has the technical, financial, and diplomatic resources and expertise that no other democracy worldwide can bring to bear on the global stage.
These efforts — often advanced in lengthy discussions deep within United Nations agencies and other international organizations — had pitted US-led proposals to keep the internet free from government oversight against Russia and China-backed attempts to impose greater state control on everything from social media to cybersecurity.
In the first 100 days of the new Trump administration, that status quo has been rewritten.
Gone is the decades-old orthodoxy that Washington is first among democratic equals in promoting open-source cybersecurity standards, technical work around interoperable artificial intelligence norms, and the myriad of other geeky international digital policy topics that remain incomprehensible to most of the public.
In its place is a more transactional doctrine that prioritizes US short-term interests, above all, and a willingness to strong-arm allies — via tariffs and other blunt policy instruments — to favor America’s tech industry.
To be clear, the Trump administration was not the first White House to lean on its global partners on digital policy.
In 2023, President Joe Biden’s officials also cajoled their counterparts in the Netherlands and Japan to impose export restrictions on high-end semiconductor equipment from reaching China over national security concerns. It was an extension of anti-Beijing tech policies that had been in place since Trump’s first term in office.
But the new era in Washington has taken that strategy to the next level.
It was encapsulated in the White House’s executive order, published days after Trump’s inauguration, that clearly stated the new administration’s goal of expanding “America’s global AI dominance.” That contrasted with Washington’s central role in creating global AI standards under previous White House administrations, including Trump’s first term.
It was on show when JD Vance, the US vice president, told an audience at the AI Action Summit in Paris a month later that “this administration will ensure that American AI technology continues to be the gold standard worldwide.” He added Washington was willing to partner with other countries in the development of the emerging technology — though via the prism of other countries relying on, not working with, US technology.
And it was continued as US officials recently pulled back from global collaboration on internet governance negotiations in Geneva to prioritize America’s singular national interests and sovereignty. That represented a fundamental break in Washington’s role in building alliances between industry, countries, and civil society groups to promote a free and interoperable internet.
It’s understandable that any government — especially one like that of Trump, which has so publicly made its guiding star “Make America Great Again” — will place its own interest over those of other countries. All leaders, inevitably, must explain to domestic audiences how they are improving people’s lives.
But the abrupt change in Washington’s approach to global tech policy is likely to harm the US’s long-term interests.
By forgoing their leadership position, US officials have opened the door to their Chinese counterparts — with their well-resourced strategy of promoting authoritarian principles in the digital age — to step into this vacuum.
Beijing had already made progress in wooing Global Majority countries ahead of the signing of the UN’s Global Digital Compact, or voluntary international commitments designed to make digital advances open to all, in late 2024. China co-wrote recommendations for that document with the so-called G77 Group of developing economies.
The world’s second-largest economy has also spent years providing state-backed loans to countries worldwide willing to build their telecommunications networks around Chinese giants like Huawei and ZTE. Until recently, US officials were central in the West’s pushback against those practices.
With Washington pulling back, Beijing is almost certainly to double down on its emerging leadership on global tech policy.
That geopolitical changing-of-the-guard is not unique to international digital discussions. But given the Trump administration’s stated agenda to secure American “dominance” in future technologies for domestic economic gain, it poses an existential risk to the US president’s MAGA agenda.
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